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Chapter 1: The problem 
Recently, more and more national legislatures have been producing rules that 
qualify as being within the private international law concept of overriding 
mandatory rules. Accordingly, international arbitrations, which operate in the 
realm of private international law, have increasingly had to deal with such 
rules. The (topical) international arbitration of disputes related to financial 
transactions is particularly susceptible to this tendency, since financial trans-
actions are often regulated through this type of rule. 
Swiss international arbitration seems not to be prepared for dealing with over-
riding mandatory rules. It treats them controversially, leaving many basic is-
sues open. Is a Swiss international arbitrator allowed to give effect to overrid-
ing mandatory rules? If yes, is he or she also obliged to do so? Where such an 
obligation is affirmed, should it be complied with ex officio (sua sponte) or 
upon invocation by a party? Whilst it is felt that for Swiss international arbi-
trators a full disregard of overriding mandatory rules is nowadays not an option 
as well as that these adjudicators show more willingness to apply such rules 
and that they are empowered to do so1, there is no firm legislative or jurispru-
dential basis for this yet. At the same time, clarity is paramount to Switzerland, 
since the latter is a popular choice as a seat of international arbitrations2. Lu-
cidity over the addressing of financial overriding mandatory rules in particular 
is even more important given that, in addition to its role as an international 
arbitration centre, Switzerland represents a financial hub. Against the back-
ground of this combination, the country is likely to be hosting quite a number 
of the potentially upcoming international arbitrations on financial 
–––––––––––––– 
1 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.95 and the references there; SCHNYDER, Anwendung 
ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 314; SCHNYDER, 
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 340 and the references there; VOSER, Mandatory rules, 330. 
2 Pursuant to statistics of ICC, Switzerland is the most popular country for international 
arbitration proceedings conducted under the arbitration rules of that institution – see HON-
EGGER/EISELE/LIVSCHITZ. Among the reasons for this positive development are legislation 
which is friendly towards international arbitration and the large court practice in the area. 
1 
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transactions3. In fact, creation of legal certainty in this respect might even at-
tract more of these international arbitrations to Switzerland.   
–––––––––––––– 




Chapter 2: The present work 
Using the example of financial overriding mandatory rules, this work explores 
the possibilities for defining the status in Swiss international arbitration of 
overriding mandatory rules through reliance on the current legislation. It con-
cludes on the shortcoming of these possibilities and proposes the enactment in 
Chapter 12 PILA of new rules which prescribe what effect overriding manda-
tory rules should «produce» within international arbitration. 
The text will first explain the characteristics of Swiss international arbitration 
and the situations in which the latter might involve financial overriding man-
datory rules. It will then sketch the process of determining the law applicable 
in Swiss international arbitration. Following this, the phenomenon of overrid-
ing mandatory rules, with some examples from the financial sphere, will be 
presented. The last (but not at all the least) part will analyse the core of the 
problem – the role of overriding mandatory rules, taking as an example finan-






Chapter 3: Terminological remarks 
Unless something else is specified, «commercial» will be understood as some-
thing that is done for profit. In this (wide) meaning, that term will encompass 
both «financial» and «non-financial» activities done for profit. This concept 
will have at least two important consequences for the present analysis. First, 
the latter will understand commercial arbitration as arbitration that deals with 
both: disputes of the non-financial (real economy) sector – disputes over non-
financial transactions; and disputes of the financial sector – disputes over fi-
nancial transactions and over transactions supporting financial transactions. 
Hence, commercial arbitration will include non-financial arbitration and finan-
cial arbitration or, in other words, financial arbitration will be a type of com-
mercial arbitration. That understanding is different than the concept encoun-
tered in the new literature on financial arbitration which perceives the latter as 
an alternative, rather than a type, of commercial arbitration. Apparently, this 
concept comprehends «commercial» more narrowly as equal to «originating 
from the real economy» i.e. as opposite to «financial». Because in the present 
work «commercial» will mean «done for profit», no contradiction will occur 
when literature on commercial arbitration is cited which dates from the time 
before financial arbitration became a hot topic – such literature will still be 
applicable as it will concern arbitration of which the new financial arbitration 
is a part. Second, a commercial contract will include both – a contract with a 
financial subject matter and a contract with a non-financial subject matter – so 
that a financial contract, as long as it is (like that one delved into here) done 
for profit, will represent a type of, not an alternative to, a commercial contract.   
«Conflict law», the system of conflict of laws rules, is, so to say, a meta law: 
it defines the applicability of other law. It is here believed that every law ne-
cessitates a conflict of laws rule (whether explicit or implicit)4. There are two 
types of conflict law: conflict law that regulates the applicability of a domestic 
law to a domestic case (domestic conflict law) and conflict law which governs 
–––––––––––––– 
4 Which conflict of laws rule would render such a conflict of laws rule applicable is another 
question, which is (fortunately) outside the scope of the current work. 
5 
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the applicability of a domestic or foreign law to an international case (interna-
tional conflict law). Relevant for the present topic is solely the international 
conflict law and, in fact, solely the part of it which addresses the applicability 
of a domestic or foreign law to an international private law case (as opposed 
to an international public law case); a part utilised in private international law, 
or private international conflict law. In the absence of a specification otherwise 
or unless the words of others are conveyed or cited, solely this private interna-
tional conflict law will be kept in mind when speaking here of «conflict law» 
respectively «conflict of laws rules».  
«Court», if not preceded by a word which indicates something else (such as 
the word «arbitration») will mean «state court».  
Strictly speaking, the substantive law of the forum can be called «domestic 
law» only when the forum is a state court but not if it is an arbitration court 
because the latter court is not so strongly related to the forum’s law as for such 
law to be called a «home» («domestic») law. However, in order to facilitate 
comparison between the relation of an arbitration court to the law of its seat 
and the relation of a state court to the law of its seat (a comparison which might 
be necessary here), the term «domestic law» will be used to signify also the 
law of the seat of an arbitration court.        
«Effect» of a (legal) rule respectively of a law will mean application or con-
sideration of such a (legal) rule respectively of such a law. 
«Financial dispute» will signify a dispute relating to a financial transaction in 
particular. It will not cover a dispute arising out of a non-financial transaction, 
even if the claims raised are financial, i.e. monetary. 
Unless something else is specified, «international arbitration» will here have 
the narrow sense of international commercial arbitration.                 
«Judge» will equal to «state judge», unless preceded by a word implying 
something else such as «private». 
The term «lex fori», which signifies the law of the country in which a forum 
is seated, will be used here in its widest meaning. On the one side, it will refer 
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other academic writings) solely to the law of a state court. Strictly speaking, a 
forum is a body which delivers a legally binding decision on a particular fac-
tual matter, and both forums – a state and an arbitration court – are such bodies; 
the fact that an arbitration court functions in a way different than a state court 
does not change that. Besides, the term which pretends to signify the law of an 
arbitration court in particular – «lex fori arbitri» – also contains the word 
«fori». Hence, «lex fori arbitri» should be understood as a type of «lex fori», 
the latter encompassing the law of a state court (which could, for example, be 
called «lex fori imperi») and the law of an arbitration court (the «lex fori ar-
bitri»). On the other side, «lex fori» will cover not only those rules of the law 
of the forum which are binding on the international arbitration but also those 
that are not, i.e. it will include the law of the forum in its entirety. No confine-
ment to the binding part of the law can be inferred from the expression «lex 
fori»: the latter speaks only of a «lex» without specifying a particular type of 
lex.  
The terms «private international law» and «international private law» are 
deemed to have the same meaning and will be used as such. 
«Private judge» will be a synonym of «arbitrator». 
«Private law person» shall include not only creatures of private law but also 
those of public law when they act as private law persons – e.g. states partici-
pating in commerce (acta iure gestionis)5. Vice versa, «public law person» 
shall include private law persons which exercise public law powers – e.g. stock 
exchanges deciding whether to admit securities to trade. 
 «Public law» in the English-inspired systems is administrative (or regulatory) 
law; law related to the powers and actions of governmental and public entities 
and to the remedies available in connection to such powers and actions. The 
concept of the civil (continental) legal system is broader – it comprises the law 
of subordinate relationships6 and thus not only administrative (or regulatory) 
–––––––––––––– 
5 – as opposed to them exercising their sovereign powers (acta iure imperii). 
6 – relationships in which one of the parties has the legal power to coerce the other party to 
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but also criminal law. The current thesis adopts this broader, civil law defini-
tion. 
«Transaction» can be understood in a wide sense as a system of contracts 
which are related to each other (though remaining separate contracts) and in a 
narrower sense as one contract. Here, the latter will be used. 
Where it is not specified to which legal act a provision, a section or a chapter 












Chapter 4: International arbitration  
I. International arbitration as a type of arbitration  
Arbitration is a consensual method of dispute resolution within which the de-
cision is rendered by a special body – an arbitration court – which does not 
adjudicate in the name of a state. A dispute is resolved in a legally binding 
manner (dispute resolution) and such legal bindingness is freely agreed on in 
advance – whether before or after the occurrence of the dispute – by the parties 
(consentaneity). Arbitration is an alternative to litigation. The latter is dispute 
resolution which is legally binding regardless of whether the parties have con-
sented to this legal bindingness of it or not (i.e. it is a non-consensual dispute 
resolution) and it takes place before a state court which adjudges in the name 
of a state7.     
1. Domestic arbitration 
Domestic is the arbitration which does not feature any international element.  
1.1 Domestic public law arbitration  
Domestic public law arbitration deals with disputes that evolve within one ju-
risdiction and concern public law relations (relations in which one of the par-
ties is subordinate to the other). This arbitration is a rarity because in domestic 
cases, where they have sovereign powers over the counterparty, public law 
parties (e.g. states or authorities representing them) prefer state courts and do 
–––––––––––––– 
7 In fact, the term «litigation» has also a wide meaning as dispute resolution in general, i.e. as 
dispute resolution delivered by both – state courts or arbitration tribunals. However, since 
this wide meaning of «litigation» does not seem to be very precise – strictly speaking «liti-
gation» is dispute resolution resting on rules of law, whereas in arbitration the dispute res-
olution can sometimes (where the parties have authorised the arbitral tribunal to decide ex 
aequo et bono) be based on the rules of another social system, e.g. on bonos mores – the 
narrow meaning of «litigation» will be used here, except where citing (when respective 
clarification will be provided). Furthermore, the narrow meaning of «litigation» is more 








not consent to arbitration8. One of the few examples is the SIX arbitration9 
(which will be discussed briefly below but which does not come within the 
scope of the current work).  
1.2 Domestic private law arbitration (domestic commercial arbitra-
tion) 
Domestic private law arbitration, or domestic commercial arbitration, is that 
domestic (under Swiss law, when both parties have their domicile or habitual 
residence in Switzerland at the time of the arbitration agreement’s conclusion 
– Art. Art. 353 (1) CPC in conjunction with Art. 176 (1) PILA) arbitration 
which addresses disputes between private law parties – parties that are equal 
to each other. This is the classical domestic arbitration. 
2. International arbitration in a wide sense 
International arbitration is that which includes some cross-border element. 
2.1 International public law arbitration 
International public law arbitration is the arbitration through which public law 
persons belonging to different jurisdictions settle disputes related to their pub-
lic law powers, such as where states arbitrate border disagreements. Since 
these persons are equal parties and since they, especially states, are politically 
reluctant to subject themselves to the court of a foreign jurisdiction, they (in 
fact, frequently) resort to arbitration. 
2.2 International arbitration (international arbitration in a narrow 
sense, international commercial arbitration) 
–––––––––––––– 
8 For instance, Rapport Final, 36, 37 confirms the reluctance of financial regulators (who have 
a relevant role for the overriding mandatory rules taken as an example here – financial 
overriding mandatory rules) to arbitrate. 
9 – on the premise (mentioned above) that private law persons with public law functions, such 
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International arbitration (international arbitration in a narrow sense, interna-
tional commercial arbitration, international private law arbitration) is that in-
ternational (under Swiss law, when at least one of the parties does not, upon 
concluding the arbitration agreement, have its domicile or habitual residence 
in Switzerland (Art. 176 (1) PILA)10) arbitration which serves for settling dis-
putes between private law persons.  
The present work will explore this type of international arbitration. References 
to «international arbitration», «international arbitration court», «international 
arbitrator», etc. should be understood as references respectively to it, to an 
arbitration court accomplishing it, to an international arbitrator adjudging in 
it, etc.; this is valid accordingly also for the plural forms of these terms.   
According to the method of organisation, international arbitration can be insti-
tutional or ad hoc. Institutional international arbitration is that which is admin-
istered by an arbitration institution. The latter receives the claim and the re-
sponse, takes deposits, arranges facilities for the hearings, etc11. Some 
prominent arbitration institutions include the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration In-
stitution, the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). 
Ad hoc international arbitration is not administered by an arbitral institution. 
It is more flexible, but, accordingly, requires more organisational steps by the 
parties. Depending on the sort of controversy being resolved, one can speak of 
–––––––––––––– 
10 The Swiss legislator does not seem to confer any relevance on the fact of whether, apart from 
the difference between the Swiss place of seat and the non-Swiss place of domicile or ha-
bitual residence of (at least) one of the parties, any other «internationality» is featured by 
the case. This follows from the language of Art. 176 (1) PILA as well as from the jurispru-
dence and literature – according to the latter in Art. 176 (1) PILA, the legislator did not care 
about the internationality of the substance of the case (but undertook a «formalistic» ap-
proach) – see DSC 4P.115/2003 of 16 October 2003, cons. 2.1 as referred to and translated 
by KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 2.28, 2.29. Hence, it is not necessary, for example, that 
the domicile or habitual residence of one of the parties is different from the domicile or 
habitual residence of the other party or that coinciding places of business of the parties 
differ from the place of the transaction’s performance; as long as this is not Switzerland, 
the dispute’s substance might even involve only one jurisdiction. 
11 The arbitral institution is a body different than the arbitral tribunal: it only administers 
the case, whilst the latter renders the decision (the arbitral award). 
27 
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international construction arbitration, international oil and gas arbitration, and 
(since quite recently) international financial arbitration, etc.                   
2.3 International investment arbitration (investment arbitration) 
International investment arbitration, or simply «investment arbitration» (an in-
vestment arbitration is by default international as it is conducted between par-
ties from different jurisdictions) handles the claim of a private law person 
against a state, whose nationality such a private law person does not hold, re-
lating to the treatment by that state of their (the private law person’s) invest-
ment in the territory of that state. The state («host state») will have concluded 
a treaty with another state («home state») or other states (each «home state») 
– a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or a multilateral investment treaty (MIT) 
respectively – under which it is obliged to protect in certain ways particular 
investments made in its territory by investors who are nationals of such other 
state(s), e.g. it is obliged to make tax exemptions in relation to such invest-
ments12. It is the manner in which, and whether at all, the defendant has com-
plied with these undertakings that is scrutinised in an investment arbitration.13 
Investment arbitration constitutes a special mixture between international pub-
lic law arbitration and international arbitration; the only international arbitra-
tion in the wide sense that is of such a mixed type. It reveals a public law nature 
because one of the parties (the host state) has sovereign powers14 to regulate 
the behaviour on its territory of the other party. At the same time, there is cer-
tain equality between the «rivals» in the procedure, hence a private law nu-
ance, for the party with coercive competence (the host state) has undertaken 
its obligation as a coequal – in an agreement (with the home state). 
–––––––––––––– 
12 The BIT or MIT is, thus, similar to a third-party beneficiary contract – through it the contrac-
tors create rights for a third person. 
13 The investor is legitimised as a party to the arbitration, even though it did not sign the BIT or 
MIT (the home state did) because, when covenanting the arbitration, the BIT or MIT created 
for the investor an option to arbitrate, which the latter accepts when initiating the arbitration 
(again as if a third-party beneficiary contract was signed). 
14 Not only, but also, due to the involvement of some public law elements, the decisions in 
investment arbitration are published. 
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Investment arbitration is not taken into the scope of the current work, even if 
it has some elements of international arbitration. In any case, overriding man-
datory rules are not so relevant in this type of arbitration. First, unlike in inter-
national arbitration, the applicable law is clear – the BIT or the MIT15. Second, 
though sometimes one will deal with overriding mandatory rules (when the 
host state’s rules that allegedly violate the BIT or MIT represent overriding 
mandatory rules), the position of such overriding mandatory rules will be dif-
ferent. The arbitrator will not, like in international arbitration, be deciding on 
their applicability or ability to be considered – it will be certain that they will 
be applied (they will even have already been applied – not by the arbitrator but 
by the defendant); the arbitrator will be deciding on their (in)compatibility 
with the host state’s obligations under a treaty16. 
II. Arbitrability  
Arbitrability is the principal possibility recognised by law that a dispute on a 
particular matter (objective arbitrability, or arbitrability ratio materiae17) and 
between particular parties (subjective arbitrability, or arbitrability ratio perso-
nae18) is resolved in a legally binding manner through arbitration such as 
through international arbitration19. Certain relations, e.g. non-pecuniary rela-
tions, will be considered inappropriate to be adjudicated by arbitrators and, 
thus, will be reserved for courts. Then, law might prohibit some categories of 
persons from arbitrating – e.g. state companies; however, it is to be noted that, 
–––––––––––––– 
15 EULER/BIANCO, 561 seem to express a similar view. When reflecting which is the better fo-
rum for vulture funds that have bought sovereign debt – investment arbitration or non-in-
vestment arbitration – they point out that investment arbitration offers more certainty with 
regard to applicable law, the applicable law in non-investment arbitration being, inter alia, 
«limited by the mandatory rules of the law of the seat … and public policy». 
16 – admittedly not the rules «in themselves but the extent to which they may violate specific 
commitments» will be what the investment arbitrator will examine, but still there will be 
some scrutinisation of the rules themselves. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The 
Republic of Argentina, ICSID case N. ARB/01/8, 17 July 2003, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, para 27. 
17 HANOTIAU, 33. 
18 HANOTIAU, 33. 
19 See also HANOTIAU, 33. 
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since such prohibitions are rarely valid outside the countries imposing them 
(in Switzerland e.g. they are not due to Art. 177 (2) PILA), they seldomly 
become an issue in international arbitration. 
Arbitrability is not a problem of substance. Even if it presupposes evaluation 
of the type of substance (e.g. pecuniary or not), it does not require (nor does it 
allow) the rendering of a decision on the merits. The arbitrability check com-
prises only an examination of whether the objective law permits that the cate-
gory of disputes, to which the submitted dispute belongs, are arbitrated, and 
that the type of parties, to which the parties that have submitted the dispute 
belong, arbitrate. Substantive matters like limitation periods, waivers of rights 
or the here-discussed substantive overriding mandatory rules are decided later 
(and only if arbitrability is affirmed).   
In Switzerland, arbitrability for the purposes of international arbitration is reg-
ulated in Art. 177 PILA. With regard to objective arbitrability, the first para-
graph of that article provides that all pecuniary matters are arbitrable, which is 
considered a liberal approach. Art. 177 (1) PILA is a substantive norm – not 
in the sense that it deals with a substantive issue (it does not; it deals with a 
jurisdictional matter – arbitrability) but in the sense that it is not a conflict of 
laws rule. Because of this quality of this norm, objective international arbitra-
bility is decided according to it and hence according to Swiss law; a foreign 
law can play a role only by way of exception if featuring a status of ordre 
public within the meaning of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA20. 
The (liberal) content of Art. 177 PILA combined with its «substantiveness» 
renders Swiss international arbitrability resistant to the involvement of (the 
here-analysed) substantive overriding mandatory rules, i.e. cases which have 
the potential of turning out to be governed by such rules will be admitted to 
international arbitration in Switzerland21. Such resistance is anyway appropri-
ate generally. Firstly, an argument that in international arbitration there is a 
–––––––––––––– 
20 The Court in dictum in DSC 4A_388/2012, cons. 3.3. An overriding mandatory character of 
such a foreign rule on arbitrability will apparently not suffice. 
21 DSC 118 II 353 from 23 June 1992. Also SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnor-




Chapter 4: International arbitration 
16 
higher risk (than in international private law state court proceedings) of eva-
sion of overriding mandatory rules cannot be raised in favour of inarbitrability 
because the issue of evasion of overriding mandatory law (and of any other 
law) is a part of the merits, in particular of the determination of applicable law, 
and not a part of the question on arbitrability. Rather than prohibitting the 
whole international arbitration process, one should embed a protective mech-
anism into the stage at which the dispute’s substance is adjudged upon. Sec-
ond, it is far from being certain that international arbitrators would tolerate 
circumvention of overriding mandatory rules. Third, exemption (from interna-
tional arbitration) of all disputes in relation to which overriding mandatory 
rules might be applied or considered entails the risk of «vice versa circumven-
tion»: mala fide avoidance of international arbitration through excessive in-
voking of the relevance of overriding mandatory rules. Fourth, the frequently 
agreed-on confidential character of the international arbitration does not auto-
matically lead to evasion of law because anonymised disclosure is still possi-
ble. 
III. Arbitration agreement   
Arbitration agreement in its wide sense (used here) incorporates the consent 
of the parties to arbitrate a dispute. It can take the form of a separate contract 
whose only aim is the submission of the dispute to international arbitration 
(arbitration agreement in a narrow sense) or, more frequently, of a clause of a 
contract governing not only such submission but also, and actually primarily, 
the relationship giving rise to the dispute (arbitration clause). 
IV. Seat 
International arbitration has its seat in a particular state (usually in a certain 
city within it, as stipulated in the arbitration agreement). The seat has legal 
functions. It sets the rules applicable to the international arbitration: if these 
are not complied with, the international arbitration is of no legal force or at 
least «annullable». The seat’s courts have certain competences – e.g. namely 
–––––––––––––– 
to more frequent dealing by international arbitration seated in Switzerland with foreign 
overriding mandatory rules. 
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to annul the resulting arbitral award, to decide on parties’ challenges of the 
arbitrator(s), etc. Then, the seat plays a role for the recognition and enforce-
ment of the award, for this is considered to have been issued in it.   
V. Finality  
An international arbitral award is in principle final – Art. 190 (1) PILA. Only 
limited grounds listed in Art. 190 (2) PILA can lead to its annulment. 
VI. Enforceability22 
A Swiss international arbitral award is directly enforceable in Switzerland. 
The procedure envisaged in Art. 193 (2) PILA is not a true enforcement pro-
cedure: it is not mandatory and it takes place without the participation of the 
counterparty. In a state other than Switzerland, the award will undergo a true 
enforcement procedure. Where this other state is a signatory to the New York 
Convention, such a procedure will be very simplified as, with few exceptions 
in its Art. V, that Convention compels enforcement of awards originating from 
another contractor, which Switzerland is. Since, in fact, a great number of 
countries (as many as 159) are parties to the Convention, Swiss arbitral awards 
have great enforceability abroad. 
VII. Non-state adjudication  
The idea of international arbitration is to represent an alternative to a state 
court as the deliverer of justice for international private law disputes. This con-
cept manifests, amongst other things, in the following. First, unlike a state 
court, an international arbitral court is not an organ of the state in which it is 
seated (or of any other state)23 and it does not render its award on behalf of 
–––––––––––––– 
22 Since enforcement of the award presupposes its recognition, where the terms «enforcement», 
«enforceability», «enforcing», «enforce», etc. are used here, «recognition», «recognisabil-
ity», «recognising», «recognise», etc. is also meant. 
23 That is why, while the law of the seat of a state court can be defined as «the law of the place 
before whose state court … a dispute is adjudged and decided» (BERTOLF, 1, own transla-
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this (or of any other) state. Second, whilst state courts that resolve international 
private law cases are permanently seated in a certain country (the one they 
represent), international arbitration courts are not24. The seat of the interna-
tional arbitration court is a seat only during the conduction of the concrete 
arbitral procedure. Third (and a direct consequence of the second), a state court 
examining an international private law controversy has a home jurisdiction –
the seat – but an international arbitration court does not. That is why Art. 190 
(2) (e) PILA, which applies to the latter, does not protect the Swiss, but the 
international, ordre public. For international arbitrators, any jurisdiction, in-
cluding the seat, is foreign (their indigenous point of view is some universal 
mindset)25. They are «sheltered» by the law of the seat and the law governing 
the substance only during the respective procedure – until the dispute is re-
solved. Moreover, the seat’s law «hosts» merely with regard to the conflict of 
laws and procedural, but not the substantive, questions (providing rules on the 
latter would often not even make sense because the facts would not be con-
nected to the seat26). 
–––––––––––––– 
called something like «the law of the place before whose arbitration court a dispute is ad-
judged and resolved». (* The phrase «own translation» in this dissertation refers to a trans-
lation made by the dissertation author.) 
24 Since, as clarified above, such an institution is to be distinguished from such a court, the 
permanent seat of an arbitration institution is not the permanent seat of the arbitration court 
which such an institution assists. 
25 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 19 N 28; CHRISTEN, 20. 
26 Such a seat would be a «disinterested forum» – it would not want to apply. See KARRER, BSK 





Chapter 5: International arbitration in finance 
Financial overriding mandatory rules – the example of overriding mandatory 
rules taken here – will be mostly relevant in international arbitration in finance 
(international financial arbitration). This is international arbitration which 
deals with financial transactions or with transactions that directly or indirectly 
support the conclusion of financial transactions (e.g. agreements for the distri-
bution of financial products or the integration of the businesses of financial 
services providers). 
Subchapter 1: Financial transactions  
I. Definition  
In a wide meaning, a financial transaction can be understood as a contract 
which involves (in any way) the provision of financial means. Narrowly, a 
financial transaction is a contract for the provision of financial means (against 
consideration). The provision of financial means is the causa – the goal – of 
such a contract27. Agreements which trigger the providing of financial means 
but whose main goal is not such providing but something else – e.g. sales con-
tracts under which a price is paid as a consideration for the transfer of property, 
where the transfer is the main objective – will not be financial transactions 
within this narrow meaning; only in the wide sense. In the present work, the 
narrow sense is used.  
One may speak also of «financial contract», «financial agreement», «financial 
relationship» and «financial instrument» and still mean «financial transac-
tion»28. The differences between these terms and the latter are not significant 
–––––––––––––– 
27 Whether the party obtaining the financial means has a further objective regarding their use 
does not change the fact that the goal of the concrete transaction is the provision of financial 
means. 
28 Similarly, SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 3 talks about «financial instru-




Chapter 5: International arbitration in finance 
20 
for the subject matter of the current analysis. «Financial contract» and «finan-
cial agreement» are, anyway, synonyms of «financial transaction». «Financial 
relationship» is the legal relationship created through the conclusion of a fi-
nancial transaction. The concept of financial instrument must be addressed 
with more caution because its legal meaning has not been completely clarified. 
It can be understood: first, as a synonym of financial transaction; second, as a 
form in which the financial market’s «goods» are marketed, i.e. a financial 
product or a legally construed title (usually fungible and easy to transfer29) 
which, even if put into a legal frame, has a rather economic connotation; and 
third, as a type of financial transaction – specifically a more complex financial 
transaction whose subject matter is not directly the provision of financial 
means but the provision of a deliverable whose subject matter is the provision 
of financial means (e.g. a derivative). For simplicity (which can be afforded 
here, since the main focus of the work is elsewhere), «financial instrument» 
will be used in its meaning as a financial transaction.     
Financial means are nothing else but money. Therefore, the characteristic ob-
ligation under a financial transaction is an obligation for the transfer30 of 
money. Delivered is either money or a right in receiving money. This is so 
even where (e.g. in a derivative contract) «physical delivery» is stipulated – in 
the financial markets’ lingua franca, this expression means the actual delivery 
of a sum of money whose size is derived from the value of an underlying com-
modity, and not the delivery of the good. The monetary nature of the obliga-
tions created by financial transactions has certain implications because there 
are different legal regimes, both on a private law and public law level, for 
monetary and non-monetary obligations. By way of example, some private 
law justifications for a failure to comply with non-monetary obligations would 
not be available for excusing non-fulfillment of monetary obligations. On a 
–––––––––––––– 
29 LEHMANN, 25-27. 
30 When defining a financial transaction, SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 3, 
248 speaks of an obligation «for the payment or transfer» of money. The distinction be-
tween «payment» and «transfer» of money is considered here unnecessary because the for-
mer is a type of the latter. 
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public law level, specific policies such as currency controls will apply to mon-
etary obligations.  
Mergers and acquisitions are, here, not considered financial transactions. They 
do not have as their goal the provision of financial means; they aim for the 
change of control over a company – full transfer (acquisition) or partial trans-
fer (merger). That renders them an issue of corporate law rather than financial 
markets law. It is true that mergers and acquisitions go along with the conclu-
sion of financial transactions, but such financial transactions only support the 
merger or the acquisition, e.g. by enabling the payment of the purchase price. 
The purchase of shares in an acquisition is different than the purchase of shares 
on the financial market: first, the acquirer has the objective of acquiring con-
trol over the company, whilst the financial market’s investor seeks to finance 
the company and to make a profit (from subsequent reselling of the shares at 
a higher price or from the dividends to which the shares entitle); second, apart 
from the ownership in it, the acquirer obtains rights to actively manage the 
company, whereas the buyer of shares on the financial market usually does 
not; third, through paying the purchase price the acquirer does not, like a fi-
nancial market’s investor, «finance» the company – they «finance» the persons 
selling the company; fourth, the acquirer will purchase some significant per-
centage of shares – only in that case there will be a change in the control of 
the company (acquisition) – whilst an investor might buy a small number of 
shares. Since mergers and acquisitions are not seen as financial transactions, 
examples of international arbitrations involving them were not specifically 
sought and are included in the present analysis only as far as some financial 
markets rule has been relevant; moreover, since it occurs frequently31, inter-
national arbitration in mergers and acquisition has already been sufficiently 
explored in the literature.                                   
II. Examples 
Often expressions like «banking and finance» or «banking and financial trans-
actions» are encountered. In these, the concept of finance is used in some sort 
of a narrow sense as encompassing only those financial transactions which are 
–––––––––––––– 
31 EHLE, 287. 
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carried out by a financial market actor different than a bank. Probably the fact 
that the largest part of the dealings in finance is executed by banks prompted 
such treatment of banking as a branch separate from and parallel to finance. 
Yet, strictly speaking, banking transactions are a type of financial transactions 
and it is more appropriate to speak of financial transactions which are divided 
into banking transactions and non-banking transactions. In fact, such a classi-
fication of the financial transactions into banking and non-banking transac-
tions has no consequences for the topic discussed here; the ordering of the 
examples of financial transactions below according to it is only for keeping a 
structure.   
1. Banking transactions 
Banking transactions include traditional banking transactions (receiving de-
posits from and granting credits to clients), transactional banking (financial 
support for reciprocal exchanges of goods, monetary flows or commercial pa-
pers executed by clients) and investment banking (supporting institutional cli-
ents e.g. through underwriting securities issued by them). 
This is a rather economic classification of the activities of a bank. To make a 
legal one is quite difficult. On the one hand, laws do not give a basis for that. 
On the other hand, in practice, bankers often use terms which do not reflect 
legal concepts. For instance, in a legal sensu stricto, every banking is commer-
cial, because in its precise meaning the latter term signifies something that is 
done for profit – and every banking is done for profit. However, the banking 
practice makes a classification of banking by using «commercial» in two other 
(with regard to the true meaning) narrower meanings: first, it understands 
«commercial banking» as banking that is not investment banking (i.e. as non-
investment banking) – it namely divides banking into commercial and invest-
ment banking32 – and, second, it sometimes understands «commercial bank-
ing» as only one type of non-investment banking (rather than as any non-in-
vestment banking) – that which is done with corporate clients.             
–––––––––––––– 
32 This is probably the most popular division of banking activities, and in any case is one of 
 practical relevance, as a bank’s work is organised according to it (the departments 
 responsible for commercial banking and for investment banking are separate). 
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1.1 Commercial banking in a wide sense 
Commercial banking in a wide sense, as already mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, is non-investment banking, i.e. it is traditional and transactional 
banking taken together. As can be inferred again from the previous paragraph, 
based on the nature of the client, commercial banking in a wide sense is di-
vided into retail banking (consumer banking, personal banking) and commer-
cial banking in a narrow sense (corporate banking, business banking). 
a Retail banking (consumer banking, personal banking) 
Retail banking is that commercial banking in a wide sense which is done with 
retail clients. «There is very little cross-border banking that involves consum-
ers»33. The needs of its clients are associated with a rather modest amount of 
capital one can gather on the local market and with daily matters (payments of 
bills, withdrawing of cash, etc.) mostly arranged within the client’s country of 
residence. Thus, any dispute resolution will usually be accomplished within 
the relevant country, and Swiss international arbitration will rarely have to deal 
with such transactions.  
b Commercial banking in a narrow sense (corporate banking, busi-
ness banking) 
Commercial banking in a narrow sense is that commercial banking in a wide 
sense which is done with corporate clients. Such corporate clients can be pri-
vate law persons but also creatures of public law, including sovereigns. They 
can range from small businesses through to middle-sized and big businesses 
operating in any part of the economy (including finance). Corporate banking 
can be both national and international. In the first case, the client is a local 
company operating within national borders; in the second, it is an entity active 
in various countries or in one country but in need of large financing obtainable 
only by accessing the international capital markets. 
1.2 Investment banking  
–––––––––––––– 
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An investment bank does not perform retail banking services. Its clients are, 
for example, companies, other financial institutions, pension funds, hedge 
funds, and governments.  
Investment banking includes, in the first place, assistance for companies to 
take new issues of securities in an initial public offering or in follow-on offer-
ings to the market. Here the bank acts as an intermediary between the securi-
ties’ issuer and the investors. Its activities consist, inter alia, of pre-underwrit-
ing counselling, underwriting (buying all the issued securities at a set price and 
reselling them to the public, mostly to institutional investors, or acting as an 
agent for the issuer in selling the securities against a commission) or advising 
after the distribution. Other activities of investment banking are the facilitation 
of transactions such as mergers and acquisitions or other corporate reorgani-
sations. Project financing is a part of investment banking as well. Then, invest-
ment banks broker to or trade for the accounts of clients (mostly institutional 
clients but also individuals – the so-called high-net-worth individuals) and 
trade on their own account with securities, indices, etc.34. Perhaps the most 
important area of investment banking is the conclusion of derivatives con-
tracts. Investment banking is very international. Accomplishing one of its main 
missions – to connect persons in need of capital with persons holding super-
fluous capital – necessitates access to as much capital as possible, hence, to as 
many capital markets as possible, or to the capital markets of as many coun-
tries as possible. That is why investment banking transactions are likely to be 
the banking transactions most often brought to international arbitration. 
2. Non-banking financial transactions 
Non-banking financial transactions are those concluded by insurers and rein-
surers, hedge or vulture funds, etc. – all participants in the financial market 
which are not banks. 
III. Multi-jurisdictionality 
–––––––––––––– 
34 Because the simultaneous performance of advisory and trading activities by a bank can lead 
to conflicts of interests, separate advisory and trading divisions are instituted in it (building 
of «Chinese Walls»). 
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Financial transactions have become immensely international, given that their 
subject matter – financial means – is easily transferrable across borders (espe-
cially because it nowadays exists mostly in an electronic form), and given that 
globalisation has had a sensible impact35 on them. For such transactions, that 
implies regulation by many jurisdictions since, whilst business no longer 
knows any boundaries, law still does36. There is some harmonisation37 which 
globalisation has brought about, e.g. harmonisation of certain types of 
financial contracts through the adoption of model agreements or the 
unification of practice, but the competence to enact legislation still lies with 
national legislators and the original competence, i.e. the competence which 
does not necessitate consent by the parties, to resolve disputes in a legally 
binding manner – with national courts. 
IV. Systemic nature 
Financial transactions are of a systemic nature – the destiny of one financial 
transaction can influence the destiny of another. For instance, since a bank 
lends «the»38 money which depositors deposit with it to others (borrowers), if 
too many of the latter fail to return the borrowed money to it and too many of 
the depositors request from it their deposits at the same time, it would be in-
capable of returning such deposits. Or, for example, where, due to a worsened 
financial situation of A, a bank starts receiving no or lower than the envisaged 
interest on a loan it has concluded with A, it will pay a lower rate of interest 
under an interest rate swap which it has entered into with B (whilst B will 
continue to pay the defined fixed interest). The problem in the loan will be 
«felt» in the interest rate swap («attaching» itself to the destiny of the loan 
was, in fact, even the idea of the swap – a hedge of the loan). In addition, 
–––––––––––––– 
35 On globalisation of financial markets – SCOTT, 3 and 4. 
36 SCHNYDER, Conflicts of Law, 426. 
37 On the trend towards harmonisation of the regulation of international finance – SCOTT. 
38 The definite article «the» is used here in order to illustrate more clearly the connection, but 
the money deposited by depositors is not the same money as that which the bank lends to 
the borrowers – depositors deposit value (which they have the right to receive back) rather 
than physical banknotes, coins or electronic book entries. 
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financial transactions interrelate with other branches of the economy – con-
struction, manufacturing etc. – since they ensure the financing for the opera-
tion of those. Furthermore, as mentioned, globalisation has had a great impact 
on financial transactions. It has caused them to be concluded more and more 
on a cross-border basis, which has led to a financial transaction evolving on 
the market of one country being able to affect a financial or namely non-finan-
cial economic transaction taking place on the market of another country.     
V. Public interest 
Public interests (or general interests) can be both the interests of the public as 
a whole or the interests of one segment of the public, whereby this segment is 
deemed to deserve the same protection as the whole public. Public interests 
usually rank higher than private interests, which is why a transaction threaten-
ing them might be invalid, even if the parties to it have an interest in seeing it 
executed. Habitually, the state perceives public interests as its own interests, 
i.e. it «declares» them the state’s interests.    
Financial transactions often touch upon public interests. That is so, on the one 
hand, due to the aforementioned systemic nature. On the other hand, a large 
number of people are involved. Many rules regulating this business have 
proven themselves necessary due to this numerousness. For instance, some 
relations that were ab initio pure corporate relations had to be regulated by 
financial markets law because of this numerousness. Even if the author gave 
it for other purposes39, one can use LEHMANN’s example of German rules im-
posing a particular conduct on the board of a company in case of a takeover – 
§§ 27, 33 to 33c German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act40: where 
the shares of a company are not traded on the financial market, the relation 
between the board and the shareholders at the time of a takeover is subject 
matter of company law but, where they are publicly traded, this relationship 
starts needing to be addressed by financial markets law rules as well. 
–––––––––––––– 
39 – in order to demonstrate one area of overlap of the (otherwise separate) international finan-
cial markets private law and international corporate law. 
40 LEHMANN, 565. 
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VI. The law of financial transactions                     
The law of financial transactions, i.e. the law that governs the latter, is finan-
cial markets law41. This is a mixed and complex branch of law. Financial trans-
actions are creatures of private law, in particular of contract law, but, since 
some of their aspects can have an impact on public interests, public law also 
steps in. Private law governs the financial transaction as a contract, whilst pub-
lic law sets frames to the private law freedom of contracting. A single action 
can be counteracted through an administrative measure of withdrawal of a li-
cence, a criminal-law-originated fine and a civil law claim for recovery of 
damages.42  
VII. The law of international financial transactions 
Financial transactions with international elements are regulated by interna-
tional financial markets law43. This is a separate area of law with its own prob-
lems, method and approach «distinctive to it, though not necessarily exclusive 
–––––––––––––– 
41 When addressing the law regulating financial transactions, the English legal literature uses 
(as if they are synonyms) terms which do not refer to «market» or «markets» – «financial 
law» or «finance law» – as well as a term which refers to «market» or «markets» – «finan-
cial markets law». The German literature uses «financial markets law» («Finanzmark-
trecht») more often than «financial law» or «finance law» («Finanzrecht»). «Financial mar-
kets law» is more appropriate here because it excludes public financial law (or public 
finance law), which is a branch of law not dealt with here – the one that comprises tax law, 
law on state budget and other rules related to public finances. 
42 LEHMANN, 174ff. 
43 Analogically to the case with «financial law» or «finance law» and «financial markets law», 
the English literature uses both the synonyms «international financial law» and «interna-
tional finance law» and the term «international financial markets law», whereas the legal 
literature of the German-speaking countries refers to «international financial markets law» 
(«internationales Finanzmarktrecht») rather than «international financial law» or «interna-
tional finance law» (the latter two translated as «internationales Finanzrecht»). That is why 
an analogical term will be used for the international context of the problem: «international 
financial markets law» (as above; it is more precise inasmuch as it excludes a subject matter 
which is namely out of the scope of the current analysis – here international public financial 
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to it». At the same time, however, it is not necessarily «separate and independ-
ent of local systems of law»44.  
International financial markets law is mostly conflict law. The rest is a material 
law substrate (e.g. international standards) and it is not small in quantity but is 
weak in legal force. International financial markets law, in its conflict as well 
as in its material law part, contains both public law and private law. 
Finance being part of the economy, international financial markets law is a 
part of international economic law. Ergo, some problems of the latter might 
be topical for international financial markets law, e.g. the putting into question 
of the operation of the traditional methods of international economic conflict 
law due to the interconnectedness of national economies45. However, some 
problems of international economic law are further intensified in international 
financial markets law owing to the specificities of the latter. For instance, the 
use of the traditional conflict of laws rules is even more difficult than in other 
branches of international economic law. The criteria of these rules (e.g. the 
place of the physical delivery of goods) are too tangible, too traditional, too 
national. To start with, financial business’ «products» – rights, financial risks, 
etc. – are often not in a physical form and thus hardly assignable to a physical 
territory46. Then, the inventive financial industry steadily engineers compli-
cated products which hardly fit traditional legal structures that might otherwise 
serve as criteria for connecting. Next, non-traditional conflict of laws rules – 
those legitimising the application or consideration of overriding mandatory 
rules – need to be applied more often than in other economic fields, as finance 
frequently touches upon public interests. Furthermore, the determination of 
(both traditional and extraordinary) conflict of laws connections is made 
–––––––––––––– 
law or international public finance law containing e.g. international tax law or law on the 
budget of international organisations). 
44 SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, 64. 
45 «... the classical connecting elements (territorial or personal) appear more and more acci-
dental on account of the interdependence of national economies and the increasing mobility 
of the respective actors», which leads to a need for «the co-ordination of competencies and 
the supervising instruments». (SCHNYDER, Conflicts of Law, 429, 426 respectively). 
46 See also SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 2, 162. 
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harder by the (not merely cross-border but) multi-border character of financial 
transactions47. The acts through which the latter are executed and their legal 
and economic effects might take place in various countries at the same time48.           
Subchapter 2: International arbitration in finance 
I. Background  
1. Reluctance towards international arbitration before 
In the past, there was not much international arbitration in the financial sector 
as there has always been in the real economy – some state that there was more 
than is generally thought, but it is a fact that not many of the published inter-
national arbitration awards or state court judgements connected to interna-
tional arbitrations dealt with financial contracts. That might be explained by 
the young «age» of many of the types of financial contracts, which means that 
no need has yet unfolded to discover all available dispute resolution tech-
niques. The reasons most frequently spoken of to explain it are, however: that 
the disputes which arose in finance, especially those originating in banking, 
–––––––––––––– 
47 In SEBASTIANUTTI’s view (SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 2, 160) they are 
«intrinsically multi-jurisdictional». The term «multi-jurisdictional» probably refers to both 
– many adjudicators and many laws – for «jurisdictional» seems to be used in its wide 
meaning as referring to a legal system, and not in its narrow meaning as characterising only 
competence to adjudicate. 
48 On the example of banking, according to the ICSID arbitral panel in Deutsche Bank v Sri 
Lanka, «the reality of today’s banking business is that major banks operate all over the 
world. The fact that one subsidiary or branch does the paperwork does not mean that the 
financial instrument is located in the country concerned». 
        SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 5, 468, 469 gives the example of an inter-
national bond which is issued out of London by a Hungarian corporate specialising in al-
ternative energy and guaranteed by its Italian parent company, with dealers or underwriters 
from the US, Japan, Germany, Korea, Australia and China and potential investors not only 
from the countries of the involved actors but also from the Near East, Canada and Brazil. 
(For SEBASTIANUTTI, the public law norms of the place of the issue (UK), of the issuer 
(Hungary), «perhaps» of the guarantor (Italy), potentially of the dealers and underwriters 
and of the placement and selling will be relevant.). 
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were considered as not demanding special knowledge (such as that of an expert 
that one could appoint as an arbitrator) since they involved simple legal issues, 
e.g. whether the borrower had paid or not; that the state courts of bank-friendly 
jurisdictions could be chosen; or that banks were not motivated to seek a quick 
dispute settlement of the type that international arbitration could offer because 
they would be satisfied with the interest rates and they would possess collateral 
securities49.  
Thus, the Loan Market Association’s model clauses, for example, referred to 
state courts, and so did the ISDA Master Agreement whose jurisdiction clause 
was in favour of New York or London state courts. Some of the few submis-
sions by the financial industry to international arbitration represented unilat-
eral optional clauses (which apparently did not establish a firm competence 
and were anyway at risk of being deemed invalid in some countries). Only 
particular types of financial transactions, such as reinsurance dealings or loans 
granted by multilateral financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank, regional 
development banks), were entrusted to international arbitrators.  
2. Increasing interest nowadays50 
2.1 Trend 
The reluctance of the financial industry to refer its cases to international arbi-
tration is being overcome. Representatives of arbitral institutions confirm a 
rise since the financial crisis in their finance-related work51; options for 
international arbitration have been added to model agreements used in the 
sector, such as the ISDA Master Agreement52. The arbitration community has 
even started preparing itself for financial markets law disputes. It has under-
taken changes tailored precisely to the new «clientele» – for instance, in 2012 
a new arbitral institution specialised in financial disputes, P.R.I.M.E. Finance, 
was established in The Hague, the Netherlands. It has also made changes of 
–––––––––––––– 
49 Further on the reasons for the financial sector’s unwillingness to arbitrate: SHEPPARD. 
50 See, inter alia, HANEFELD, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, PETERSON and MISTELIS. 
51 See Rapport Final, 97. 
52 More on the adoption of the clauses: in PEACOCK/KENNELLY/BLANSHARD. 
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general application but especially useful for financial disputes – e.g. rules on 
joinder and consolidation, international arbitrators’ powers to impose provi-
sional measures or fast track procedures have been adopted.  
2.2 Reasons53 
What triggered the increasing recourse to international arbitration was, in the 
first place, the financial crisis which started in 200854. It led to an overall 
increase in disputes in the sector which then prompted a search for new dispute 
resolution methods. The growth in the over-the-counter clearing also 
contributed to the trend because clearing houses prefer arbitration. In addition, 
more and more financial transactions (e.g. project financing dealings) have 
been concluded with parties from the emerging markets against which the 
usual preference is to arbitrate rather than litigate.   
However, the financial industry would not have chosen it if it did not see cer-
tain advantages in international arbitration (and in fact in arbitration gener-
ally). Of course, as with anything, there are also pitfalls of arbitrating rather 
than litigating a financial markets law dispute – but these appear to be fewer 
than the advantages55. The strength that probably comes to mind first is the 
deciding body’s expertise – this is very useful in financial disputes which are 
often highly complex56. Another factor is the very wide international recog-
nisability and enforceability of arbitral awards ensured by the New York Con-
–––––––––––––– 
53 For further discussion on why international arbitration and arbitration as a whole is a suitable 
means for resolving disputes of the financial sector – MAZURANIC/FAVRE, WERLEN, BERGER 
or DRAGIEV. 
54 «The financial crisis is changing the litigation culture in the banking and financial industry.» 
– BERGER, foreword. Also the representatives of arbitral institutions talk about increase in 
work related to finance namely since the financial crisis – see Rapport Final, 97. 
55 See for some of the flaws DRAGIEV. 
56 A case from 2012 triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and concerned with in-
terest rate swaps and forward freight agreements concluded under the ISDA Master Agree-
ments demonstrates the complexity of issues which can arise upon interpretation of these 
Master Agreements – Lomas & Ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc & Others, [2012] EWCA Civ 
419. As a matter of fact, the state court which looked at the case here had a good under-
standing of derivatives, but this would not always be the case. 
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vention. This feature is very valuable to the financial business due to the lat-
ter’s cross-border operating, and especially to its crossing borders of «emerg-
ing» markets, in which recognition and enforcement difficulties might be 
great. Another advantage of submitting a dispute to international arbitration is 
that an unambiguous jurisdiction is created. In this way, certain difficulties 
(such as that of defining the place of performance of an obligation) are avoided 
and potential attempts to «escape from» legal proceedings by questioning the 
appropriateness of the forum are left without prospect. Then, the contestability 
of the arbitral award on only few and strict grounds strengthens legal certainty. 
Flexibility is another advantage – parties themselves can choose the applicable 
procedural rules, the language in which the arbitration will be conducted and 
so on. Further, the proceedings are quick, albeit one should note that nowadays 
velocity has decreased to become not much greater than that of state court 
proceedings, and this concerns also the examination of financial markets law 
disputes57. An essential plus is also the neutrality; to begin with – neutrality 
towards the parties (international arbitrators would not favour particular types 
of parties – e.g. insured persons); then – neutrality in respect of legal orders 
(international arbitrators are not affiliated to a particular state and would not 
need to protect the interests of such). Neutrality is, for example, one of the 
reasons why financial transactions concluded with state partners in their acta 
jure gestionis (especially where those are the debtors) and with parties from 
emerging markets are often submitted to international arbitration. Another 
positive side of international arbitration is the avoidance of the conduct of legal 
proceedings in unfamiliar jurisdictions, which is associated with additional 
(legal, translation and other) costs. Last but not least, the opportunity to have 
the adjudication kept confidential will be appreciated by the financial industry, 
for which reputation (and with this, privacy) is crucial.   
II. Financial transactions likely to be submitted to in-
ternational arbitration  
–––––––––––––– 
57 Probably this decrease in the rapidity of the proceeding was what prompted the mentioned 
introduction of special expedited procedures. Whether the latter would manage to solve the 
problem remains to be seen. 
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Arbitration (in general, not only international arbitration) of retail banking 
would be problematic. An objective law might be prohibiting arbitration with 
consumers, or a state court might find that the bank has «imposed» the arbi-
tration clause through a bad faith use of its economic power over the retail 
client. Then, the practice in that area would often prefer state courts because it 
would see them as more protective towards small, inexperienced consumers. 
In addition, the few cases of arbitrating would be domestic arbitration, since, 
as already noted, consumer banking is quite a national business. Corporate 
banking is more likely to «seek» international arbitration, since the business 
appreciates arbitration as a way of dispute resolution, often operates transna-
tionally, and is not covered by consumer protection laws that possibly exclude 
arbitrability. Actors of investment banking are also inclined to go to interna-
tional arbitration for the same reasons as actors of corporate banking. Non-
banking finance is also likely to be a «client» of international arbitration, as 
those who conclude financial transactions and are not banks are most often 
professionals viewing international arbitration as convenient. Reinsurance 
companies, for example, are, in fact, a traditional client of international arbi-
tration; insurers are a rather recent one (some of their new products, e.g. war-
ranties and indemnities insurance, refer to it). 
III. Empirical evidence 
Throughout a general review of case law and literature, international arbitra-
tions were encountered in: a bank guarantee58; a bond subscription agreement; 
–––––––––––––– 
58 E.g. ICC arbitration case SITI – B&T Group S.p.A. (Italy) v PAT AKB Industrialbank 
(Ukraine), ICC arbitral tribunal, 14 June 2010, Case No. 15818/FM (unpublished) fol-
lowed by a decision on an action for annulment of the resulting award before the Court 
(Case No. DSC 4A_414/2010 of 27 October 2010) concerned payments under bank guar-
antees. For more information on the case, see WIETZOREK. 
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an investment agreement59; put and call option agreements60; project financ-
ing61; syndicated loans62; an «integration and investment agreement» between 
financial markets actors63; insurance and reinsurance64; a settlement agreement 
between a wealth manager and his client65; a «vulture» funds’ claims66.                     
–––––––––––––– 
59 – providing for a Singapore law and arbitration at the SIAC – Transpac Capital PTE Limited 
v Buntoro [2008] NSWSC 671 (Supreme Court, New South Wales, 7 July 2008, No. 11373 
of 2008). 
60 The agreements between a French and Italian party in DSC 4A_500/2007 of 6 March 2008; 
the option agreements that have led to the Megafon case examined in DSC 4P.208/2004 of 
14 December 2004, DSC 4P.102/2006 of 29 August 2006 and DSC 4P.168/2006 of 19 Feb-
ruary 2007. 
61 One can mention the arbitration of the Hydro dispute regarding the size of the financing that 
Deutsche Bank had agreed to provide for the construction of a hydro power plant – see 
Deutsche Bank’s Annual Report 2013 on Form 20-F (the form is to be filed with SEC by 
«foreign private issuers» that have listed equity shares on exchanges in the U.S.), Item 8: 
Financial Information, 68. The concessionaires claimed future damages resulting from the 
potential withdrawal of the concession for which the Albanian state might have held them 
liable. On the evolution towards international arbitration in the field of international project 
financing DUGUÉ. 
62 Reported by GILLOR, 61ff. The author describes a tendency from court jurisdiction clauses 
through «split jurisdiction clauses» to arbitration clauses in these transactions: the first were 
mostly used with counterparties from Europe; the second with parties from outside Europe, 
especially from emerging markets like Russia and the former Soviet states, Asian or African 
countries; the third are the newest trend and often come in lieu of the optional jurisdiction 
clauses. 
63 «Integration and Investment Agreement dated as of as of March 30, 2010 by and between 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. and Morgan Stanley» for the integration of both par-
ties’ Japan related securities businesses which in Art. VIII, Sec. 8.2 submits potential dis-
putes to arbitration in Tokyo under the auspices of ICC – see the Mitsubishi UFJ FG Annual 
Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended 31 March 2010, Exhibit 4(e). 
64 One case which reached (English) state courts Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and 
others v Enesa Engenharia S.A [2012] EWCA Civ 638 concerned both insurance and rein-
surance at the same time. 
65 – a settlement agreement regarding the dispute examined in cases 4A_80/2010 of 26 April 
2010 and 4A_642/2010 of 15 February 2011. 
66 «Vulture» funds are hedge funds or other financial vehicles which buy troubled sovereign (or 
corporate) bonds on the secondary market at a time when (due to the debtor’s inability to 




Interviews with lawyers from Swiss banks brought evidence of probably up-
coming, though not yet widespread, use of international arbitration in finance. 
One Swiss bank reported that about sixty percent of the agreements for the 
distribution of its financial products outside Switzerland were subjected to 
(mostly Swiss) arbitration. Another Swiss bank stated that it frequently chose 
London arbitration for the contracts it concluded with counterparties from 
other European countries under the ISDA Master Agreement. A third Swiss 
bank, which is a part of an international banking group, resorted to arbitration 
when dealing in private equity with counterparties that were not Swiss or not 
belonging to its banking group.  
The annual reports of the so-called global systemically important financial in-
stitutions (G-SIFIs) as determined by the Financial Stability Board – the global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) as defined by the Board in 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015 and the global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) 
as defined by the Board in 2014 and 2015)67 – inform about arbitrations, some 
of which are international, on the following financial transactions or cases re-
lated to such: auction-rate securities68, investment management69,  processing 
–––––––––––––– 
pay back or due to repudiation) their price is low. They then seek (in legal proceedings) the 
recovery of the entire sum. «Vulture» funds resort to both international and investment ar-
bitration. 
67 As of 04.03.2015, the Financial Stability Board is working on methodologies for defining 
Non-Bank Non-Insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (NBNI G-SI-
FIs). 
68 JP Morgan Annual Report 2010; Citigroup Annual Report 2011, 271; UBS Annual Report 
2010 and UBS annual reports and 20 -F forms for the years 2011 and 2012; Bank of New 
York Mellon Annual Report 2011, 152; Credit Suisse Annual Report 2011, 339; Bank of 
America Annual Report 2012, 226. 
69 Goldman Sachs Quarterly Report for the period ended March 2015 on Form 10-Q, 95 and 
Goldman Sachs Annual Report 2014, 195; JP Morgan Annual Report 2011, JP Morgan 
Annual Report 2012. 
69 
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of debit card transactions70, mortgages71, mortgage-backed securities72, pro-
ject financing73, financial advisory services74, ownership of economic expo-
sure to Greek bonds75, municipal bonds and closed-end funds76, sales of Leh-
man principal protection notes77, structured transactions and derivatives78, 
–––––––––––––– 
70 JP Morgan Annual Report 2011, 297. 
71 Credit Suisse Financial Report Third Quarter 2015, 129 (residential mortgage loans); Gold-
man Sachs Quarterly Report for the period ended March 2015 on Form 10-Q, 92 and Gold-
man Sachs Annual Report 2014, 192 (mortgage-related products); UBS Annual Report 
2012 and 20-F form 2012 filed with SEC (mortgage-related securities). 
72 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc Results for the half year ended 30 June 2014, 29. 
73 Deutsche Bank had to arbitrate a dispute over the funding of a hydro power project in Albania 
(in particular over the extent of its obligation to fund). The dispute was settled – see 
Deutsche Bank’s Annual Report 2013 on Form 20-F, Item 8: Financial Information, 68. 
74 Goldman Sachs Quarterly Report for the period ended March 2015 on Form 10-Q, 95 and 
Goldman Sachs Annual Report 2014, 195. 
75 The Royal Bank of Scotland Holdings N.V. (RBS Holdings N.V.) Interim results for the half 
year ended 30 June 2015, 21; The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (RBS N.V.) Interim results 
for the half year ended 30 June 2015, 21. 
76 UBS Annual Report 2013 and UBS 2013 annual report on 20-F Form filed with SEC as well 
as UBS Annual Report 2014. 
77 UBS annual reports and 20-F forms filed with SEC for the years 2012 and 2013 – customers’ 
allegations of a failure to disclose the risks upon such sales by UBS Financial Services Inc. 
78 UBS Annual Report 2012 and 20-F form 2012 filed with SEC. 




insurance brokerage79, squeeze-out price80, exercise price of a put option81, 
investment82 and cases related to the financial crisis as a whole83.       
With regard to derivatives, it can be noted that the introduction of model arbi-
tration clauses into the ISDA Master Agreement in 2013 was very much com-
mented on as setting a trend towards arbitration – but it seems that this type of 
dispute resolution was used also prior to that, simply in a non-standardised 
manner84.     
IV. Arbitrability85 
Claims resulting from financial relations will be arbitrable under Art. 177 
PILA because they are of a pecuniary nature. Following the logic from Chapter 
–––––––––––––– 
79 UniCredit S.p.A. Report and Accounts 2010 and UniCredit SpA Group Consolidated Reports 
and Accounts 2010, UniCredit SpA Reports and Accounts 2011, UniCredit SpA Group 
Consolidated Reports and Accounts 2011 and UniCredit SpA Reports and Accounts 2012 
and UniCredit SpA Group Consolidated Reports and Accounts 2012, UniCredit SpA Re-
ports and Accounts 2013 and UniCredit SpA Group Consolidated Reports and Accounts 
2013. A settlement was reached in 2013. 
80 One of the minority shareholders of Bank Austria initiated arbitration against UniCredit re-
garding the squeeze-out price paid by the latter upon purchasing 99, 995 % of Bank Aus-
tria’s shares – see UniCredit S.p.A. Reports and Accounts 2010, UniCredit Group Consol-
idated Reports and Accounts 2010. 
81 Dexia went to the International Court of Arbitration in Madrid over a dispute on the exercise 
price of a put option granted by Dexia Crédit Local (France) regarding the stake of Banco 
de Sabadell (Spain) in Dexia Sabadell (Spain) – see Dexia Annual Report 2014, 33. 
82 Citigroup faced ICDR-AAA arbitrations regarding an Abu Dhabi investment (Annual Report 
2013, 306). 
83 UBS Annual Report 2012 and 20-F form 2012 filed with SEC. 
84 That is evident from the information obtained through the conducted interviews with Swiss 
banks’ lawyers as well as from GILLOR’s article dating back before the introduction by 
ISDA of model arbitration clauses and dealing with the use of international arbitration. 
85 Further on arbitrability, including on the influence of public interests on arbitrability, of fi-
nancial transactions historically and comparatively in several jurisdictions – HANOTIAU, 
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4, II., last paragraph, such arbitrability will exist also where financial overrid-
ing mandatory rules regulate the financial relations.      
V. Arbitration agreement 
Arbitration agreements submitting financial disputes to international arbitra-
tion are no different to arbitration agreements submitting any other type of 
disputes to international arbitration. One can only note that financial model 
agreements (which, due to the complexity of the business, are used often) have 
lately started to refer to international arbitration ever more frequently; exam-
ples are the above-mentioned famous ISDA Master Agreement86, the Euro-
pean Master Agreement87, the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement88, 
the Loan Market Association Facility Agreement for Pre-Export Finance 
Transactions89, and other standard facility agreements of the Loan Market As-
sociation (like the Loan Market Association Development Markets Secured 
Document90). 
VI. Arbitral institutions  
International arbitration in finance can be conducted by ad hoc arbitral tribu-
nals or those administered by arbitral institutions. The latter can be the tradi-
tional arbitral institutions that shelter disputes from any area, like the Swiss 
–––––––––––––– 
86 In September 2013, the Association published an Arbitration Guide with model arbitration 
clauses as options. 
87 – the Master Agreement for Financial Transactions, sponsored by the Banking Federation of 
the European Union in cooperation with the European Savings Bank Group and the Euro-
pean Association of Cooperative Banks. Sec. 11 (2) of its 2004 edition contains a sample 
jurisdiction clause granting a choice between state court and arbitration and Sec. 4 of its 
Special Provisions, as reviewed in 2013, submits disputes to the Euro Arbitration, ICC or 
any other arbitration centre. (The Agreement is, however, less used in derivatives than the 
ISDA Master Agreement.) 
88 – with its Sec. 13 (c) providing for the possibility to submit future disputes to an ICC arbitra-
tion seated in London or New York – whilst, however, one can opt for another forum. 
89 Its Sec. 12 provides for an option to arbitrate under the LCIA. 
90 – stipulating an option for arbitration next to that for litigation in England. 
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Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, ICC, LCIA, ICDR-AAA, HKIAC, SIAC, 
or arbitral institutions specialising in the financial sphere. Some of the special-
ised ones have been established recently as a reaction to the increase in finan-
cially related legal procedures (caused by the financial crisis). Notable are the 
already mentioned «P.R.I.M.E. Finance» in The Hague91, the «Euro Arbitra-
tion – European Center for Financial Dispute Resolution» («EuroArbitra-
tion»)92, and the City Dispute Panel in London (established in 1994), which de 
jure (according to its rules and model clauses) is not specialised in financial 
matters but de facto is most popular for financial transactions and interbank 
settlements. There is a discussion whether to create a sovereign non-invest-
ment debt arbitral tribunal – one that deals with sovereign debts (e.g. state 
bonds) and in particular with the restructuring of such debts. Currently credi-
tors of the latter lodge their claims either with a national court (in their capacity 
as creditors) or with an investment arbitration (relying on their investors’ qual-
ification93). Some authors advocate for the tribunal94, whilst others oppose it95. 
In any case, the real challenges in the area would not be resolved, for those are 
of a substantive character – e.g. the lack of globally recognised international 
public insolvency law96.  
Subchapter 3: Other arbitrations in finance  
Described here below in this Subchapter 3 are other arbitrations in finance – 
other than international arbitration in finance. The latter is the arbitration in 
finance which is taken as an example here, whilst these other arbitrations in 
finance will remain outside the scope of the current analysis (and are men-
tioned solely for completeness). 
–––––––––––––– 
91 More on P.R.I.M.E. Finance: DALHUISEN, P.R.I.M.E.; ROSS; PEACOCK/KEN-
NELLY/BLANSHARD. 
92 – existing since 2000 and administering disputes between professionals concerning financial 
instruments, asset management, clearing, settlement and other financial matters. On Euro-
Arbitration: HIRSCH. 
93 An example here is Abaclat v Argentina. 
94 PAULUS, 320 f. contending that the World Bank Group is «a source of perceived bias». 
95 HANEFELD, Sovereign Debt Tribunal. 
96 HANEFELD, Sovereign Debt Tribunal. 
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I. Domestic arbitration in finance     
1. Voluntary domestic arbitration in finance 
Voluntary domestic arbitration in finance, which is always commercial (never 
public law) arbitration, is domestic arbitration that is not imposed on any of 
the parties. For instance, in the US case LRN Holding, Inc. v Windlake Capital 
Advisors, LLC, 949 N.E. 264 (Ill.App.3d 2011) a contract for brokerage ser-
vices was subjected to domestic arbitration (the state court whose judgment is 
cited here was seized at first and it compelled arbitration)97.  
2. Mandatory domestic arbitration in finance 
Mandatory domestic arbitration in finance is that domestic arbitration which 
must be agreed on in order that one is allowed to conduct certain financial 
business. It usually takes place before an arbitration institution established es-
pecially for accomplishing it. It can be commercial mandatory domestic finan-
cial arbitration (when the dispute is between private law parties) and public 
law mandatory domestic financial arbitration (where one of the parties exer-
cises public law powers over the other). Unlike international arbitration in fi-
nance, mandatory domestic arbitration in finance is not a new phenomenon. 
2.1 Mandatory domestic arbitration in finance imposed by a self-regu-
latory organisation 
The disputes resolved in a mandatory domestic arbitration in finance which is 
imposed by a self-regulatory organisation (SRO, in plural – SROs) are mostly: 
those between a member of the SRO and the SRO in relation to the exercise 
by the latter of public law powers (delegated to it by law) over the former; 
those between one member of the SRO and another member of the SRO; and 
those between a member of the SRO and a client of such member. The arbitral 
–––––––––––––– 
97 This dispute is also an example of the relevance of financial overriding mandatory rules in 
domestic commercial arbitration in finance, as the brokerage services contract in question 
was claimed to be void (and fees paid under it to be reimbursable) since the broker failed 
to meet a rule that could be qualified as a financial overriding mandatory rule – one that 








institution is mostly embedded in the SRO. Stock exchanges, such as the SIX, 
are a common example of SROs that impose arbitration in finance (the so-
called stock exchange arbitration).. Another example of SROs that impose ar-
bitration in finance are industry associations, membership of which is a pre-
condition for the execution of certain business. Such associations might re-
quire consent to arbitration in order to grant such membership. One can 
mention the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in the US. 
2.2 Mandatory domestic arbitration in finance imposed by a financial 
regulator 
In France, the Financial Markets Authority has competence deriving from Art. 
516–16 of the French General Regulation of the Financial Markets Authority 
to start arbitration for resolving disputes between a stock exchange and one of 
its members, among stock exchange members or between a stock exchange 
member and its customer. However, this is not much used in practice. It re-
sembles stock exchange arbitration, with the difference that here the procedure 
is imposed and started by the state regulator instead of being imposed by the 
stock exchange and initiated by a party to the dispute. Then, one can mention 
the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre in Hong Kong, which has operated 
since 2012 as a permanent mediation and arbitration organisation for disputes 
between financial institutions and their clients who are physical persons or 
one-person companies. Participation in the arbitration is mandatory for the fi-
nancial institutions registered or authorised by the Monetary Authority or the 
Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong (with some exceptions) and 
is optional for these financial institutions’ customers.  
II. Investment arbitration in finance 
Until recently, investment arbitration has dealt prevailingly with claims of the real 
economy. However, ever since the famous Abaclat v Argentina and Deutsche 
Bank v Sri Lanka proved that financial undertakings qualified as investments, 
more and more financial disputes have been brought; this is also because global 
79 
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financial turmoil and the debt crises in some regions of the world have generated 
occasions for complaints.98 
–––––––––––––– 
98 For instance, currently (24.02.2019) a case Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. v Hellenic 
Republic is pending before an ICSID panel (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/16). The claimant 
contends that during the Greek crisis in 2012 it was treated less favourably than other bank-











Chapter 6: The term «applicable law» 
I. «Applicable»  
Through the word «applicable» in the term «applicable law», the international 
arbitration legal practice and doctrine refer most often to a law’s competence 
to regulate which originates in the traditional private international law’s con-
flict of laws rules, i.e. a principal competence to regulate. Understood in this 
way, the word «applicable» caters for a meaning of the expression «applicable 
law» as «proper law», «lex causae» or, in the language of PILA99, «desig-
nated» law». Except those of them which belong to a lex causae that is con-
nected to uniformly, overriding mandatory rules remain outside the scope of 
such applicable law – their competence to regulate does not derive from the 
traditional private international law’s conflict of laws rules100 and it is, thus, 
an exceptional rather than a principal competence to regulate.  
This meaning of «applicable» used by the international arbitration practice and 
literature is not the literal meaning of the word. It is more technical than the 
literal meaning. More precisely, it is specific to private international law (in 
particular to one of the main tasks of private international law – to appoint one 
out of many legal systems to regulate an international relationship between 
coequals101). The literal meaning is more general – it makes sense also in other 
branches of law apart from private international law – e.g. there would be «ap-
plicable» national private law or «applicable» international public law. Be-
sides, the literal sense refers to both principal and exceptional competence to 
–––––––––––––– 
99 – e.g. Art. 19 PILA talks about law «designated by this Act». 
100 – but, depending on the theory followed: from special conflict of laws rules of private inter-
national law, from special autonomous conflict of laws rules or from them (overriding man-
datory rules) themselves, in particular from their own substantive high importance. 
101 It is probably because «applicable» law is the subject matter of one of the main tasks of (and 
thus of great importance for) private international law that the latter’s understanding of the 
term is encountered most frequently. 
81 
82 
Chapter 6: The term «applicable law» 
 
46 
regulate: the semantics points at the presence simply of competence i.e. of any 
competence to regulate. 
In fact, the title of Sec. 3 of Chapter 1 PILA – «Applicable law» – appears to 
use the term «applicable» in its literal meaning and hence to encompass both 
principal and exceptional competence to regulate. Evidence is that the section 
itself contains not only rules on lex causae – Art. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 PILA 
– but also such on overriding mandatory rules – Art. 13102, 18 and 19 PILA.  
In order to be consonant with the legal practice and the remaining literature 
and also to have two separate terms signifying «proper law» and «overriding 
mandatory rules» for the purpose of comparing these two in a clearer way, the 
current work will use the first-mentioned, narrow meaning of «applicable» 
which renders «applicable law» a synonym of «proper law», «lex causae» or 
«designated law». Only sometimes (and whilst expressly noting this) will the 
wide sense of the term be resorted to.  
II. «Law»  
Strictly speaking, naming Art. 187 PILA «Applicable law» (own emphasis) 
and using this term as well as its (academic-flavoured) synonym «lex causae» 
in order to signify what the mentioned article regulates is incorrect because the 
latter does not prescribe only applicable «law» but also applicable «non-law»: 
the ex aequo et bono considerations envisaged in the second paragraph repre-
sent namely non-law – they are rules of social systems other than law. If wish-
ing to cover all the causās made available by Art. 187 PILA for the substantive 
resolution of the international arbitration dispute, one should rather speak of 
«applicable norms», «applicable law and concepts» or simply of «causa». 
However, for the sake of consistency with the literature’s language and since 
anyway solely legal norms are relevant to the present topic (overriding man-
datory rules constitute legal norms), the terms «applicable law» and «lex 
causae» will be used here as if they encompass all the causās under Art. 187 
PILA – legal causa and non-legal causa. 
–––––––––––––– 








Chapter 7: Determination of applicable law  
I. Method  
It is private international law, in particular that of the lex arbitri, that defines 
the law to be applied to the substance of a dispute, including a financial dis-
pute, which undergoes international arbitration. The method it uses was estab-
lished by Savigny and consists of conflict of laws rules formulated in an ««ab-
stract» manner»103 and using as a criterion the facts of the case without 
considering the content of the rival laws (i.e. the respective law becomes ap-
plicable «from the facts»104; the concrete (subjective) relationship plays a cen-
tral role).                                                             
II. Conflict of laws rules 
1. The references 
The Swiss lex arbitri provides the conflict of laws rules on applicable law in 
international arbitration in Art. 187 PILA.  
This rule stipulates that a dispute is resolved ex aequo et bono when the parties 
have authorised the international arbitrator to do so (Art. 187 (2) PILA) 105, 
–––––––––––––– 
103 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 56, in initio. 
104 However, this underlying of the extraction of a law’s applicability from the facts of a case 
might be confusing because the facts play a role for the applicability of any law, not only 
for the applicability of a law referred to by a private international law’s conflict of laws rule 
– in order that the dispositive order of a law applies to the facts of any case, the latter must 
qualify under the hypothesis of such law, and in this sense any law is connected to according 
to the facts of the case. The peculiarity of private international law is rather that the extrac-
tion of the applicability of a law from the facts of a case is not followed by a check of the 
content of the law whose applicability these facts point at. 
105 Similarly does Art. 28 (3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Model Law, § 1051 (3) German Code Of 
Civil Procedure, Sec. 46 (1) (b) English Arbitration Act 1996 (referring to «such other con-
siderations as are agreed by them [the parties] or determined by the tribunal»), Art. 31 (3) 




Chapter 7: Determination of applicable law 
 
48 
according to the law chosen by the parties106 (Art. 187 (1), first suggestion) or 
in the absence of such a choice according to the law (German and Italian trans-
lation of PILA) respectively rules of law (PILA’s French version) most closely 
connected to the case (Art. 187 (1), second suggestion PILA). The ex aequo et 
bono adjudication is here mentioned first, even if Art. 187 PILA provides for 
it after the other two connections (in the second paragraph) and even if the 
literature usually follows this order of the article, because a first place corre-
sponds more to the subsidiarity in the connections since, in fact, if ex aequo et 
bono authorising is present the other two connections will not be resorted to. 
The ex aequo et bono adjudication and the application of the law chosen by 
the parties are known as subjective connections since they are based on the 
will of the parties whilst the application of the law most closely connected to 
the case is an objective connection – the closeness of the facts of the case to 
the respective law does not (at least directly107) depend on the parties’ will.  
It is evident that the will of the parties (or the subjective type of connection) is 
a priority – if the latter have agreed on arbitration ex aequo et bono or on a law 
to be applied, the arbitrator will have to follow such agreement, without being 
able to construct the objective connection108.   
As a side note of comparison, in the EU, conflict of law rules on the law ap-
plicable in international arbitration are contained in some acts on specific types 
–––––––––––––– 
106 Other examples of conflict of laws rules conferring a choice of law include Art. 3 (1) Rome 
I, Art. 46 (1) (a) English Arbitration Act 1996, § 1051 (1) German Code of Civil Procedure, 
Art. 28 (1) UNICITRAL Model Law, Art. 2 (1) Hague Principles on Choice of Law, Art. 
33 (1) Swiss Rules, Art. 21 (1) ICC Rules, Art. 22 (3) LCIA Rules, Art. 31 (1) ICDR-AAA 
and Art. 35 (1) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 
1346ff.). 
107 The parties might have the opportunity to exert influence on such connection indirectly by 
arranging the facts of the case which constitute criteria for such connection to take place in 
the country whose law they wish to see connected. 
108 Also in the determination of applicable law in state court proceedings, the will of the parties 
has precedence – Art. 116 PILA (parties have, however, less power than in international 
arbitration to appoint non-legal concepts as applicable – they cannot choose adjudication 








of international private law relations and whether they are contained also in 
the EU general private international law on contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters – Rome I and Rome Convention109 – is disputable. In the 
latter discussion, the majority of authors give a negative answer110 and a mi-
nority give a positive one111. Upon a strict interpretation of Rome I’s text, one 
can defend the latter opinion. Art. 1 (2) (e) Rome I exempts from the regula-
tion’s scope only «arbitration agreements»112, i.e. not arbitration in general – 
hence the determination of the law to apply to other (than the arbitration agree-
ment) aspects of arbitration such as the substance of the case must  remain 
within the scope of Rome I113. In fact, if this exclusion of «arbitration agree-
ments» is read as an exclusion of arbitration as a whole, then (by analogy) also 
the exclusion contained in the same provision of «agreements on the choice of 
court» would have to be read as an exclusion of the whole state court procedure 
where the parties have chosen the court, which would be odd, since a huge 
amount of litigation would be excluded, keeping in mind that in civil and com-
mercial matters – the subject matter of Rome I – choice of court is frequent. 
In addition, Art. 9 (2) Rome I is compatible with international arbitration; more 
–––––––––––––– 
109 Rome I replaces the Rome Convention. However, since Rome I is not applicable to all EU 
Member States (e.g. Denmark is not bound by it because of an opt-out of regulations under 
the area of freedom, security and justice), the Rome Convention is still in force with regard 
to the Member States to which Rome I does not apply. 
110 – e.g. the following authors cited in: GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1349, in par-
ticular fn. 1510. 
111 as cited in GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1349, in particular fn. 1512. KARRER, 
BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 259 considers the predecessor of Rome I which equally excludes 
arbitration agreements form its scope – Rome Convention – as applicable to arbitration. 
112 In this sense also YÜKSEL, 153 who compares Rome I with Brussels I: the former regulation 
excluded «arbitration agreements», and the latter – «arbitration». 
113 See YÜKSEL, 177. According to the second para of «Conclusion», not only the law applicable 
to the arbitration agreement but also that applicable to the arbitration procedure was ex-
cluded from the scope of Rome I. However, the law applicable to the substance of the case 
was not excluded and that is the point made here. On the other hand, admittedly, as under-
lined in the third para of «Conclusion», the regulation uses mostly the word «courts» and it 
is not certain whether the other encountered term «tribunals» encompasses (also) arbitral 
tribunals. 
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precisely, it does not lead to a (from the perspective of the latter «unde-
served»114) privilege of the overriding mandatory rules of the seat of the inter-
national arbitration, because it only allows this seat to anchor, but it does not 
itself impose, such privilege – «Nothing … shall restrict» (most probably the 
seat will indeed anchor such privilege for state court proceedings, but it will 
not for international arbitration – and this wording of Art. 9 (2) Rome I has 
perhaps been adopted precisely in order to make that possible). On the other 
hand, the possibility remains that the EU legislator indeed intended to exclude 
arbitration as a whole, not only arbitration agreements, but did not express that 
precisely enough. 
1.1 Ex aequo et bono 
Adjudication ex aequo et bono is not a version of the choice of law under Art. 
187 (1) PILA, first proposition, as KARRER contends115, because parties’ au-
thorisation for such adjudging is a choice of non-legal considerations, not of 
law: the ex aequo et bono decision is based on «considerations of fairness, not 
of existing law»116.  
For now, financial actors, especially banks, are not keen on having their dis-
putes decided ex aequo et bono. Their reason is consideration of legal cer-
tainty. The Rapport Final, 83 gives an example on how a bank’s interests can 
be «harmed» by a decision ex aequo et bono: if a party fails to pay under a 
loan which it had taken in relation to a purchase contract because, due to a 
force majeure circumstance, its counterparty under such a purchase contract 
has failed to pay to it, an arbitrator might excuse the party out of a sense of 
equity, thus considering a force majeure that has «happened» outside the loan 
relationship (in the purchase contract); since prudential capital requirements 
will have demanded this, the bank will have built reserves corresponding to 
the credit concerned and will now not receive returns on the latter, meaning 
that it will have blocked financial means that could have been invested in other 
undertakings. 
–––––––––––––– 
114 Why «undeserved» will be discussed in Chapter 23, II., 2.3 (mostly in a. thereof). 
115 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 291. 
116 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1426. 
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1.2 Choice of law 
The opportunity to choose a law is frequently used in international arbitration. 
Parties which make the «effort» to determine the forum (international arbitra-
tion) usually also make the «effort» to define the governing law. They, espe-
cially those acting in the financial sector, seek legal certainty and are, moreo-
ver, supported by sophisticated advisers. 
1.3 The law most closely connected to the case 
A difficulty, but on the other hand maybe an advantage, in international arbi-
tration is that there is no concretisation of the concept of the closest connection 
as there is for state court proceedings (e.g. in Art. 117 (2) and (3) PILA, 118 
et seqq. PILA). In principle, important criteria for finding the law mostly re-
lated to a transaction are the place of business or habitual residence of the 
parties (particularly of the one performing the characteristic obligation) or the 
place of performance of the characteristic obligation. When it comes to finan-
cial transactions, the place of the market often deserves to be reckoned as the 
one to which the transaction relates the most.                             
If the arbitrated matter reveals equal closeness to more than one laws, all of 
these laws can be applied – each to the relevant part with which it has this 
close connection.  
In international arbitration (but also in litigation) the objective connection is 
associated with circumvention of law much less than the subjective one, as the 
usual suspects for attempting such circumvention – the parties – cannot di-
rectly117 influence this connection. 
2. Scope of the references  
It is established in the literature that the reference in the international arbitra-
tion legislation to applicable law includes only the substantive norms of such 
–––––––––––––– 
117 They might do it indirectly – they could have the chance to cause some or all facts of the 
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law without its conflict of law rules – no renvoi. Many choice of law clauses 
themselves talk about «substantive» law. 
By selecting a law, the parties displace both ius dispositivum and ius cogens 
of the law otherwise applicable with the exception of one category of ius co-
gens – overriding mandatory rules. If only ius dispositivum was replaced, that 
would have been the so-called «materialised choice of law» which is, in fact, 
no choice of law because the thus substituted ius dispositivum could have been 
derogated from also without choosing another law – through the parties agree-
ing in their contract on something other than that which such dispositive rules 
envisaged. 
One of the biggest disputes in connection with the scope of the reference to 
applicable law is connected again to Art. 187 (1) PILA118 and overriding man-
datory rules, but this time it concerns both references under that article (not 
only the reference to the law chosen by the parties) – namely whether these 
two references cover the lex causae‘s overriding mandatory rules. This prob-
lem will be discussed below when dealing with overriding mandatory rules.  
3. Types of applicable laws under Art. 187 (1) PILA          
3.1 Under the current Art. 187 (1) PILA 
At the moment there is a lack of clarity with regard to the type of applicable 
law referred to by Art. 187 (1) PILA. The text of the latter does not clarify 
whether such law can be both national and non-national or only national. The 
German and Italian translations refer to «law» («Recht» respectively 
«diritto»), whereas the French one refers to «rules of law» («règles de droit»). 
«Law», which is the traditional and more frequently encountered concept, is 
considered to be the rules in force in a particular state (national law), and «rules 
of law» – both the rules of a state (national law) and rules whose author is not 
a state (non-national law).  
–––––––––––––– 
118 The issue cannot arise for the reference under Art. 187 (2) PILA because the latter can only 









There is an international trend that also non-national legal orders are applied 
to relationships subject to international arbitration, and parties often select 
such orders119. Art. 3 of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law expressly 
provides: «The law chosen by the parties may be rules of law that are generally 
accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral and 
balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides otherwise.». At the 
same time, recommendations to choose a concrete national substantive law 
can often be «heard» – the consideration is that the content of non-national 
laws is difficult to establish, also due to diverging interpretations120. 
a Non-national rules of law 
Since this is the less traditional concept, it is appropriate here to make some 
remarks on non-national rules of law. These can be general principles of law, 
internationally recognised principles, or lex mercatoria, transnational law, a 
combination of national laws (rules common to two or more national laws), 
legal principles common to the legislations of civilised countries, etc.  
To take the example of lex mercatoria, that legal system consists of «rules of 
transnational law developed by the international business community to regu-
late commercial activities within that community. The rules of the lex merca-
toria are founded on usages developed in international trade, standard clauses 
or contracts proposed by international organisations, uniform laws, general 
principles of law and international instruments»121. Considering that some of 
them can be pacta sunt servanda, clausula rebus stantibus or force majeure, 
–––––––––––––– 
119 – that is stated also in Sec. I.18 of the Introduction to The Hague Principles on Choice of 
Law. 
120 The danger of choosing e.g. a combination of national laws, «general principles of law», 
«internationally recognized principles» or «legal principles common to the legislations of 
civilized countries» is referred to in MEIJER/HANSEN, 6.47. Therein also, Born is cited (see 
reference there) as stating that these solutions can «give rise to significant questions of va-
lidity and enforcement». 
121 GIRSBERGER /VOSER /COLACINO /DONCHI, 1364. See also BANTEKAS, 47. 
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these rules are not firmly established and only open-end catalogues122 are pos-
sible. BANTEKAS points at Art. 28 (4) of the UNICITRAL Model Law as an 
example of an obligation imposed on an international arbitrator to take into 
account lex mercatoria, in particular trade usages123. SEBASTIANUTTI, how-
ever, disagrees with the existence of lex mercatoria for international financial 
transactions124. In his view, these transactions are still subject to national 
laws125 – through their behaviour, financial markets participants are only han-
dling the implications of the multi-jurisdictional environment in which they 
do business but are not creating an international financial law that is «an iso-
lated legal island unto itself, freed of legal context»126. One can agree with 
SEBASTIANUTTI.  
3.2 Expected amendment of Art. 187 (1) PILA 
The bill with amendments in PILA’s Chapter 12 released in October 2018127 
includes a proposal for changing the word «law» in the German and Italian 
texts of Art. 187 (1) PILA to «rules of law». Such modification would be a 
right step. On the one side, it would remove the difference between the differ-
ent language versions of PILA, which is apparently beneficial, and, on the 
other side, it would bring the latter in harmony with the international trend of 
expanding the circle of substantive norms that can be given effect to in inter-
national arbitration, in particular of allowing that also rules originating from 
non-national legal systems are given effect to. 
–––––––––––––– 
122 – like the open-end catalogue of lex mercatoria norms encountered in the international arbi-
tration practice, available at (last visited on 05.02.2019): http://trans-lex.org/principles. 
123 BANTEKAS, 47. As also the author points out, that rule requires that the international arbitra-
tor takes into account trade usages even «regardless of the parties’ choice of law». Art. 28 
(4) talks about such taking into account «in all cases» which, interpreted systematically 
with the preceding rules in Art. 28, one of which contains namely this hypothesis (Art. 28 
(1)), must include the hypothesis of a parties’ choice of law. 
124 SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 4, 363. 
125 SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 2, 161. 
126 SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 4, 363. 
127 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht (IPRG), Änderung vom …, Entwurf, 2018-
















Chapter 8: Context 
I. Freedom of contract and its limitation  
The freedom of contract is a general principle of private law. Yet it is not ab-
solute. In some cases, it is limited for the sake of protecting particular interests 
– individual interests (e.g. the interests of the weaker party to a contract) or 
public interests (public health, stability of the financial system, etc.).         
1. Legal rules and concepts for the granting of freedom of 
contract 
1.1 Contracting as one wishes to 
The freedom to contract is in the first place realised through permitting private 
parties to contract as they wish to, where no rule exists. 
1.2 Dispositive rules 
In addition, the freedom to contract is expressed in permitting contracting par-
ties to deviate from dispositive rules (dispositional rules, discretionary rules, 
non-mandatory rules, ius dispositivum). Contractors may agree on something 
else than that prescribed by the dispositive rule, and in that case the latter 
would not apply128. 
Dispositive norms can be encountered in both private and public law acts but 
more often in the former. 
–––––––––––––– 
128 Sec. 4 (1) and (2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 read together and separately give an 
express definition of mandatory and non-mandatory rules. In fact, those will be procedural 
rules because, arbitration being the subject matter of the Act, they will be rules of arbitration 
law and the latter is a procedural law, but it is worth mentioning this legislative description 
of a mandatory and non-mandatory norm. With regard to non-mandatory rules, Sec. 4 (2) 
of the Act states: «The other provisions of this Part (the “non-mandatory provisions”) allow 
the parties to make their own arrangements by agreement but provide rules which apply in 
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Dispositive rules are enacted, even though they can be derogated from, be-
cause they ensure legal certainty in the cases where the parties did not agree 
anything and a dispute arises.  
The fact they are applicable only in the absence of a parties’ arrangement as 
well as the fact that (as will be seen below) they are the antipode of «manda-
tory rules» does not mean that dispositive norms are not compulsory. When 
their hypothesis is realised, they are compulsory – but this realisation is present 
solely when they have not been derogated from by the parties. 
2. Legal rules and concepts for limiting the freedom of con-
tract 
2.1 Mandatory rules 
Opposed to dispositive rules are mandatory rules (imperative rules, ius co-
gens129). The latter apply even if the parties have agreed something else130, and 
this is exactly contrary to how dispositive rules function. Mandatory rules act 
in this way because they protect important interests. Both public and private 
law can be the source of these rules, but more frequently it is the former. 
2.2 Ordre public (public order, public policy) 
Ordre public (public order, public policy) is a concept which puts together the 
highest (apparently public) interests in a legal system – elements which are a 
conditio sine qua non for the very existence of that system. Ordre public is 
–––––––––––––– 
129 – not in the sense of international public law; a sense which comprises only a part of the ius 
cogens meant here – the most important ones. 
130 In its first para, the above-mentioned Sec. 4 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides 
with regard to mandatory rules «The mandatory provisions of this Part are listed in Schedule 
1 and have effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.». In fact, through this Sec. 
4, the English Arbitration Act 1996 becomes a rare example of a lex arbitri providing ex-








composed of both rules contained in the objective law (which will be interna-
tionally mandatory rules) and legal principles not incorporated in the objective 
law.  
Ordre public differs from mandatory rules because its subject matter is always 
only public interests of the highest importance, whilst mandatory rules protect 
both – individual and public – interests. It is true that also one type of manda-
tory rules – overriding mandatory rules – will protect solely public interests, 
but the latter will not always (only sometimes) be so important as to be con-
sidered also a part of the ordre public131. Then (as is clear from the definition 
provided in the previous paragraph), ordre public does not need to be incor-
porated in the objective law, whereas mandatory rules do – they are namely 
rules of law. 
II. Mandatory rules in particular 
1. Types 
Mandatory rules can be internally mandatory rules (ordinary mandatory rules), 
internationally mandatory rules (overriding mandatory rules, qualified manda-
tory rules, unequivocally mandatory rules) and socially (protective) mandatory 
rules. This Chapter 8, II., 1. uses the terms «internally mandatory rules» and 
«internationally mandatory rules» more often than the remainder of the current 
work (which refers most often to the synonyms «ordinary mandatory rules» 
and «overriding mandatory rules» respectively). That is because the first set 
of terms contains adverbs which directly oppose each other – «internally» and 
«internationally» – and, thus, demonstrates in a clearer manner the difference 
between the two types of mandatory rules concerned132.  
1.1 Internally mandatory rules (ordinary mandatory rules)  
–––––––––––––– 
131 More on the differentiation between ordre public and overriding mandatory rules in Chapter 
11, IV. 
132 Also, VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 164 uses the adverb «internationally» (own 
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The mandatory character of internally mandatory rules, as with the validity of 
ordinary law, is effective only on the territory of the state whose legislator 
issues them. This means that they are obligatory only if the law to which they 
belong is the lex causae. The legal protection of the interests which are legally 
protected by mandatory rules is not afforded such importance as to have to be 
spread beyond national borders – such protection is needed only «in the opin-
ion» of the local national, but not of the international, community133. Ordinary 
mandatory law protects individual134 or public interests. It is substantive law 
which the domestic conflict law treats preferentially compared to other domes-
tic substantive law. 
1.2 Internationally mandatory rules (overriding mandatory rules, 
qualified mandatory rules, unequivocally mandatory rules)  
Internationally mandatory rules are mandatory not only within the territory of 
the country that enacted them but also abroad (hence, «internationally manda-
tory rules»), i.e. they are applicable even if they do not belong to the lex causae 
(that is also why in the German language they are called «intervening» norms 
– they are able to «intervene» with the lex causae). The reason is that those are 
namely the qualified mandatory rules, i.e. those of the mandatory rules which 
protect the most important of the interests which mandatory rules protect: be-
ing most important, the protected interests are paramount not only within the 
borders of the state, like the interests protected by the other type of mandatory 
rules (the ordinary mandatory rules), but also internationally135. In other 
words, a substantive difference between ordinary mandatory rules and over-
riding mandatory rules leads to a difference in the territorial scope of their 
–––––––––––––– 
133 For instance, in the Swiss international arbitration ICC Case No. 6379 of 1990 (published in 
YCA, Vol. XVII, 1992, 212ff.) a Belgian mandatory law prescribing a thirty-six-month 
notification period and obligatory access to state courts for agreements on distribution of 
goods was seen as expressing local preferences and, thus, as an ordinary mandatory law not 
to be imposed on an Italian-law-governed contract. 
134 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 275 gives an example of a mandatory rule which puts 
the emphasis on an individual interest with the Swiss cantonal maximums on interest rates 
on credits. 
135 See also MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 18 N 10 with references. 
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mandatoriness. Due to the global scale and interconnectedness of the busi-
nesses, mandatory rules in finance – the example taken here – will more often 
implement international instead of local preferences and will thus more often 
be overriding.  
In Recital 37 of its preamble, Rome I distinguishes between «overriding man-
datory provisions» and «provisions which cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment», defining the former as a narrower category (to «be construed more re-
strictively»). What is meant is not their territorial scope of application (which 
is wider – it is international); but their material scope of application – this 
scope will be narrower, since fewer interests will feature significance that 
overcomes the borders of their own jurisdictions. 
The applicability of an internationally mandatory rule is determined by inter-
national, and not domestic, conflict law.  
1.3 Mandatory (socially) protective rules 
Mandatory (socially) protective rules seek to safeguard the interests of a cate-
gory of persons considered to be in an economically weaker position. They are 
contained in both private and public law. Examples are the sociopolitical 
norms of consumer protection law (Art. 6 (2) Rome I), employment law (Art. 
8 (1) Rome I) or tenant law. 
It is difficult to assign mandatory (socially) protective rules to ordinary or 
qualified mandatory law, it can even be said that they are somewhere between 
these two. It seems that for KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, for example, they 
are a type of overriding mandatory rules – the authors enumerate the goals 
pursued by those rules among the aims of overriding mandatory rules136. Here 
it is rather believed that they are ordinary mandatory rules. First, Art. 6 (2) and 
8 (1) Rome I, for example, call them rules that «cannot be derogated from», 
which is language usually seen in definitions of ordinary mandatory rules – 
the language used for describing overriding mandatory rules always adds to 
the impossibility of avoiding the rule also an indication that such impossibility 
–––––––––––––– 
136 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.93, where «mandatory rules» is a synonym of «overriding 
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is present, even if a foreign law is applicable (through an expression like «re-
gardless of the law applicable to the case»). Second, mandatory (socially) pro-
tective rules do not enjoy default international mandatoriness – they are inter-
nationally mandatory only in special cases when that is ordered by a special 
rule such as Art. 6 (2) or 8 (1) Rome I, and not always by virtue of a general137 
rule such as Art. 9 Rome I. Third, mandatory (socially) protective rules most 
often reflect perceptions of a particular country to be given effect only within 
it – e.g. which party is weak in a contractual relation.  
2. Terminology 
The term «mandatory rules» is unfortunately inconsistently used in the legis-
lation and doctrine. Rather than the wide interpretation used here (mandatory 
rules in general), it is often perceived narrowly and, what is more, it is given 
two different narrow meanings: first, internally (ordinary) mandatory rules; 
and second, internationally (overriding, unequivocally, qualified) mandatory 
rules.  
The first of the two narrow meanings (ordinary mandatory rules) is frequently 
used in material civil law138.  
The area in which the second narrow meaning (overriding mandatory rules) is 
often used is conflict law. Examples are Art. 18 and 19 PILA: the adverb 
«mandatorily» and the adjective «mandatory» refer to internationally manda-
tory rules. Probably due to the fact that conflict law deals with international 
cases, the internationality of the discussed problem – a rule’s mandatoriness – 
is taken as granted. Thus, the present work may contain citations of awards, 
–––––––––––––– 
137 Such a «general» rule is, in fact, special compared to the classical Savigny’s conflict of laws 
rules because it is a conflict of laws rule that deals with overriding mandatory rules – but 
here it is general in the sense that it deals with rules that are generally, i.e. always, interna-
tionally mandatory, and not with those that are internationally mandatory only for the spe-
cific occasion. 








court decisions or literature which refer to «mandatory norms» but mean «in-
ternationally mandatory rules»139. 
The Rome Convention even uses «mandatory rules» in both of the narrow 
meanings at the same time – as internally and as internationally mandatory 
rules. According to the Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Conven-
tion, 45 «the expression “mandatory provision” covers multiple realities: it 
designates at the same time overriding mandatory rules in the meaning of Art. 
7, a concept specific to private international law, and public-policy rules of 
national law». (By «public-policy rules of national law» the Green Paper 
seems to mean ordinary mandatory rules, and not the above-described public 
policy when incorporated in rules – if still the latter is meant, then the Rome 
Convention adds a fourth meaning of «mandatory rules» – as public policy 
rules.) 
Here, «mandatory rules» will mean only mandatory rules in the wide sense.  
III. Summary  
Freedom of contract is granted through the delegation to contract as one wishes 
in fields in which there are no rules whatsoever and in fields in which there 
are rules that one can derogate from (dispositive rules). The limitation of the 
freedom of contract is realised through mandatory rules, which on their side 
can be internally mandatory rules, internationally mandatory rules and man-
datory (socially) protective rules, and through the ordre public, which can be, 
but not necessarily is, incorporated in objective rules (the latter being simulta-
neously also internationally mandatory rules).140 
–––––––––––––– 
139 – for instance, ICC Case No. 8528, 25 et seqq. 
140 SCHNYDER, for example, makes the following classification of rules in the field of insurance 
contract law: «non-mandatory rules», «mandatory rules in relative terms», «mandatory 
rules in absolute terms» and «<unequivocal> or <qualified> mandatory rules and/or provi-
sions which form part of public policy» (SCHNYDER, EC International Insurance Contract 








Chapter 9: Characteristics   
I. Definition  
1. Overriding mandatory rules   
1.1 Legislation 
a Switzerland 
Swiss law does not provide an explicit definition of overriding mandatory 
rules. The characteristics of the latter can be extracted from Art. 18 PILA141 
and Art. 19 PILA. Art. 18 PILA concerns Swiss overriding mandatory rules; 
Art. 19 PILA concerns foreign overriding mandatory rules. In fact, whether 
they are foreign or domestic is not relevant for their characterisation as over-
riding mandatory (it might be relevant for their treatment, especially by state 
courts, but that is another question). This is also why the specifying of such 
origin by the mentioned legislative texts will be omitted here when construct-
ing the definition of overriding mandatory rules.           
Art. 18 PILA talks about «provisions … which, because of their special aim, 
are to be applied mandatorily, irrespective of the law designated…». One can 
infer from this that overriding mandatory provisions feature a special goal, a 
requirement that they are applied always (including when they do not belong 
to the lex causae) and a causal link between these two elements.  
Art. 19 PILA is less descriptive than Art. 18 PILA and allows one to deduct 
only one of the characteristics pointed out in the latter – the mandatory ap-
plicability: a «provision … which wants to be applied mandatorily…». Art. 19 
PILA most probably owes its laconic language to having been premised on the 
fact that Art. 18 PILA already contains the details.  
–––––––––––––– 
141 Whether Art. 18 PILA concerns overriding mandatory rules or positive ordre public and 









To sum up, for PILA an overriding mandatory rule is a rule that has a special 
goal, and due to this special goal, it has to be applied always – even where the 
law to which it belongs does not govern the case.  
b EU 
EU law has given an explicit definition of overriding mandatory rules for the 
first time – the first paragraph of Art. 9 Rome I142 provides: «Overriding man-
datory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial 
by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situa-
tion falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to 
the contract ….»143. The main points here are: relevance of the rules in ques-
tion for a public interest which can be (but is not limited to) a political, social 
or economic interest; importance of the safeguarding of such interest; applica-
bility of these rules which does not depend on whether they belong to the lex 
causae or not (applicability at any price, mandatory applicability). Unlike the 
German version, the English version does not specify that overriding manda-
tory rules are provisions which are «mandatory» (i.e. that overriding manda-
tory rules are a type of mandatory provisions), but it does not need to, as that 
is clear already from the term – «overriding mandatory provisions» (from the 
German term it is not clear, since the word «mandatory» («zwingend» or sim-
ilar in German) is not contained – «Eingriffsnormen»).  
c Comparison between Swiss and EU law 
EU law is more detailed than Swiss law. It explains that overriding mandatory 
rules are connected to a public interest and even gives examples of such public 
interests – political, social or economic. Swiss law talks about a special goal 
–––––––––––––– 
142 Rome II does not have an explicit definition of overriding mandatory rules. 
143 The concept of «overriding mandatory provisions» embedded in Art. 9 Rome I is a pan-
European concept, not one of the national law of a EU Member State («This is a European, 
not Greek Law concept…» – Eurobank Ergasias v Kalliroi [2015] EWHC 2377 (Comm) – 
i.c. a Greek banking rule allegedly rendering a commission related to an English-governed 
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without elaborating on the character, in particular on the cause, of this speci-
ality of the goal. However, it should also be admitted that the wording of the 
Swiss law («special aim» – Art. 18 PILA), at the end, achieves as much as that 
of the EU law («provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a 
country for safeguarding its public interests» – Art. 9 (1) Rome I) and even 
more because it is broader – having a special purpose can include the serving 
of a public interest and in addition having other special aims.  
Otherwise Swiss and EU law have the following similarities. Under both, 
overriding mandatory rules are to be applied obligatorily regardless of any po-
tential belonging to the lex causae. Both indicate a causal link between the 
substantive content of the concerned rule and the compulsiveness of such a 
rule’s applicability – the rule is mandatorily applicable exactly because of the 
substantive goal it is trying to achieve, in particular because of the importance 
of that goal. This nexus is visible from the phrases «because of» in Art. 18 
PILA and «crucial … to such an extent that…» in Art. 9 (1) Rome I.  
In effect, it could be said that the Swiss «definition» in Art. 18 and 19 PILA 
and the EU definition in Art. 9 (1) Rome I are more or less the same. In fact, 
the predecessor of the latter which was in force at the relevant time – Art. 7 of 
the Rome Convention – was followed when creating PILA144 145.  
1.2 Literature 
According to SCHNYDER, overriding mandatory rules are domestic or foreign 
norms which claim to be applicable regardless of the appointed law. They de-
termine their spatial scope independently from the references made by private 
international law because they are of a special imperative nature.146 
–––––––––––––– 
144 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 315. 
145 Though this Art. 7 of the Rome Convention did not devote a whole separate paragraph to 
the defining of overriding mandatory rules as Art. 9 (1) Rome I does today, quite some 
features of the concept of overriding mandatory rules could be extracted from it, and thus 
taken as a model. 









According to KARRER, who sees them as «a modern version of the French 
concept of «lois de police»»147, overriding mandatory rules are norms of pub-
lic law or of private law which in the respective law are to apply in an abso-
lutely mandatory way and sua sponte and which, from the point of view of 
private international law, are lois d’application immédiate.  
One can refer also to VOSER’s definition of overriding mandatory rules of the 
lex fori. In her view, the latter are material norms with a unilateral, related-to-
them conflict of laws rule, through which the law maker wanted to ensure the 
applicability of the domestic law (express lois d’application immédiate) or 
through which it would have ensured the applicability of the domestic law had 
it thought of the applicability of the material norm in international situations 
(implicit lois d’application immédiate)148. 
KÖHLER discusses overriding mandatory rules in a formal and in a material 
sense. He seems to understand the former as substantive rules to which an ex-
plicit (contained in them or separately) unilateral conflict of laws rule attaches. 
This conflict of laws rule is lex specialis towards the general conflict of laws 
rule and, because of being such lex specialis, leads to the concerned substan-
tive rules asserting themselves against the substantive rules designated by the 
general conflict of laws rule. Overriding mandatory rules in a material sense 
appear to be deemed by KÖHLER as substantive norms (only) which, upon in-
terpretation of their purpose (and not simply their wording which might show 
differently), are not encompassed by the general conflict of laws rule but need 
to be connected to autonomously, and, thus, assert themselves against the sub-
stantive rules designated by the general conflict of laws rule.149 
1.3 Proposed definition 
Overriding mandatory rules are material law rules whose content is so im-
portant for the society that conflict law provides that they are to be applied or 
–––––––––––––– 
147 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 230. 
148 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 133. 
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considered always, regardless of whether the law to which they belong governs 
the matter or not.      
2. Financial overriding mandatory rules 
2.1 Definition 
Financial overriding mandatory rules are overriding mandatory rules concern-
ing the financial sphere. Their material law content protects the public interests 
that can be touched upon in the course of concluding financial transactions. In 
order to accomplish such protection, they regulate the financial transactions 
(loans, equity and debt securities, derivatives, insurance products, etc.), the 
persons participating in or facilitating the conclusion of the financial transac-
tions (banks, insurers, funds, collective investment schemes, stock exchanges, 
investors, etc.) and the methods of concluding those (i.e. the financial ser-
vices)150. Financial overriding mandatory rules are e.g. currency regula-
tions151, requirements for securities trading, restrictions on movement of cap-
ital, bans on financial services providers from offering services in the territory 
or to the citizens of a country, etc. 
2.2 Frequent presence of status of financial markets law as overriding 
mandatory law  
Nowadays, overriding mandatory rules are ever more enacted, especially with 
regard to economic – and in particular financial – transactions. Financial mar-
kets law is even said to be «archetypical overriding law»152. As became clear 
(see Chapter 5, Subchapter 1, V.), financial transactions often touch upon pub-
lic interests and the latter are namely the subject matter of overriding manda-
tory rules. Globalisation in the financing business has also played a role. It was 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Subchapter 1, IV. that it has led to financial transac-
tions being able to touch upon the interests of other jurisdictions, except of the 
–––––––––––––– 
150 See also MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 18 N 16 as well as SEBASTIANUTTI, Interna-
tional financial law, Part 5. 
151 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 203. 
152 LEHMANN, 533. 
141 
142 




jurisdictions within which these transactions are concluded. That has moti-
vated the legislators of the other jurisdictions to regulate the effects of such 
foreign (to them) financial transactions, and such regulating necessarily hap-
pens through the enactment of extraterritorially applicable law, like overriding 
mandatory rules.  
2.3 Frequent absence of status of financial markets law as interna-
tional ordre public     
Whilst frequently characterised as overriding mandatory law, financial mar-
kets law would rarely be characterised as international ordre public law. That 
is also why the problem discussed here of the treatment of this law by Swiss 
international arbitration arises – if it belonged to international ordre public its 
treatment would have been clear: as per Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA it would have 
had to be complied with by international arbitrators adjudicating out of Swit-
zerland. Financial market rules are very important to it but rarely constitute 
some of the real fundamentals of social life. The prevailing view in the litera-
ture and the jurisprudence is that market regulation and economic regulation 
are not part of the ordre public153. With its famous decision Terra armata (see 
cons. 3.2 and the third paragraph of cons. 3.1), the Court denied competition 
law the status of ordre public under Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA: this law was found 
to be an instrument only of some but not of all economies; planned economies 
with more state intervention, for example, did not resort to it, and such planned 
economies could not be held out as immoral or contrary to the fundamental 
principles of law. That logic might be applied also to financial market regula-
tion – namely also market regulation. On the other side, one cannot exclude 
financial markets law altogether from the space of international ordre public. 
Some of its rules will belong to the latter – mostly those that also have other 
subjects of protection apart from the financial market (e.g. anti-money-laun-
dering rules). 
II. Terminology                       
1. Legislation 
–––––––––––––– 
153 PFISTERER, Art. 190 N 86. 
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Swiss law still lacks a specific legislatively established term for the concept of 
overriding mandatory rules. Only descriptive phrases such as «provisions … 
which, because of their special aim, are to be applied mandatorily, irrespective 
of the law designated…»  or «provision … which wants to be applied manda-
torily…» exist in Art. 18 (respectively 19) PILA. Within the EU, Rome I has 
brought some clarity to the terminology. In its English version, it speaks of 
«overriding mandatory rules». The German translation refers to 
«Eingriffsnorm» (for singular; respectively «Eingriffsnormen» for plural) 
which puts a certain end to the dispute on the German term154.  
2. Literature 
The terminology in the literature is not universal. It was already mentioned 
above that «mandatory rules», «qualified mandatory rules», «internationally 
mandatory rules» and «unequivocally mandatory rules»155 are synonyms of 
«overriding mandatory rules». In addition, in the various writings one can en-
counter, for example, «lois d'application immédiate», «absolute rules in the 
lex fori», «spatially conditioned internal rules», «lois de police», «peremptory 
rules»156. Though this is not clear from its wording, the term «lois d’applica-
tion immédiate» covers the immediately applicable rules only of the lex fori, 
and not of any lex, which means that it cannot be a synonym for, but is «solely» 
a type of, «overriding mandatory rules». «Absolute rules in the lex fori» which 
is a quite precise term, on the other hand, makes it clear that it refers only to 
rules of the forum. The indication of the spatial application in the term «spa-
tially conditioned internal rules» (present also in the Italian term «norme 
sostanziali spazialmente delimitate» (in English something like «spatially lim-
–––––––––––––– 
154 SCHNYDER, IPR der Leistungsstörungen, 212. Own translation from German. 
155 In connection to insurance contract law, SCHNYDER uses, amongst others, the term «une-
quivocal mandatory rules» (SCHNYDER, EC International Insurance Contract Law, 590). 
This is a suitable term, although it might be better to use an adverb («unequivocally») – 
«unequivocally mandatory rules» – as done here, rather than an adjective («unequivocal») 
– «unequivocal mandatory rules» – so as to show that the unequivocalness characterises the 
rule’s mandatory nature, and not merely the rule. 
156 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 6. 
144 
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ited substantive norms»)) is unexplainable because lois d'application immédi-
ate rather touch upon more territories than only one. Some authors use «lois 
de police» and «lois d'application immédiate» as synonyms of each other and 
sometimes both of those terms – as synonyms of «mandatory rules»157. «Lois 
de police» seems to be wide and mean simply «mandatory rules» rather than 
«lois d’application immédiate» because it neither indicates an overriding na-
ture of the mandatoriness of the rules nor belongingness of those to the lex 
fori.  
As far as other (than English) languages are concerned, there are for example: 
the already mentioned German term «Eingriffsnorm» (for singular; respec-
tively «Eingriffsnormen» for plural), the French «dispoitions internatio-
nalement imperatives», and the Italian «norme di applicazione necessaria»158 
159. «Eingriffnormen» has been increasingly used. Literally translated into 
English it means «interfering norms», «intervening norms», «interference 
norms»160 or «norms that interfere» or «norms that intervene» (from 
«Eingriff» – «interference», «intervention» and  «Normen» – «norms»), and 
as a matter of fact it is very precise as it connotes an act of interfering which 
indeed happens in practice161. In addition, the English «overriding mandatory 
rules» and the German «Eingriffsnormen» correspond well to each other – 
they both show supersession by the norms in question of other norms. 
3. Proposed terminology 
Even if a precise term would bring about clarity and, thus, legal certainty, its 
practical significance would not be that great because a rule would apply as 
overriding mandatory as long as it has the described characteristics regardless 
–––––––––––––– 
157 See GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO//DONCHI, 1373-1377 and citations there. 
158 KAUFMANN-KOLHER/RIGOZZI, 7.92. 
159 See VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 5, 6 for further terminology. 
160 Also, SCHNYDER uses this term in English – SCHNYDER, Conflicts of Law, 435. 
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of whether it is expressly called «overriding mandatory», which would any-
way seldom be done162. Still, uniform terminology is always the better option. 
It is apparent that something should be added to «mandatory rules» in order to 
specify the nature of the mandatoriness. This could be e.g. one of these adjec-
tives, adverbs and substantives: «overriding», «internationally», «unequivo-
cally», «qualified»163, «interference», «interfering». «Overriding» has been 
used in a law – Art. 9 of Rome I – and though such law is not Swiss (but EU), 
this presence of some legislative use strengthens the justification for a refer-
ence to it and hence to «overriding mandatory rules».  
III. Types 
Overriding mandatory rules can be substantive or procedural. Most often sub-
stantive ones are those being referred to, and that is also the case here.  
IV. Sources  
Overriding mandatory rules can originate from public (both regulatory and 
criminal) or private law. In any case, however, they are «at least close to public 
law»164. Overriding mandatory rules of the forum – lois d’application immédi-
ate – are «functionally» public law norms165: even where they are contained 
in private law norms, they still protect some (forum’s) regulatory interests.          
Then, overriding mandatory rules can be contained in national, supranational 
or international law.                 
Overriding mandatory rules would often be situated outside the private law act 
governing the contract – in a separate, e.g. regulatory or criminal, statute. That 
would be so where they are of a public law character (which is often the case) 
–––––––––––––– 
162 SCHNYDER, Conflicts of Law, 435. 
163 – even if «qualified» only indicates the presence of a special character without making it 
clear what the latter consists of. 
164 VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 18 N 2. 









and it is the reason why it is so difficult to know of the relevance of an over-
riding mandatory rule in the first place. 
V. Components 
1. Special objective 
The most important distinguishing feature of overriding mandatory rules is 
their special purpose, which is special because it consists of the protection of 
very important interests – namely public interests (health protection, human 
rights, environmental protection, preservation of the cultural heritage, eco-
nomic policy, etc.166).  
It would be most logical to extract the characterisation of this purpose of the 
overriding mandatory rule as very important from the law which contains the 
overriding mandatory rule. On the other hand, one can argue that also the lex 
causae should have a say, and probably the lex fori, or the law applicable to 
the parties, and so on and so on – in an international situation, many laws may 
become relevant. Yet one should at least start with the «opinion» of the legis-
lation which contains the overriding mandatory rule and as an additional cri-
terion check if another law – be it the lex causae, the lex fori or a third law (the 
idea is simply to make a comparison) – protects the same interests167.    
Such special purpose is a part of the material law content of the overriding 
mandatory rule. 
–––––––––––––– 
166 See also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.93, where «mandatory rules» is a synonym of 
«overriding mandatory rules» (as can be inferred from the previous paragraph – 7.92) and 
where the authors apparently consider mandatory (socially) protective rules as a type of 
overriding mandatory rules rather than a category equal and parallel to overriding manda-
tory rules. 
167 SCHNYDER, Eingriffsnormen im Versicherungskollisionsrecht, 626. The author gives the ex-
amples of Liechtenstein’s insurance law provisions on the obligatory use of national lan-
guage in insurance contracts, the prohibition of the cancellation of the contract and others 
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2. Willingness to apply mandatorily 
In order to be qualified as overriding mandatory the rule in question itself 
should want to be applied. «The scope of application of the rule, whether ex-
press or implied, will tell» if there is willingness168. This willingness means 
that «the state enacting the rule intended it to apply to international situa-
tions»169.  
Thus, it is the law that contains the overriding mandatory rules which should 
be calling for overriding mandatoriness, whereby it does not play a role if such 
law is lex cause, lex fori or a third law170.  
This willingness of the qualified mandatory rule to apply mandatorily is its 
conflict of laws component171 – an implied conflict of laws rule. As contended, 
every material law norm, even a domestic one, needs a conflict of laws rule in 
a wide sense which «declares» its applicability. In fact, there is a debate in the 
literature, with regard to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori in par-
ticular, on whether the material norms which such overriding mandatory rules 
contain are their only content and the trigger of their applicability or whether 
also conflict of law rules are contained. VOSER does not agree with Frances-
cakis that the lois d’application immédiate define their scope of application on 
their own172. She believes that conflict of law rules are in any case needed; 
they built a logical autonomous supplement to material norms173. VOSER even 
doubts the very need of Art. 18. PILA, stating that the latter incorporates the 
«“given”»174 – probably she believes that the function of this article (to order 
overriding mandatoriness) will already have been performed by the conflict of 
laws rule which, she deems, is contained in the loi application immédiate. If a 
–––––––––––––– 
168 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.98 wth regard to Art. 19 PILA. 
169 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.98. 
170 ICC case No. 8528. 
171 The order for the special scope of application of the overriding mandatory rules «is the con-
flict of laws mechanism» of the overriding mandatoriness – SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskolli-
sionsrecht, 56 (end of first paragraph), own translation from German. 
172 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 125 and passim. 
173 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 125-127 and passim. 








conflict of laws rule is anyway present, the term «lois d’application immedi-
ate» used for overriding mandatory rules legis fori will be imprecise because 
the application will not be derived from the loi itself, but from the conflict of 
laws rule. VOSER also underlines the inaccuracy of the term but considers that 
there is no better term. Here the terms «overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
fori» or «overriding mandatory rules legis fori» are considered better alterna-
tives.      
3. Causal link between the willingness of the rule to apply 
mandatorily and the special objective 
An overriding mandatory rule wants to be applied mandatorily, namely in or-
der to attain the special objective it has.  
VI. Legal consequences 
1. Legal consequences 
Overriding mandatory rules can produce administrative, criminal and/or civil 
law consequences. Only the latter will be enforceable in international arbitra-
tion, and in arbitration as a whole. For instance, an administrative law conse-
quence of a financial overriding mandatory rule will be the withdrawal of a 
licence, a criminal law consequence will be imprisonment (e.g. in case of 
money laundering or insider dealing), and a civil law consequence will be the 
voidability or voidance of a contract, claim for damages, etc.  
2. Civil law consequences  
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The direct civil law consequences of an overriding mandatory rule concern the 
«destiny of the legal relationship between the parties»175. They are the conse-
quences that stand the closest in time to the act of applying or considering the 
overriding mandatory rule.    
The overriding mandatory law itself could define them, as does, for example, 
Art. 26 of the Swiss Federal law of 16 December 1983 on the acquisition of 
real estate by persons abroad (nullity of transactions concluded without the 
necessary permission) or Art. 101 (2) TFEU (nullity of arrangements violating 
EU competition law). 
However, the overriding mandatory law in question might also omit to deter-
mine its direct consequences, in which case separate rules will have to be con-
sulted. In Switzerland, such rules will be Art. 20 CO or Art. 97 respectively 
119 CO176. The first article prescribes nullity of a contract with illegal content 
and the last two prescribe subsequent impossibility to perform a contract, in 
particular objective impossibility under the law177. Nullity of the contract is 
present when the overriding mandatory rule infringed by the contract was sub-
sisting at the time of the latter’s conclusion, and subsequent impossibility of 
the contract’s performance is present when the overriding mandatory rule vi-
olated comes into effect only after such conclusion. It should be noted that, 
even if, read strictly, Art. 20 CO deems itself applicable to violations of any 
–––––––––––––– 
175 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 272, in initio with regard to the direct legal conse-
quences of overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori (lois d’application immediate) under 
Art. 18 PILA, own translation from German. 
176 Wihin the material law approach, these articles were the basis for applying or considering 
the respective overriding mandatory rules. Here, under the conflict of laws approach, they 
have another mission – to regulate the consequences of an already applied or considered 
overriding mandatory rule. 
177 In this sense, with regard to lois d’application immédiate in particular, VOSER, Lois d’appli-
cation immédiate, 273. 
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law178, case law and literature are of the view that Art. 20, 97 and 119 CO are 
not applicable to every violation of an overriding mandatory rule. The author-
ities consider, for example, that there is nullity of the contract only where the 
meaning and purpose (not necessarily the wording) of the violated overriding 
mandatory rule so demand. For instance, the violation of a rule that prohibits 
the participation by certain parties in a particular type of contract does not 
render the contract void unless collective interests are involved (the infringe-
ment by a foreign broker of the prohibition on activity in Switzerland without 
a licence does not lead to nullity of the contract179, whilst medical doctors, 
lawyers or notaries whose work touches upon public interests need an author-
isation in order to conclude contracts180). Thus, it is apparent that where the 
overriding mandatory law does not define its direct consequence, one cannot 
presume voidance of the contact. One needs to elaborate criteria here. Im-
portance and unambiguity of the violated overriding mandatory rule might be 
such: where the rule is very important and clear (in the financial sphere, due 
to the complex relations, clarity might not always be present), the contract 
would be void, and where it is not very important or not clear, the contract 
would be voidable. 
2.2 Indirect  
The indirect civil law consequences of an overriding mandatory rule are those 
that «regulate … the just balance between the interests of the parties after the 
–––––––––––––– 
178 Also VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 273, in initio underlines that Art. 20 CO appears 
to cause nullity automatically. She considers the context of mandatory norms imposing pro-
hibitions and Art. 20 CO appears, in her view, to trigger the nullity of the violation of any 
such norm. 
179 DSC 62 II 108 of 19 February 1936, 111; DSC 114 II 279 of 21 June 1988, 281, cons. 2, b); 
DSC 117 II 47 of 13 March 1991, 48, cons. 2, a), second paragraph. 
     Similarly, in Germany a violation of the prohibition on performing certain banking activities 
without the required licence does not automatically lead to voidance of the concluded con-
tracts but only creates a right of the German financial regulator – Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht («Bafin») – to order the winding-up of those (§ 37 (1) German 
Banking Act) which right might also remain unexercised. 
180 DSC 117 II 47 of 13 March 1991, 48, cons. 2, a), second paragraph. 
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direct consequence … has been already clarified»181. They are less close to the 
act of applying or considering the overriding mandatory rule than the direct 
consequences – they are the result which comes after the latter. The question 
about them «concerns in particular the civil law consequences of the nullity of 
the contract»182, such as rescinding of the contract, unjust enrichment or tort 
claims183.  
–––––––––––––– 
181 VOSER in respect of the indirect consequences of lois d’application immediate under Art. 18 
PILA (VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 277 – own translation from German). 
182 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 278, in initio (own translation from German). 





Chapter 10: Examples  
I. Non-economic overriding mandatory rules  
Overriding mandatory rules which do not concern the economic sphere are e.g. 
those protecting public health, human rights, the environment, the cultural her-
itage. 
II. Economic overriding mandatory rules 
Economic law participates in the producing of overriding mandatory rules 
mainly through: competition law, import and export provisions, trading with 
the enemy legislation, capital market controls (e.g. emergency laws), currency 
controls, legislation on the acquisition of land by persons abroad, prohibitions 
or restrictions on export of food (in cases of shortage)184 or economic sanctions 
by one country against another imposed for political reasons.                     
III. Financial overriding mandatory rules 
1. Examples according to type 
One can talk about institutional and transactional financial overriding manda-
tory rules. The former will concern the financial markets participants as insti-
tutions – or their organising as legal persons – e.g. rules on licences, minimum 
capital, minimum solvency ratio. Transactional financial overriding manda-
tory rules will regulate the carrying out of the business – anti-money-launder-
ing provisions, rules against the financing of terrorist activities, currency ex-
change regulations etc. 
–––––––––––––– 
184 SCHNYDER, IPR der Leistungsstörungen, 211. VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 203 
gives as examples for prohibitions or restrictions on export of food the US and Polish bans 
on exporting soya beans and sugar after bad harvests; in Switzerland the export of existen-
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Financial overriding mandatory rules can also be initial and prudential. The 
initial type are to be implemented at the beginning of the activity of the finan-
cial markets participant. Many of the institutional financial overriding manda-
tory rules – e.g. the requirement for obtaining a licence – are such initial fi-
nancial overriding mandatory rules. Prudential financial overriding mandatory 
rules are the financial overriding mandatory rules which apply throughout the 
whole financial business activity of the respective person. Both the institu-
tional and the transactional financial overriding mandatory rules can be pru-
dential, with the latter always being such. 
Financial overriding mandatory rules regarding the normal course of business 
are those financial overriding mandatory rules enacted under ordinary eco-
nomic circumstances in order to prevent a crisis and safeguard certain rights. 
They are valid for an indefinite period of time. The prohibition on securities 
fraud, capital requirements or publicity duties are amongst them. On the other 
side are the crisis-determined financial overriding mandatory rules, such as 
capital controls, which are introduced upon the occurrence of an economic 
and/or financial crisis and aim at mitigating such a crisis. Their effect is tem-
porary, for a short (but sometimes, if the situation does not improve, longer) 
period. 
2. Examples in different laws 
The following Swiss legal acts regarding the financial sector might incorporate 
overriding mandatory rules: the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 
November 1934; the Federal Act on the Swiss National Bank of 3 October 
2003; the Federal Act on the Supervision of Insurance Companies of 17 De-
cember 2004; the Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes of 23 June 
2006 («CISA»); the Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading 
of 24 March 1995 («SESTA»)185; the Federal Act on the Financial Market In-
frastructures and the Market Conduct in Securities and Derivatives Trading of 
–––––––––––––– 
185 However, large parts of it were repealed and the respective issues are now regulated by the 
new Federal Act on the Financial Market Infrastructures and the Market Conduct in Secu-
rities and Derivatives Trading («FMIA»). 
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19 June 2015 («FMIA»); the Federal Act on Intermediated Securities of 3 Oc-
tober 2008; the Federal Decision on Protection of the Currency of 8 October 
1971 and the ordinances of the Federal Council supplementing that decision, 
such as the Ordinance on the Measures against inflow of foreign monies of 20 
November 1974 and its amendment from 22 January 1975186; the Criminal 
Code of 21 December 1937 («CrimC»); the Federal Act on Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector of 10 October 1997 
(«AMLA»); the Federal Act on the Execution of International Sanctions of 22 
March 2002 («Embargo Law») and some ordinances enacted under it, like the 
Ordinance on economic measures against Iraq of 7 August 1990, the Ordi-
nance on measures against Zimbabwe of 19 March 2002, the Ordinance on 
measures against the Central African Republic of 14 March 2014 or the Ordi-
nance on measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran of 11 November 2015; 
the Federal Act on external economic measures of 25 June 1982; the Ordi-
nance on the Liquidity of Banks of 30 November 2012; the Ordinance con-
cerning Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for Banks and Securities 
Traders of 1 June 2012; and eventually, the Federal Act on Financial Services 
(«FinSA») and the Federal Act on Financial Institutions («FinIA») adopted on 
15 June 2018 and likely to enter into force on 1 January 2020. For instance, in 
one decision, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission applied Art. 18 PILA 
and subjected a takeover bid which targeted a non-Swiss (Luxembourgish) 
company to SESTA, in particular to Art. 22 (1) SESTA (now repealed)187. In 
addition, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court characterised the reporting 
and tender obligations of Swiss stock exchange law as lois d’application im-
médiate188.   
–––––––––––––– 
186 – an example (of Swiss currency regulations) given by VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 
203. The Court held null a contract clause violating the prohibition on interest yield for 
foreign deposits imposed by the Ordinance – DSC 110 II 360 of 13 March 1984. 
 
187 – Decision of the Upper Chamber of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission of 30 Septem-
ber 1999 concerning an offer by LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton to TAG Heuer In-
ternational SA, as cited in MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 18 N 16. 
188 – B-1215/2009 of 9 November 2010 of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, cons. 
7.1.2ff., as cited in MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 18 N 16. 
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Financial overriding mandatory rules in the EU are contained in Directive 
2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
on criminal sanctions for market abuse (Market Abuse Directive) or in Regu-
lation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps. 
For instance, the latter contains a prohibition of uncovered short selling in its 
Art. 12 (1) and 13 (1)189. Further, the EU fights against money laundering 
through overriding mandatory rules in Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 
2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. 
An example of enactment of crisis-determined (in particular determined by a 
public debt crisis) financial overriding mandatory rules is witnessed in the 
Greek jurisdiction. In 2010 a Hellenic Financial Stability Fund («HFSF») was 
established through Law 3864/2010 on the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund 
as a state-owned private legal entity, a special purpose vehicle created to «con-
tribute to the maintenance of the stability of the Greek banking system, for the 
sake of public interest». Among the competences of HFSF was the extension 
of capital aid to financial institutions. The HFSF became a shareholder in cer-
tain credit institutions (which led to new notification requirements for the other 
shareholders190). Next, capital controls were introduced in the summer of 2015 
in the peak of the country’s debt crisis. As of 18 November 2016, they are still 
in force, though to a certain extent eased. In a nutshell, forced bank holidays 
were announced, cash withdrawals from any branch or cash dispenser of credit 
institutions in Greece or abroad were limited to EUR 60 per depositor 
per credit institution per day (or EUR 420 per week), the transfer of funds or 
cash abroad was prohibited  (with certain exceptions in cases of transfers to 
–––––––––––––– 
189 LEHMANN, 544. 
190 E.g. upon HFSF acquiring or selling a certain amount of an institution’s shares, apart from 
it being under a notification duty, other shareholders of the respective institution became 
obliged to notify the percentage of shares they held after considering the percentage of 
shares which the HFSF had announced to hold. 
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children studying abroad up to a certain amount or of transfers for health pur-
poses), large bill payments to foreign suppliers had to be approved by a gov-
ernment commission (with preferences for payments regarding certain prod-
ucts such as medicines), Greek citizens were prohibited from opening foreign 
bank accounts or buying shares abroad.191 The restrictions applied to «credit 
institutions that operate in Greece in any form, including branches of foreign 
credit institutions within the scope of Law 4261/2014 (Government Gazette 
issue A 107), the Consignments and Loans Fund, payment institutions under 
Law 3862/2010 (Government Gazette issue A 113) and electronic money in-
stitutions under Law 4021/2011 (Government Gazette issue A 218) 
and branches and agents of payment institutions and electronic money institu-
tions established in other states and lawfully operating in Greece…»192.  
On 22 March 2013, Cyprus enacted two laws connected to its banking crisis: 
The Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Law («Law 17(I)/2013») and 
The Enforcement of Restrictive Measures on Transactions in Case of Emer-
gency Law of 2013 («Law 12(I)/2013»). Restrictive measures were imposed 
that included, for example, limitations on cash withdrawals and on export of 
cash as well as prohibitions on cashing cheques and making payments and 
transfers of funds outside and inside Cyprus (with certain exceptions for pay-
ments made within the normal business or associated with salaries or expenses 
for studies). Ensuing decrees under Law 12(I)/2013 modified the measures. 
In 2011, Argentina adopted restraints on currency and trade in order to protect 
its foreign currency reserves that had decreased. Among those were foreign 
exchange controls which restricted the purchase and sale of foreign currencies, 
including and especially of US dollars (otherwise popular among Argentinian 
–––––––––––––– 
191 These rules objectively violated the free movement of capital granted under Art. 63 TFEU 
but were adopted under the exception the latter allows for situations where public policy 
interests need to be protected – Art. 65 (1) (b), in fine TFEU. 
192 Art. 1, point 1 of the Greek legislative act «Urgent provisions for imposing restrictions on 
cash withdrawals and capital transfers» (G.G. issue A 84, 18.07.2015), as applicable (G.G. 
issue B 1561/24.7.2015), (G.G. issue Α 90, 31.7.2015), (G.G. issue B 1617, 
31.7.2015), (G.G. issue B 1620, 1.7.2015), (G.G. issue B 1721, 17.8.2015), (G.G. issue B 
1867, 1.8.2015), (G.G. issue B 1871, 3.9.2015), (G.G. issue B 2100, 25.9.2015), (G.G. issue 
B 2110, 29.9.2015) and (G.G. issue B 2131, 2.10.2015). 
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savers). This concerned both individuals and companies. Cash withdrawals 
were limited. Bank holidays were announced. Accounts above a certain thresh-
old were converted into fixed-interest savings accounts and those in dollars 
were converted into Argentinian peso accounts. A yearly mandatory bank de-
posit in foreign currency applied to thirty percent of the inflows of funds in 
Argentine financial institutions. The controls were removed at the end of 2015. 
As of 26.01.2016, the Dutch Financial Markets Amendment Act 2015 obliges 
banks’ employees to take an oath in which they, inter alia, promise to perform 
their duties with integrity and care, to balance the interests of customers, share-
holders, employees and the society in which the bank operates, and to put the 
interests of the client at the forefront within this balance. This rule seems to 
have been intended to address problems of the financial market, which have 
proved themselves sensitive throughout the financial crisis. It will be interest-
ing to see if that rule will have any impact on civil law relations. And if it does, 
it will be even more interesting to see whether it has an influence in particular 
on international civil law relations, i.e. whether it will be deemed as so im-
portant that e.g. a cross-border contract concluded by a bank through an em-
ployee who has not taken the oath will be void or voidable.  
Two Cuban decrees provide examples for exchange control regulations. De-
cree No. 13 of 1948 required all obligations paid in Cuba to be executed in the 
Cuban currency (Cuban pesos), and Decree No. 568 of 1959 required all pay-
ments to Cuban nationals to be rendered in Cuba. The aim of these acts was to 
preserve the supply of foreign exchange in Cuba through keeping Cuban pesos 
in the country and, in so far as possible, attracting into it dollars owed to Cu-
bans.  
The Mexican exchange control regulations scrutinised in the case of Braka v 
Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d 762 F.2d 222 (2d 
Cir. 1985 and the case of Callejo v Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 
1985) – both cases as cited by MARKS, 120 – imposed the conversion of do-
mestic debts denominated in foreign currency into Mexican pesos at an official 









An Italian law, involved in the English case Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v 
Teruzzi193, required residents in Italy to obtain a ministerial permission for in-
curring obligations against non-residents. The purpose was to preserve the 
country’s exchange resources through inhibiting residents from exporting cap-
ital. 
United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v Royal Bank of Canada194 con-
cerned Peruvian regulations which restricted the export of currency out of Peru 
by private persons for reasons of preserving the supply of foreign exchange of 
the country. 
Czechoslovakian capital regulations were invoked in a case leading to a 
French judgment from 16 October 1967195. In order to protect the country's 
reserves of foreign exchange, they restricted the export of capital, including of 
foreign currency, by Czechoslovakian citizens.196   
Frantzmann v Ponijen case197 involved Indonesian regulations that required a 
licence for currency exchange contracts. The adjudging Dutch court defined 
the contract at stake – a promissory note to pay Dutch currency in return for 
Indonesian currency – as covered by these regulations and (since the envisaged 
licence had not been obtained) refused enforcement based on Art. VIII (2) (b) 
of the Bretton Woods Agreement. 
–––––––––––––– 
193 [1976] 2 W.L.R. 418 (C.A.), [1976] 1 All E.R. 817. 
194 [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039 (H.L.), [1982] 2 All E.R. 720. 
195 Cass. Civ.  1re, Fr. (Arrêt No. 746; Pouvoir No. 65-12.879). 
196 Even though the court deemed it to be against French public policy to enforce contracts 
entered into with the intention of circumventing foreign law, the court enforced a contract 
circumventing the Czechoslovakian law, since the latter was not consistent with the Bretton 
Woods Agreement and thus was not protected by the latter’s Art. VIII (2) (b). One cannot 
follow the court’s logic – the violation of French public policy is a basis separate from Art. 
VIII (2) (b) Bretton Woods Agreement, which means that, even if the latter cannot be ap-
plied, the infringement of French public policy should still be sanctioned (by a refusal to 
enforce the contract whose existence causes this infringement). 








Chapter 11: Differentiation 
I. Internally mandatory rules 
For differentiation of overriding mandatory rules from ordinary mandatory 
rules, see above – Chapter 8, II.    
II. Lois d’application immédiate 
Lois d’application immédiate are the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
fori. The doctrine of lois d’application immédiate is rooted in Art. 18 PILA 
for Switzerland198. Lois d’application immédiate are a type of overriding man-
datory rules. Ergo they cannot actually be distinguished from the latter. They 
might have some of their own specificities, such as the ability (within a state 
court procedure) to prevail over competing overriding mandatory rules (in par-
ticular over competing overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and of a 
third law) but they preserve the general characteristics of overriding manda-
tory rules; they are the latter.  
III. Public law norms within public law relations 
Overriding mandatory rules can be public law norms, i.e. their material law 
content can be a public law content (and will often be so). In this case, they 
might be competing with other national public laws for the right to regulate 
the public law dimension of the concerned international relationship, but this 
competing will not be analysed here. Rivalry between national public laws is 
the subject matter of public conflict law (which is anyway scarce), whilst the 
conflict law examined here is private conflict law (even if potentially influ-
enced by public law – namely by overriding mandatory public law). Moreover, 
in the context of competition between national public laws, there would be no 
«overriding» mandatory rules: since national public laws are coequals (their 
–––––––––––––– 
198 For the EU in Art. 9 (2) of Rome I and respectively Art. 7 (2) of the latter’s predecessor – 








authors – states – are equal to each other), none of these laws would «over-
ride», i.e. be more important than, another; it would solely be defined (by pub-
lic conflict law) as competent to regulate. 
IV. Ordre public 
Often, even in case law, the term «public policy», «ordre public», or «public 
order» is used as a synonym of «overriding mandatory rules». That is confus-
ing, since these are generally seen as distinct concepts. Here they are consid-
ered as differing from each other – although case law cited here might use 
them as interchangeable terms.              
Because overriding mandatory rules are different than ordre public, the regu-
lation of the role of the latter in Swiss international arbitration (Art. 190 (2) (e) 
PILA renders a violation against it a ground for annulment of the arbitral 
award) does not help in defining the role of overriding mandatory rules within 
this dispute resolution procedure199. 
1. On the terms 
«Ordre public» and «public order» signify the same concept. The former term 
has a French and the latter an English origin.              
Controversy can be encountered with regard to the existence of a difference 
between «ordre public» (a synonym of «public order») and «public policy». 
Some authors use them as different concepts200. Public policy is seen as one 
of the faces of public order, in particular as passive public order (and overrid-
ing mandatory rules as active public order). In such a constellation, public or-
der is a common denominator of public policy and overriding mandatory 
–––––––––––––– 
199 Ordre public’s violation is a ground for annulment also under Art. 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Model Law, § 1059 (2) (2) (b) of the German Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and Sec. 68 (1) in connection with (2) (g) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. It is 
also a ground for the refusal to recognise and enforce a foreign arbitral award – Art. V (2) 
(b) New York Convention or Art. 36 (1) (b) (ii) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Model Law. 
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rules201. However, other authors202 and (notably) many standard agreements 
and legal acts hold «public order» and «public policy» to be interchangeable. 
Examples of such standard agreements and legal acts are The Hague Principles 
on Choice of Law (Art. 11 – the wording of the title and paras 3, 4 and 5 are 
clear on this), Rome I (Art. 21), the Rome Convention (Art. 16), Rome II (Re-
cital 32 of the preamble and Art. 26), and the Inter-American Convention (Art. 
5 (2) (b)). Since it is legal acts that treat them as such, «ordre public» and 
«public policy» will be here used as synonyms. Keeping also in mind that, as 
mentioned above, «ordre public» is a synonym of «public order», all three – 
«ordre public», «public order» and «public policy» – will be synonyms.   
2. Definition 
Ordre public consists of ideals, concepts or thoughts203 which are fundamental 
for a legal system – «legal thoughts which stand in the basis of the sense for 
law in the country and of the natural law»204. Ordre public is a very abstract 
–––––––––––––– 
201 It is indeed possible for public policy and overriding mandatory rules to have a common 
denominator because they were born from the same consideration – the thought to protect 
general interests. At the same time, there is no great need for finding this common denom-
inator because public policy and overriding mandatory rules can function independently 
from each other. 
202 See GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1400 who use the term «public policy» (more 
precisely, «international public policy») when commenting on a provision which speaks of 
«ordre public» (and is read as meaning international ordre public) – Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA 
– which cannot mean anything other than that he considers them synonyms. See further 
JAGUSCH, 5.125, first sentence. Also in unofficial translations of German-speaking Swiss 
judgments into English, the German term «ordre public» is translated into English as «pub-
lic policy» (see e.g. the translation of DSC 4A_414/2010 of 27 October 2010, cons. 2.1, in 
fine under http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/27%20octo-
bre%202010%204A%20414%202010.pdf (last visited on 07.02.2019)). 
203 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 249 speaks of «legal thoughts» (while comparing or-
dre public with lois d’application immédiate). Own translation from German. 
204 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 249 (while comparing ordre public with lois d’appli-
cation immédiate). Own translation from German. 
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concept. Its abstract nature renders it almost undefinable (Terra armata, cons. 
2.1); it is even compared by some to a chameleon205. 
Because it is so abstract, ordre public is not necessarily objective law, i.e. it is 
not necessarily anchored in a legal provision, in a legal act206. Its abstract na-
ture is also the reason why it is able to include moral207 values without «losing» 
legal character.  
3. Types 
3.1 Negative and positive  
Negative ordre public was historically the first to be employed. It can be com-
pared to a sort of «defence». Its task is to prevent the application within one’s 
territory of a law which is irreconcilable with fundamental concepts of the ter-
ritory’s own law or of the law of the international community. Art. 17 and 190 
(2) (e) PILA incorporate negative ordre public: the former – the Swiss nega-
tive ordre public, the latter – the international negative ordre public208. Simi-
larly to overriding mandatory rules, in order for the respective ordre public to 
have the «right» to be defended, the legal system to which it belongs should 
be sufficiently connected to the case209.    
–––––––––––––– 
205 DUTOIT, 455ff. (in particular the title of the work). 
206 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 249 (while comparing ordre public with lois d’appli-
cation immédiate); LEHMANN, 536. 
207 LEHMANN, 536 talks about «moral values» (own translation from German) when discussing 
the term «ordre public» contained in Art. 21 Rome I. 
208 That Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA envisages negative ordre public is visible from case Not Indicated 
v Not Indicated, cons. 1, b), aa): «L'ordre public, au sens de l'art. 190 al. 2 lit. e LDIP, n'est 
qu'une simple clause d'incompatibilité dénuée d'effet positif ou normatif sur les rapports 
juridiques litigieux (ordre public négatif).». 
209 For instance, in DSC 125 III 443 of 30 September 1999 (in particular cons. 3, d)) Art. 17 
PILA was not activated against the Islamic prohibition on interests because such a connec-
tion was missing (and also because the opposite of such prohibition – the principle of inter-
ests on capital – was not so fundamental to the Swiss legal system as to be applicable by 
189 
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Positive ordre public imposes on a law that is applicable to the case the fun-
damental concepts of the law in force in the territory of the forum that exam-
ines the case or in the international community as a whole. The positive form 
of ordre public is rarely invoked: adjudicators have a minimalistic approach – 
they try to intrude into the private law relationship as little as possible and thus 
only in defence. Though it does not refer to it expressly, Art. 18 PILA is reck-
oned by most (even if not all) authors to incorporate the positive ordre pub-
lic210. At the same time, it was namely this article that above the characteristics 
of overriding mandatory rules were inferred from (see Chapter 9, I., 1., 1.1, 
a.). In fact, there is a discussion in the literature as to whether positive ordre 
public and overriding mandatory rules represent the same, but this will be ad-
dressed below211.  
ARNOLD is right that the hindering of the application of a law through the ordre 
public reservation (the ordre public’s negative function) is equal to the assert-
ing of the ideas of one’s own law (the ordre public’s positive function), and it 
is therefore difficult to separate completely these two functions of the ordre 
public212. According to ARNOLD, whether despite such inseparability the pos-
itive function of the ordre public can be used for a separate goal such as the 
–––––––––––––– 
way of exception despite Swiss private international law’s having appointed a non-Swiss 
law as governing). 
210 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 17, N 3 with references regarding the prevailing opin-
ion and the critics against it. Also, according to SCHNYDER, the positive ordre public is 
explicitly incorporated in Art. 18 PILA. VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, passim dis-
agrees that Art. 18 contains the positive ordre public – it does not refer expressly to it. 
However, according to her, historically the Swiss legislator did want to incorporate the or-
dre public in Art. 18 – this was apparent from the preparatory acts of PILA (VOSER, Lois 
d'application immédiate, 246). In addition, also for VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 
247 the Court in DSC 117 II 494ff. of 17 December 1991 acknowledges a connection be-
tween Art. 18 and the positive ordre public. However, she also notes (again there) that the 
Court was very cautious and did not hold that positive ordre public and overriding manda-
tory rules were identical, nor that they were closely related, but only that Art. 18 PILA 
touched upon the positive aspect of ordre public (see DSC 117 II 494 of 17 December 1991, 
501, cons. 7, last paragraph). 
211 See 5.2. 
212 ARNOLD, 143. 
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assertion of overriding mandatory rules is also a difficult question, as he notes, 
not decided unanimously in Germany213. 
3.2 Procedural and substantive  
Public policy has two substrates: procedural and substantive; hence, one talks 
of procedural and of substantive ordre public214.  
Procedural public policy consists of the principles that shape the form in which 
justice is delivered – the legal procedure – or, in other words, of the basics of 
procedural law. According to the Court, «Procedural public policy guarantees 
to the parties the right to an independent judgement issued consistently with 
applicable procedural law as to the submissions and the facts submitted to the 
Arbitral Tribunal; procedural public policy is violated when fundamental and 
generally recognized principles were not respected, thus leading to an unsus-
tainable contradiction with the sentiment of justice, so that the decision ap-
pears inconsistent with the values recognized by a state ruled by law»215. Pro-
cedural public policy includes, amongst others, the right to be heard, the right 
to equal treatment or the principle of res judicata. Violations in Swiss interna-
tional arbitration of the procedural public policy (in its international form) are 
counteracted through raising them as grounds for setting the arbitral award 
aside: via Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA for infringements of the right to be heard and 
to equal treatment and by means of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA for breaches of other 
fundamental procedural principles. 
Substantive public policy comprises the basics of the law that regulates the 
material relations. The respect for material (international) public policy by 
Swiss international arbitrators is safeguarded through Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA’s 
threat of annulment of the award in case of its breach. The Court gives a defi-
nition of a violation of material ordre public, setting very high criteria, 
–––––––––––––– 
213 ARNOLD, 143. 
214 Terra armata, cons. 2.2.1, first paragraph. 
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amongst others, in DSC 4A_414/2010 of 27 October 2010, cons. 2.1216 as well 
as in 4A_558/2011 of 27 March 2012, cons. 4.1 (corresponding to DSC 138 
III 322, 327) and the therein cited: Terra armata, cons. 2.2.1 and 4P.282/2001 
of 3 April 2002 (corresponding to DSC 128 III 191), cons. 6, b). For instance, 
in the third paragraph of the mentioned cons. 2.2.1 of Terra armata, the Court 
holds that «an award is contrary to material public policy when it violates fun-
damental principles of material law in such a serious way that it is no longer 
consistent with the legal order and the pertinent system of values; amongst 
such  principles are contractual trust, the respect for the rules of good faith, the 
prohibition of abuse of rights, the prohibition of discriminatory or confiscatory 
measures, as well as the protection of incapable persons.»217. Other decisions 
include also the prohibition of excessive contractual limitation of a person’s 
freedom (4A_558/2011 of 27 March 2012, which corresponds to 138 III 322, 
27 March 2012). The literature adds: the prohibition of corruption, the prohi-
bition of arrangements to smuggle goods into or out of a country and the pro-
hibition of agreements regarding the supply of illicit drugs.218 Contradictions 
in the award, for example, do not per se infringe the material ordre public219. 
The first time the Court annulled an international arbitral award for a violation 
of substantive public policy was in the above-mentioned 4A_558/2011 of 27 
March 2012, which corresponds to 138 III 322 of 27 March 2012. The case 
–––––––––––––– 
216 The Court in DSC 4A_414/2010 of 27 October 2010, cons. 2.1 does not expressly refer to 
«international» substantive ordre public, but this is implied, since it examines a complaint 
under Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA and the latter is seen as envisaging international ordre public. 
217 Some decisions which deal with the violations given as examples are: regarding the principle 
pacta sunt servanda – DSC 4A_93/2013 of 29 October 2013 (cons. 4.2), DSC 138 III 270 
of 2 May 2012 (cons. 5.2.1); regarding the prohibition of abuse of right – DSC 4A_490/2013 
of 28 January 2014 (cons. 4.2), partially published as DSC 140 III 75 of 28 January 2014, 
DSC 4A_600/2008 of 20 February 2009 (cons. 4.1); regarding the prohibition of expropri-
ation without compensation – DSC 138 III 322 of 27 March 2012 (cons. 4.1); regarding the 
prohibition of discrimination – DSC 4A_70/2015 of 29 April 2015 (cons. 4.2), DSC 
4P.104/2004 of 18 October 2004 (cons. 6.1), DSC 4P.207/2002 of 10 December 2002 (cons. 
2.1). 
218 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1634 and the therein-cited literature and cases. 
219 DSC 4A_448/2013 of 27 March 2014, cons. 3.2.2; DSC 4A_ 362/2013 of 27 March 2014, 
cons. 3.2.2; DSC 4A_150/2012 of 12 July 2012, cons. 5.2.1; DSC 4A_481/2010 of 15 March 
2011, cons. 4. 




concerned a ban from performing any football activity, which threatened a 
football player if a request of his previous football club for the payment of a 
sum due as a result of the termination of his contract with that club was not 
paid within 90 days. In the Court’s view, as an open-ended ban to play football 
capable of being imposed at the sole decision of a former employer, this meas-
ure was excessive contractual limitation of the freedom of the football player 
and thus contravened Art. 27 (2) CC.  
3.3 Domestic and international  
a Domestic 
Domestic ordre public comprises legal principles fundamental for the legal 
system of a country. The Swiss legislator protects its domestic ordre public 
through Art. 17 PILA and, if we accept that overriding mandatory rules are in 
fact the positive ordre public, also through Art. 18 PILA. Domestic ordre pub-
lic has both procedural and substantive substrate.     
b International     
International ordre public encompasses legal principles fundamental to the le-
gal system of any state which is based the rule of law. The Court gives a defi-
nition of substantive international ordre public: «Ordre public is infringed by 
the material adjudgment of a disputed claim only when it disregards funda-
mental legal principles and is, therefore, absolutely irreconcilable with the es-
sential, broadly recognised order of values which, according to the predomi-
nant view in Switzerland, should constitute the foundation of every legal 
order.»220. International ordre public consists of «clearly fundamental legal 
principles»221 and moral values; so fundamental that they make part of any 
–––––––––––––– 
220 – 4A_558/2011 of 27 March 2012, cons. 4.1 (corresponding to DSC 138 III 322, 327); own 
translation from German. Also DSC 4A_414/2010 of 27 October 2010, cons. 2.1 (the Court 
does not expressly refer to «international» substantive ordre public but this is implied since 
it examines a claim based on alleged violation of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA), Terra armata, 
cons. 2.2.1 and 4P.282/2001 of 3 April 2002 (corresponding to DSC 128 III 191), cons. 6, 
b) give examples of international ordre public. 
221 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 17 N 25. 
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civilised country (though not necessarily of all countries222) and the «commu-
nauté international des Etats» recognises them as unrenounceable223.  
Being so important, the principles to be accounted to international ordre public 
are quite few, i.e. the latter has a narrow scope224 – not in territorial but in 
quantitative aspect – as to the number of principles which qualify as its com-
ponents. For instance, despite its wide and rapid embracement by various leg-
islatures around the world, competition law was not seen by the Court as in-
herent in every legal system225; sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council 
are also not certain to make part of international ordre public226. That is also 
why the case law under the provision which sanctions violations against inter-
national ordre public – Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA – is very strict227: violations of 
law (even clear ones)228 such as wrongful application of law or erroneous de-
termination of applicable law229 or wrong findings of fact (even evidently 
–––––––––––––– 
222 Even though some statements leave the impression that international ordre public consists 
of rules that are present in all the states (see e.g. «...l'ordre public international ... consiste 
en la combinaison cohérente des systèmes juridiques de l'ensemble des États» – para 88 of 
Cour D’appel Canada Province de Québec Greffe de Montréal, case N°: 500-09-009391-
004 (500-05-043881-984), judgment of 31 March 2003), it comprises rules present only 
(although these are not few) in those countries considered civilised («A rule does not have 
to be adopted in all jurisdictions worldwide for it to be considered part of the international 
public policy» – GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1379. 
223 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 17 N 25; GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 
1379. 
224 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1379. 
225 In Terra armata, the Court ruled this with regard to EU and national (i.c. Italian) competition 
law. EU competition law is a part of the ordre public of the EU and thus of the ordre public 
of EU member states (see Case C-126/97 of 1 June 1999 of CJEU, known as Eco Swiss 
China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, referred to also by the Court in Terra armata, 
cons. 3.1), i.e. it is a part of a domestic ordre public, not necessarily of the international 
ordre public as envisaged in Art. 190 (2) (e) (Terra armata, cons. 3.1). 
226 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1399. 
227 DSC 118 II 193, cons. 6. 
228 DSC 4A_18/2008 of 20 June 2008, cons. 2.2. 
229 DSC 116 II 634 of 14 November 1990, cons. 4. 
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wrong)230 do not per se qualify as ordre public infringements in the meaning 
of that rule231.  
It is not excluded, and it might even often be so, that international coincides 
with a national ordre public232. This is because international ordre public is a 
total of national ordre publics (of most, though not all, ordre publics). It should 
be noted that the terminology used for the concept of international ordre public 
is sometimes confusing233 since the adjectives «transnational», «universal» 
and «international» are each used, in combination with the term «ordre pub-
lic», to signify an antipode of «domestic ordre public» – but they are not syn-
onyms of each other: «transnational» might be understood as something that 
is valid almost everywhere in the world, i.e. in almost every country («trans-
national»); «universal» might be understood as valid everywhere in the world, 
i.e. universally in every country («univers-al»); and «international» might be 
understood as valid in relations between countries («inter-national»).  
c Both 
In Switzerland, state courts are solely called upon to watch for the protection 
of the Swiss ordre public within international private law relations. Interna-
tional arbitration courts take care only of international ordre public. The rules 
that apply to state courts and provide for the protection of ordre public – Art. 
17 PILA (and potentially Art. 18 PILA) – speak of Swiss ordre public. The 
rule which makes sure that ordre public is paid tribute to within Swiss inter-
national arbitration – Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA – is read as envisaging international 
ordre public. In fact, Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA does not characterise the ordre 
public which it refers to as «international», «transnational» or «universal» ex-
plicitly. However, first of all, the Court has ruled that its case law «strived to 
free the public policy of art. 190 (2) (e) PILA from any national connection, 
–––––––––––––– 
230 DSC 116 II 634 of 14 November 1990. 
231 A narrow view of a violation of ordre public is witnessed also in other jurisdictions – see 
e.g. § 1059 of the German Civil Code of Procedure or Sec. 67 and 68 of the English Arbi-
tration Act. 
232 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 17 N 25 and the therein cited authors. 
233  – which was admitted also by the Court itself (Terra armata, cons. 2.2.2, second paragraph). 
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whether the lex fori, the lex causae or the law of a third country» and that «the 
ground of appeal set forth in that provision does not aim at protecting the Swiss 
legal order»234. Second, Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA is read a contrario to Art. 17 
PILA: since the latter speaks of «Swiss ordre public» and it – of «ordre public» 
– it must envisage an ordre public wider than the Swiss ordre public which is  
an international ordre public235. Third, it is considered logical that Swiss in-
ternational arbitration awards comply with international, rather than Swiss, or-
dre public because they «as a rule, are intended for export»236 (they are usually 
enforced outside Switzerland), and by making sure that they obey the funda-
mental principles of most civilised countries around the globe, the chances for 
export of them (for their enforcement abroad) are raised237. One can also add 
that since the relation of a Swiss international arbitration procedure to Swit-
zerland will be loose (because of the idea of international arbitration as a dis-
pute resolution mechanism as distant as possible from states’ laws, including 
from the seat’s law), the Swiss ordre public would not be that much touched 
upon by such procedure, especially if the award is to be enforced abroad (to 
be «exported»).  
Apart from Swiss law, international law is also believed to render international 
rather than domestic ordre public relevant for international arbitration: Art. V 
(2) (b) New York Convention, which contains a ground for a refusal by a party 
to the Convention to recognise and enforce a foreign arbitral award, is mostly 
interpreted as envisaging a violation of international ordre public238 (though 
one cannot help but observe that, as much as it corresponds to the spirit and 
–––––––––––––– 
234 Terra armata, cons. 2.2.2., fourth paragraph. 
235 ZÄCH, 284. 
236 ZÄCH, 285. 
237 Berti cited in MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 17 N 25; ZÄCH,  284, 285. 
238 The description in World Duty Free Company Limited v The Republic Of Kenya (ICSID 
ARB/00/7), para 138-141 of the practice of seeing the ordre public under Art. V (2) (b) New 
York Convention as international is rather confusing. 
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ideas of the Convention, this interpretation contradicts far too much the word-
ing of the article – «public policy of that country» (emphasis added)239).   
4. Similarities  
Overriding mandatory rules and ordre public in fact have common origin – 
they are both born from the care for public interests. This has made it possible 
that so far, when a conflict of laws rule regarding such laws has been missing, 
«the connection of overriding mandatory laws has been addressed within the 
ordre public reservation»240 (even if this approach left a part of the overriding 
mandatory laws unhandled because only a part of them qualify as ordre public, 
since (as will be discussed) despite the common origin, overriding mandatory 
rules differ from ordre public).                     
5. Differentiation  
Differences between overriding mandatory rules and ordre public have al-
ready been considered in Chapter 8. 
Overriding mandatory rules can be, and frequently are (but do not have to be) 
part of the ordre public241. Even when overriding mandatory rules reach the 
level of ordre public, Art. 17 PILA, potentially Art. 18 PILA or Art. 190 (2) 
–––––––––––––– 
239 Also, the Court might be accepting that the public policy envisaged in Art. V (2) (b) New 
York Convention is domestic. In Terra armata, cons. 3.1, it asserts that the view of the 
Court of the European Community that Community competition law belongs to the ordre 
public designed by the New York Convention does not prevent it from concluding that such 
law does not qualify as ordre public under 190 (2) (e) PILA. Consequently, for the Court 
the ordre public under Art. V (2) (b) New York Convention is different than the ordre 
public under 190 (2) (e) PILA. Keeping in mind that according to its case law, the latter is 
international ordre public, the Court apparently accepts that the ordre public under Art. V 
(2) (b) New York Convention is not international ordre public, hence, that it is domestic. 
240 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 57, first paragraph. 
241 «Well, there are norms of the material law which possess a qualified mandatory character, 
yet do not, without further ado, absolutely fulfil the impetus of ordre public» – SCHNYDER, 
Eingriffsnormen im Versicherungskollisionsrecht, 620; emphasis in the original text; own 
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(e) PILA will apply to them; i.e. of relevance will be their capacity as ordre 
public, and not their capacity as overriding mandatory rules. Then, ordre pub-
lic has a much higher ethical content, and hence smaller content (only few 
principles are of such high ethical nature) than overriding mandatory rules. 
The values protected by ordre public are more fundamental than those pro-
tected by overriding mandatory rules – if the latter seeks to protect principles 
which keep a legal system «healthy», the former safeguards principles without 
which there is no legal system (no rule of law) at all. Ordre public does not 
need to be incarnated in a concrete norm of the objective law, whilst an over-
riding mandatory rule is always a legal provision242; that is also why Art. 19 
PILA and Art. 9 (1) Rome I speak of «provision» and respectively «provi-
sions»243. 
Legal acts distinguish between overriding mandatory rules and ordre public. 
The treatment of overriding mandatory rules in para 1 and 2 of Art. 11 of The 
Hague Principles on Choice of Law differs from the treatment of public policy 
in para 3 and 4 respectively. Besides, the title and para 5 of that article mention 
overriding mandatory rules and public policy separately. Rome I handles over-
riding mandatory provisions, public policy, mandatory rules and mandatory 
protective rules in different norms – in Art. 9, in Art. 21, in Art. 3 (3) and (4) 
and 11 (5) (b) and in Art. 6 (2) and 8 (1) respectively. In Recital 37 of its 
preamble, the regulation refers to «public policy and overriding mandatory 
rules» (emphasis added). Also, the preamble of Rome II distinguishes public 
policy from overriding mandatory provisions and from mandatory rules and 
mandatory protective rules (Recital 32). 
Because overriding mandatory rules differ from ordre public, their violation 
does not automatically qualify as a violation of the ordre public under Art. 190 
(2) (e) PILA. That is demonstrated in Not Indicated v Not Indicated or in Terra 
armata. In the latter, the Court states that Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA does not sanc-
tion «the failure to consider an immediately applicable mandatory provision 
–––––––––––––– 
242 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 249. 
243 See also, with regard to Art. 9 Rome I, LEHMANN, 536. 
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of a third state»244. Also, the majority (despite some, seemingly, other 
views245) in the doctrine consider that the failure of an international arbitral 
award to observe overriding mandatory rules is not equal to failure to respect 
ordre public – e.g. an arbitrator’s incompliance with Art. 19 PILA (i.e., as in 
the last cited case, incompliance with the overriding mandatory rules of a third 
state) was not in itself contrary to public policy under Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA246. 
The violation of overriding mandatory rules could qualify as a violation of 
ordre public but only where the overriding mandatory rules infringed have at 
the same time the character of ordre public; and in that case, the concerned 
violation will be treated as a violation of ordre public, and not as one of over-
riding mandatory rules.  
Para 47 of the CJEU’s judgment of 17 October 2013 in Case C-184/12 is con-
fusing. It defines «public order legislation» in an almost identical way to how 
Rome I defines overriding mandatory rules; it states: «the classification of na-
tional provisions by a Member State as public order legislation applies to na-
tional provisions compliance with which has been deemed to be so crucial for 
the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State 
concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the 
national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships within that 
–––––––––––––– 
244 Terra armata, cons. 2.2.2., fourth paragraph, in fine. 
245 See e.g. PFISTERER, Art. 190 N 86. In her view, the missing or wrong application of an 
overriding mandatory competition law rule can constitute a violation of the ordre public 
when it leads to a decision whose result is contrary to the ordre public. It is not clear why 
the defect of the application of overriding mandatory law should lead to a result that con-
tradicts the ordre public – if there is such contradiction, that means that the respective in-
fringed rule is an ordre public rule, and not an overriding mandatory rule. Then, since one 
of the rules which he sees as candidates to be applied to the violation of overriding manda-
tory rules – Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA – deals namely with ordre public, also KARRER, BSK 
IPRG, Art. 187 N 237 must believe that a violation of overriding mandatory rules can con-
stitute a violation of ordre public. 
246 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.101. Again, such a statement apparently rests on a presumption 
that Art. 19 PILA is binding in international arbitration. The correctness of this will be 
discussed below, but it is in any case irrelevant for the differentiation between overriding 
mandatory rules and ordre public made here. 
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State (Arblade and Others, paragraph 30, and Case C-319/06 Commis-
sion v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-4323, paragraph 29)».  
5.1 Differentiation of overriding mandatory rules from negative ordre 
public 
In a state court procedure, negative ordre public is activated only «after» the 
applicable law has been determined in accordance with the traditional conflict 
of laws rules (only if he or she knows which this governing law is can a judge 
conclude that its application would be contradictory to the values of his or her 
forum), whilst some overriding mandatory rules, in particular the overriding 
mandatory rules of the forum, are applied «before» the proper law is known247 
– as long as the state court «finds out» about their applicability. This chronol-
ogy is, in fact, the consequence of another difference – that the reservation 
clause, which is the negative ordre public, serves to hinder an unfair result 
which could occur upon application of a foreign law, whereas overriding man-
datory rules want to assert certain goals at any price248. Then, since overriding 
mandatory rules are amongst the law applied or considered with the aim of 
resolving the dispute, they are part of the resolution of the dispute, whilst the 
negative ordre public is a limitation to such resolution (and thus to the over-
riding mandatory rules). Last but not least, as SCHNYDER puts it with regard 
to economic law, ordre public regards the content of a foreign lex causae and 
cannot explain the consideration of the economic overriding mandatory rules 
of the lex fori in the presence of such foreign lex causae – this consideration 
happens independently from such lex causae; hence, the ordre public (most 
probably the negative ordre public is meant) had to be supplemented by a 
«positive function» whose mission had been to dogmatise the lois d’applica-
tion immédiate249.          
5.2 Differentiation of overriding mandatory rules from positive ordre 
public 
–––––––––––––– 
247 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention, 45. 
248 ARNOLD, 142. Own translation from German. 
249 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftslkollissionsrecht, 275. 
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The difference between overriding mandatory rules and positive ordre public 
is much slighter – if it is present at all – than that between overriding manda-
tory rules and negative ordre public.  
KARRER250 and, seemingly, SCHNYDER251 equate positive ordre public with 
overriding mandatory rules. Indeed, both concepts «act» in the same way – 
they impose themselves on the law regulating the case. Besides, it was Art. 18 
PILA that was considered to contain the positive ordre public that the charac-
teristics of overriding mandatory rules were extracted from (see above – Chap-
ter 9, I., 1.1, a.). This article appears to be describing rules rather than an ab-
stract concept – it talks about «provisions» – and such rules cannot be anything 
but overriding mandatory rules. 
On the other hand, differences remain. First, being a type of ordre public, the 
positive ordre public contains the most important principles, whilst overriding 
mandatory rules – contain only (though also substantial) important principles. 
Second, whilst, again owing to its nature as ordre public, positive ordre public 
would not necessarily be vested in a rule (it might also be a concept or an idea) 
overriding mandatory rules would.                
–––––––––––––– 
250 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 246. 
251 The author refers to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori as «the so-called positive 








Chapter 12: Method  
I. Historically  
1. Inapplicability of Savigny’s (classical) conflict of laws 
rules 
Savigny saw certain laws as incapable of being treated through his method, 
which consisted of conflict of laws rules determining the applicable law ac-
cording to the facts of the case (see above – Chapter 7, I.). The free acting 
across states entailed by this approach was, in his view, irreconcilable with the 
specific nature of those laws. The laws are namely the overriding mandatory 
rules.  
The defining of the borders of those laws excluded by Savigny was probably 
the most difficult task in the whole doctrine.  
2. Francescakis’ view on applicability from the law  
Francescakis made an attempt in the direction of finding these rules that Savi-
gny excluded from his technique; covering, however, only a part of them – 
those that belong to the state that hosts the legal process without those of the 
lex causae or of a third law. The author created a new term – the nowadays 
famous «lois d’application immédiate»252. For him, these lois were domestic 
material norms which, in the name of the protection of the organisation of the 
state (or of the society of the state – «société étatique»), were to be applied 
only by virtue of their own will without a conflict of laws rule ordering such 
applicability, ergo, immediately («immédiate»), in fact, even in ignorance of 
other conflict of law rules potentially ordering the applicability of other sub-
stantive laws. The spatial scope of lois d’application immédiate resulted di-
rectly from their significance for the protection of the organisation of the state.      
–––––––––––––– 
252 As a matter of fact, he wanted to analyse an existing phenomenon but became famous as a 








3. Today’s position on special conflict of laws rules 
3.1 Not from the law 
While acknowledging his contribution in «finding» and managing some of the 
law to which Savigny’s method could not be applied, today’s main doctrine is 
sceptical towards Francescakis’ theory. It does not agree that the reason why 
the rules in question remain outside Savigny’s technique is that their applica-
bility does not need to be ordered by conflict of laws rules. The reason was 
that the conflict of laws rules which were anyway necessary were not those of 
Savigny. 
3.2 Overriding mandatory rules needing special conflict law distinct 
from private international law 
The conflict of laws rules needed to address the rules that are unhandled by 
Savigny’s method are not based on the facts of the case, i.e. on the concrete 
(subjective) relationship (like Savigny’s conflict of laws rules), but on the ob-
jective rule253. The substantive norm is interpreted in order for one to establish 
whether this norm wants to be applied254. In particular the protective goal of 
the material law content of the rule influences the conflict law decision regard-
ing the rule’s applicability255. In other words, the conflict law dealing with 
overriding mandatory rules turns out to be a new, special conflict law.  
On the example of economic conflict law, SCHNYDER considers that the de-
pendence of the conflict law steering overriding mandatory rules on the mate-
rial law content of the latter is «qualified» and that it attributes to such conflict 
law connection a special character256. For SCHNYDER, this special character is 
–––––––––––––– 
253 SCHNYDER,Versicherungsrecht der Schweiz, 611f., VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 
133 and passim. 
254 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 56, in initio, own translation from German. 
255 For SCHNYDER it is beyond any doubt that the «conflict law of the economic law must ad-
dress the protection goals of the material law» – SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 
159, own translation from German. 
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so significant that a separate economic conflict law system parallel to the con-
ventional private international law – international economic law – arises257. In 
his opinion, since economic (both domestic and foreign) law has the function 
to ensure at the same time «interindividual» and «macroeconomic» justness, 
it has to be connected through a new «special» connection different than the 
private international law connection, i.e. regardless of whether it is covered by 
the latter258. This separate economic conflict law, it is contended, arises on the 
basis of Art. 18 and 19 PILA259. KARRER criticises the fact that in practice it 
is very difficult to differentiate between «ordinary public law» and overriding 
mandatory rules.260 According to him, there is not much support in the first 
eleven chapters of PILA for the theory that there is a distinct economic conflict 
law, as Art. 18 and 19 PILA deal with overriding mandatory rules under the 
heading of positive ordre public261. For him, there is only an exception from 
the normal connection rather than a separate conflict law262. He also underlines 
that Art. 187 PILA does not mention any separate economic conflict law.  
3.3 The special conflict law – lex specialis of or not at all covered by 
Savigny’s conflict of laws rules  
The special conflict law on overriding mandatory rules is considered to be a 
lex specialis towards private international law263. Further, the traditional doc-
trine on them accepts that lois d'application immédiate are lex specialis with 
respect to the usual bilateral conflict of laws rules, and it can be presumed that 
this is thought of with regard to the overriding mandatory rules of other laws 
than the law of the forum as well, i.e. with regard to any overriding mandatory 
–––––––––––––– 
257 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, passim. 
258 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 318 and 
SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 300, 301. 
259 – as cited (with further authors) in MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 18 N 6. 
260 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 248. 
261 It is here contended that overriding mandatory rules and positive ordre public are, at least in 
theory, separate concepts; see above – Chapter 11., IV., 5.2. 
262 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 246. 
263 LEHMANN, 502 apparently has such a starting point. 
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rules. VOSER denies such a lex specialis status of the material264 lois d'appli-
cation immédiate265. According to her, those lois were anyway not encom-
passed by the bilateral conflict of law rules – in her view, the latter dealt mostly 
with the private (and not public) law dimensions of a relationship and were, 
thus, conceptually incompetent to cover overriding mandatory rules266. Formal 
lois d'application immédiate were, to the contrary, covered by the traditional 
bilateral conflict of law rules and, thus, a lex specialis.  
3.4 Dogmatic basis of the method  
The dogmatic basis of overriding mandatory rules is the international public 
law’s effects principle, which leads to extraterritorial application of law.  
The effects principle is a sort of exception of another principle of international 
public law – the territoriality principle. The latter represents the capability of 
a state to issue legal acts which are legally enforceable only within the territory 
in which the state exercises its imperium.  
The effects principle is the capability of a state to issue legal acts that cover 
facts which have effects within the territory in which this state exercises its 
imperium but which take place outside this territory267. The use of this capa-
bility (which is of this principle) leads to extraterritorial application of a leg-
islation i.e. to the material scope of a legislation exceeding its territorial scope. 
In fact, extraterritorial application of law is frequent in financial markets law 
and in economic law in general. Internationalisation and integration of finan-
cial markets causes events taking place abroad to have an impact on one’s own 
jurisdiction; for example, the listing of bad quality securities on a stock ex-
change can have a negative impact on the reputation of the country which is a 
–––––––––––––– 
264 See in VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 198ff. a division of lois d’application immédi-
ate into material and formal. 
265 VOSER, amongst others, Lois d’application immediate, 289. 
266 Also VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate,181. 
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seat of that exchange268, or the disclosure abroad of insider information re-
garding an issuer whose securities are listed on a domestic stock exchange 
might be of relevance at home269. In the context of these examples, it makes 
sense to subject events taking place abroad but connected to securities listed 
on a domestic stock exchange to the law in force at the seat of the latter – see 
e.g. § 1 (2) of the German Securities Trading Act. The effects principle is use-
ful also because the relevant events might be difficult to localise «into» a par-
ticular territory (as it is with events set as criteria by financial markets law).   
Even if it sounds paradoxical, the territoriality principle and the extraterritori-
ality application of law resulting from the effects principle are able to «live» 
together. The territoriality principle is valid for the enforcement of acts but not 
for the application of law: it prevents state A from employing coercion in the 
territory of state B in order to enforce a legal act X which it issued, but it does 
not prevent state A from submitting an event materialised in the territory of 
such state B to this legal act X. This is a just approach because the occurrence 
of effects within one’s territory should be more crucial than the localisation of 
the event triggering such effects. Moreover, with the pace of today’s globali-
sation, spatial separation of events and effects becomes more and more usual. 
In any case, international public law’s requirement for the presence of a mean-
ingful connection between the regulating jurisdiction and the regulated facts 
which will also be present here (e.g. that the law in question applies extrater-
ritorially not to any foreign financial services providers but to those that con-
tract with persons based in the territory in which such law is in force) will 
bring at least some territorial «flavour» to the extraterritorial application. In 
addition, there is already an area within private international law – delict law 
– in which the state having suffered the damaging effects of an event accom-
plished abroad often regulates those effects.  
II. Assessment 
The fact that the effect of overriding mandatory provisions is determined in-
dependently on whether these belong to the law which the traditional conflict 
–––––––––––––– 
268 For US, European and German law listing is, indeed, enough – LEHMANN, 120. 
269 LEHMANN, 112. 
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of laws rules of private international law have appointed as the lex causae is a 
strong argument that such provisions are not subject to private international 
law. In addition, one can contend that, since private international law is «all 
about resolving competition between private law rules»270 (being namely «pri-
vate» international law), it is anyway inapt to solve matters which involve 
public interests – such as the matter of the effect of overriding mandatory rules.       
Nevertheless, several other arguments justify the law addressing overriding 
mandatory rules «remaining» in the private international law’s domain. First, 
the Swiss codification of private international law – PILA – contains conflict 
of laws rules on overriding mandatory rules (Art. 13, 18 and 19 PILA), and 
inclusion of norms in the codification of a branch of law speaks quite strongly 
in favour of the belonging of such norms to that branch of law. Second, that 
these conflict of laws norms on overriding mandatory rules apply a technique 
for connecting which differs from the technique employed by the majority of 
conflict of laws rules of private international law does not mean that they do 
not make part of the latter – it means only that they are a special part of it. 
Private international law might treat overriding mandatory rules in a special 
manner, but it (and not «someone» else) treats them. Third, overriding man-
datory rules’ impact is an impact on private international law relations, hence, 
it is logical that the instruments of private international law are employable. 
Fourth, the fact that imperative concerns are touched upon does not mean that 
the issue needs to be taken out of private (international) law – if it was so, 
private law would not have contained any imperative norms, which is not the 
case. Fifth, even if overriding mandatory rules are theoretically a distinct (from 
private international law) conflict law, (at least by now) in practice they are 
handled through private international law instruments. The latter are the only 
means available, and as a matter of fact, as long as they apply the special ap-
proach they are applying, they are not a bad option. All in all, there is no need 
to address overriding mandatory rules through special treatment outside pri-
vate international law, but only a need to address them through special treat-
ment inside private international law (to use special elements of the private 
–––––––––––––– 
270 SEBASTIANUTTI, International financial law, Part 2, 163; emphasis in the original text. 
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international law’s apparatus when approaching them), and this is indeed done 
at the moment.  





Subpart 2: Treatment 
For a state judge, it is relevant whether the overriding mandatory rule he or 
she is contemplating giving effect to originates from the lex causae, the lex 
fori or a third law. Whether this will be relevant also for an international arbi-
trator will be seen in Part 4 below. Here, the attitude of a state court is consid-
ered. This discussion will also form the basis of a comparison in the later anal-






Chapter 13: Overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae 
I. Uniform connection 
1. Definition 
According to the so-called uniform connection theory, all norms of a law are 
applied together, and the conflict of laws reference to a lex causae connects to 
a law in its entirety; i.e. amongst others, also to the overriding mandatory rules 
of such a law. It is one single connection for both the ordinary and the over-
riding mandatory rules of this law. The overriding mandatory rules here are 
not applied in an exceptional manner but as any other rules of the lex causae 
are.  
The uniform connection is easy to apply because it rests on a clear criterion – 
whether the overriding mandatory rules in question belong to the lex causae. 
2. Literature  
The prevailing view in the literature is in favour of the uniform connection271, 
with Art. 13 PILA mostly pointed at as a ground. However, there are several 
voices opposing this view272. 
3. Arguments 
3.1 Preservation of effect of overriding mandatory rules of the law that 
would have been applicable in the absence of a choice of law 
–––––––––––––– 
271 See (together with any literature cited there): MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 13 N 
24; SCHNYDER, Eingriffsnormen im Versicherungskollisionsrecht, 620; SCHNYDER/LIA-
TOWITSCH, 219; SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch 
Schiedsgerichte, 313; KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94 (where 7.92 gives a reason to be-
lieve that «overriding mandatory rules» are meant by the term «mandatory rules»). 
272 VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 19 N 2-5,7; VOSER, Mandatory rules, 339, 340; VOSER, Lois d’ap-









The strongest argument against the uniform connection is that automatic ap-
plication of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae would allow the 
parties to choose whose state’s interests to serve: when they select the lex 
causae (which they are free to do, and in international arbitration often do) the 
parties render certain overriding mandatory rules (those of the selected law) 
applicable and other overriding mandatory rules (those of the law which would 
have been governing but for such choice of law) inapplicable. However, one 
can object that inclusion of overriding mandatory rules legis causae into the 
choice of lex causae does not mean that the overriding mandatory rules of the 
law which would have been applicable in the absence of the choice of law have 
no effect – the application or consideration of the overriding mandatory law 
of the forum or of a third law is possible, and even obligatory, when the con-
ditions for that are fulfilled regardless of the fact that the overriding mandatory 
rules of the chosen law are also applied. The inclusion of the overriding man-
datory rules legis causae into the reference to the lex causae is relativised e.g. 
by Art. 19 PILA – as a result of the latter, a third law’s overriding mandatory 
rules are able to suppress the regulatory law of the lex causae273. Indeed, their 
belonging to the lex causae would ensure applicability of the overriding man-
datory rules of the lex causae but not their precedence over the overriding 
mandatory rules of other laws – the overriding mandatory rules legis causae 
will be applied automatically only as long as they do not come into a conflict 
with the overriding mandatory rules of another law – in which case the respec-
tive rules on competition between overriding mandatory rules of different laws 
will be consulted.                  
3.2 The advantages of overriding mandatory rules legis causae to-
wards overriding mandatory rules of other laws would be insignifi-
cant    
Even if the uniform connecting of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae would not make it impossible that the overriding mandatory rules of 
other laws are given effect, it is true that such connecting would lead to certain 
advantages for the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae in comparison 
–––––––––––––– 
273 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 304. 
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with the latter overriding mandatory rules. Yet those advantages might be cat-
egorised as insignificant and natural. For instance, the overriding mandatory 
rules legis causae will be applicable without there being need to prove that 
they are connected to the case and that their application is required by legiti-
mate and manifestly preponderant interests of a party, as (in accordance with 
Art. 19 PILA) there will be need with regard to the overriding mandatory rules 
of another law. However, first, this is fair because the overriding mandatory 
rules of the lex causae are naturally more connected to the case than the over-
riding mandatory rules of another law (especially of a third law). They are the 
correction of the ordinary rules of the lex causae, hence, the correction of the 
rules to which the case is (indisputably) submitted. Then, the overriding man-
datory rules legis causae would obtain «more» effect than the overriding man-
datory rules of a third law, since they would be applied and obligatorily ap-
plied, whilst the latter would be considered and not obligatorily considered 
(but only if the adjudicator decides so – see the words «considered» and «may» 
in Art. 19 PILA). Again, that would be fair because, as third, the third law is 
so far from the case that the giving of effect to its overriding mandatory rules, 
if any, is justified only in a light form. 
3.3 Systemic nature of law  
It is true that because of the private law nature of the dispute, the latter will be 
submitted mostly to the private law norms of the chosen law; however, not 
exclusively. With regard to some questions, the dispute might be governed by 
the chosen law’s overriding mandatory rules. What is chosen is the whole legal 
system concerned, and it is just that «de facto» (if this term can be used for a 
legal process like the application of legal norms) the private law norms of the 
lex causae obtain most effect – because they are needed the most. 
Law is a system. The components of a system, even if they have distinct func-
tions, cannot be contradictory to nor entirely split from each other. On the con-
trary, they are meant to function together – they «cannot make it» without each 
other. Thus, the ordinary private law rules of a law cannot be totally separated 
from the overriding mandatory rules of that law. The function of the latter is, 
amongst others, to «correct», i.e. to set a border to the freedom to act under, 
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the former274. Ergo, the ordinary rules of the lex causae are by default accom-
panied by the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae275. In fact, this ob-
servation is enough to tip the scales in favour of the uniform connection: it 
would just be too much against the idea of law as a system (one of the main 
ideas of it) to split its ordinary from its overriding mandatory rules. 
3.4 Nullité sur choix 
There is the argument that parties’ choice of law applicable to a contract must 
be understood as not encompassing a law’s overriding mandatory rules, which 
invalidate such a contract, since the parties could not have intended to con-
clude a void contract – «nullité sur choix», DSC 102 II 143 of 30 March 
1976276. One possible counter-argument is that it cannot be that one «looks 
after» the parties and «corrects» their behaviour – these are «adults» who 
should take responsibility for their actions. They were or should have been 
aware of the effect of the lex causae’s overriding mandatory rules when draft-
ing the choice of law clause. In accordance with one of the most fundamental 
principles of law, persons are presumed to know the law – ignorantia juris non 
excusat. And this is so especially with regard to a law that a person chooses 
and a law which is of particular importance (overriding mandatory law).                                   
4. Potential legal basis – Art. 13 PILA 
In EU law, for example, there is no legal basis for the uniform connection – 
Art. 9 Rome I does not handle overriding mandatory rules legis causae at all. 
In Switzerland, Art. 13 PILA is generally accepted as the legal ground, but 
there are numerous objections – which is not surprising, as the article’s text 
(in particular the second sentence thereof) is somewhat ambiguous.  
The order of Art. 13 PILA is that the reference to a foreign law encompasses 
all rules that in the view of such a law are applicable to the case (Art. 13 PILA, 
first sentence) and that the application of the rules of such a foreign law which 
are of «a public law character» is not excluded by virtue of this character of 
–––––––––––––– 
274 SCHWANDER, Einführung, 535, 536, in particular 536. 
275 SCHWANDER, Einführung, 535, 536. 
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them (Art. 13 PILA, second sentence). Overriding mandatory rules, even if not 
always contained in public law acts, are considered to be of «public law char-
acter» because they take care of public interests. Hence, overriding mandatory 
rules are covered by the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA.  
4.1 Subject matter 
Art. 13 PILA defines the scope of «the reference of this Act to a foreign law», 
i.e. the scope of a foreign lex causae. By «foreign law», what is meant is law 
other than Swiss law – or, keeping in mind that Swiss law is the lex fori (the 
procedure in question takes place in Switzerland), law other than the lex fori. 
Most probably it was considered unnecessary to regulate the scope of the ref-
erence to Swiss law because such reference was presumed to be omniferous, 
this law being the own law of the court. 
4.2 The second sentence of Art. 13 PILA 
According to VOSER, Art. 13 PILA does not incorporate the uniform connec-
tion but, through its second sentence, only prevents their public law character 
from becoming the weightiest factor when determining whether norms of a 
foreign lex causae are included in the reference to it277. On a strict viewing, 
she is right. The text of the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA excludes only this 
exclusion of the norms of a foreign lex causae from the reference to it which 
is based on these norms’ public law character, and not any exclusion, hence, it 
allows other exclusions, hence, it does not include these norms (at least not 
automatically). In VOSER’s view, the legislator intentionally left a gap in the 
law with regard to the scope of the reference to the lex causae, which had to 
be closed by doctrine and practice278.  
SCHNYDER sees two meanings in the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA: a more 
restrictive one, which coincides with that seen by VOSER, as a prohibition of 
the exclusion of a foreign law on the sole basis of the public law character of 
such a law; and another, which corresponds to the uniform connection, as in-
–––––––––––––– 
277 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 76-79 (in particular 78, 79), 83. 








voking all regulatory law that originates from the lex causae and wants to ap-
ply. The second meaning is, in SCHNYDER’s view, better – but at the same 
time, he admits that it represents a systemic breakage for the economic conflict 
law whose special character did not allow abstract privilege based solely on 
the private international law’s reference. At the end, the author seems to be-
lieve (rightly) that whilst economic conflict law should in theory be subjected 
to the special connection, its submitting under the uniform connection is more 
«natural».279  
VOSER’s position is in line with the literal text of the second sentence of Art. 
13 PILA – this sentence is indeed not firm enough on the inclusion of overrid-
ing mandatory rules of the lex causae into the reference to such lex causae. 
SCHNYDER’s interpretation is more liberal and oriented to a practical solution.  
4.3 The first sentence of Art. 13 PILA 
At the same time, the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA needs to be read in 
connection to its first sentence. Also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI invoke the 
latter to support the applicability of overriding mandatory rules legis causae 
280. This sentence stipulates that «all provisions» which a foreign lex causae 
considers applicable to the case are encompassed by the reference to such lex. 
Since «all provisions» cannot but include overriding mandatory rules, this sen-
tence must be ordering namely the inclusion of the overriding mandatory rules 
of the foreign lex causae into the reference to it. KAUFMANN-
KOHLER/RIGOZZI even note that such application is «well established»281.  
4.4 The first and second sentence of Art. 13 PILA read together 
On the one hand, because the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA is second, its 
content can be perceived as concretisation of the content of this provision’s 
first sentence and thus as narrowing the latter’s wide rule. On the other hand, 
this second sentence can be perceived as additional explanation of the first 
–––––––––––––– 
279 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 304, own translation from German. 
280 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94. They do not refer expressly to that sentence (solely to 
the article as a whole), but they reproduce the content of that sentence. 
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sentence. That constellation even seems to be more natural because the second 
sentence appears to be trying solely to underline that the first sentence includes 
(into the reference to the lex causae) rules of a public law character, in order 
to make sure that the private law character of the dispute does not lead one to 
exclude such rules from this reference.          
II. Special connection  
1. Characteristics 
The special connection is independent of the belongingness of the overriding 
mandatory rules to the lex causae282, hence, it is different from the connection 
to such lex causae – the private international law connection – and that is why 
it is special. Overriding mandatory rules will not remain unapplied simply be-
cause they do not make part of the law of the contract and, on the other hand, 
they will not automatically be applied because they make part of that law. 
Privilege of economic overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae towards 
the overriding mandatory rules of a third law is excluded by the special char-
acter of the connection. The concept of the special connection is that all over-
riding mandatory rules, i.e. also the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
cause, are connected specially and are, hence, equal to each other, with the 
exception of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori, which by virtue of 
Art. 18 PILA enjoy a preferential treatment283. From the point of view of the 
special connection, the overriding mandatory rules legis causae are situated 
outside the borders of the lex causae, in some «community» of overriding 
mandatory law together with the overriding mandatory rules of other laws.  
To be applied via the special connection, the overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae need to be connected to the facts of the case – an objective connection 
which also does not depend on the lex causae, including on whether the latter 
–––––––––––––– 
282 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollionsrecht, 158 (Summary of the first part). 
283 VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 19 N 3 also excludes the overriding mandatory rules of the forum 
from the equal treatment of the different overriding mandatory rules he proposes. 
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is the result of a parties’ choice or of the application of a conflict of laws 
rule284. 
2. Literature           
VISCHER believes that overriding mandatory rules legis causae are not auto-
matically included in the reference to a foreign law but, where this is so, are 
applicable because their own scope of application wants this; and that it cor-
responds more to the specific nature of overriding mandatory rules if all of 
them, with the exception of those of the forum (Art. 18 PILA), are treated as 
equally footed under the conditions of Art. 19 PILA285. MORSCHER also sup-
ports a special connection286. VOSER advocates for treating the overriding 
mandatory rules legis causae and the overriding mandatory rules of a third law 
equally, without granting preferential treatment to the former287. Also, for 
SCHNYDER, the connection in economic conflict law is objective; a choice of 
law by the parties is irrelevant288. In Germany, LEHMANN – who sees it as the 
connection being expressed in Art. 9 Rome I – appeals for the special connec-
tion also for the area of financial markets laws289.  
3. Arguments  
3.1 Regulation of private law disputes 
–––––––––––––– 
284 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 337 (last paragraph thereof). 
285 VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 19 N 2 et seqq. 
286 MORSCHER, 101, 102. 
287 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 79. 
288 SCHNYDER, Versicherungsrecht der Schweiz, 612. See also SCHNYDER, 
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, passim, e.g. 301, 158 (Summary of the first part). Admittedly, 
it was mentioned above in Chapter 13, I., 4.2 that this author seems to believe that it is more 
practical for one to read the alternative of this special connection – the uniform connection 
– in Art. 13 PILA, but, as underlined there, he seems to see the special connection as more 
correct from a doctrinal point of view (e.g. SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 304, in 
fine).  
289 LEHMANN, 528-530. 
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The disputes adjudged under PILA (especially those under Chapter 12 thereof) 
are private law disputes; hence, one could think that it is only «the business» 
of the private law part of the lex causae to tackle their resolution. In addition, 
where they have chosen this lex, the parties might have had in mind solely this 
private law part of the lex causae. Moreover, parties – especially those that 
resort to international arbitration – often choose a neutral, i.e. not connected to 
the relationship, law and a relation of the overriding mandatory rules of such 
a neutral law to the case is difficult to see.290    
3.2 Hindering the evasion of overriding mandatory rules of a law that 
would have been applicable in the absence of a choice of law 
Owing to the parties’ freedom to choose a governing law, the application of 
overriding mandatory rules of such a governing law by the mere reason of their 
belonging to that law would allow such parties to avoid the overriding manda-
tory rules of the law which would have been applicable in the absence of such 
a choice simply by choosing a law different than the latter. This situation is 
inadmissible291. A means of preventing it is to connect the overriding manda-
tory rules of the governing law through the special connection which does not 
depend at all on this belonging of those rules to the chosen law.  
3.3 Nullité sur choix 
Another argument in the cases where the lex causae is selected by the parties 
is that, because the latter could not have intended to choose a law under which 
their contract would be void, at least those of the overriding mandatory rules 
of that law which invalidate the contract should not be included in the parties’ 
choice («nullité sur choix», DSC 102 II 143 of 30 March 1976)292.  
3.4 Special character of overriding mandatory rules 
–––––––––––––– 
290 See also SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 
313, 318. There the author refers to a lex causae which coincides with the lex arbitri – both 
are Swiss law – but this coincidence is not relevant for the argumentation here. 
291 Also according to SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 301, in fine it cannot be left to the 
parties to decide on the applicability of regulatory law. 
292 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 226. 
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For the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae, the special connection 
appears logical. In order for them to be able to override other rules (and thus 
namely be «overriding») they must be connected in some special manner.           
4. Potential legal basis – Art. 19 PILA 
If overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae are to be connected as if they 
were overriding mandatory rules of a third law, the first idea that comes to 
mind is to base (directly or indirectly) their application on Art. 19 PILA – this 
is the provision dealing with overriding mandatory rules of a third law. VOSER 
suggests that the legislative gap which she sees with regard to these overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex causae be filled through application by analogy of 
the criteria of Art. 19 PILA293. Also, VISCHER seems to be applying Art. 19 
PILA by analogy – as already mentioned, he applies the requisites of the latter 
(not the latter itself but its requisites, which namely resembles application by 
analogy)294. MORSCHER sees even a direct application of Art. 19 PILA to the 
lex causae’s overriding mandatory rules295. For MORSCHER, an overriding 
mandatory rule which is a part of the lex causae but is not encompassed by the 
conflict of law rule’s reference to the lex causae constituted «a provision of 
another law which claims to be mandatorily applied» and the lex causae – «the 
law designated by this Act» – within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) PILA. This 
view for application of Art. 19 PILA to the overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae is not supported here. That Art. 13 PILA does not provide for automatic 
inclusion of law of a public law character into the reference to the lex causae 
does not mean that there cannot be non-automatic inclusion, and in that case 
the lex causae’s rules of public law character will not be able to qualify as 
provisions of a law other than the law designated by PILA, as contended by 
MORSCHER – they will make part of such designated law. Also, VOSER – who 
denies inclusion by Art. 13 PILA of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae into the reference to the latter – does not go so far as to apply Art. 19 
–––––––––––––– 
293 VOSER, Lois d’application immediate, 79-84. 
294 VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 19 N 2 et seqq, in particular N 3. 
295 MORSCHER, 101, 102. 
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PILA directly; she applies it by analogy296. All in all, the legal basis of the 
special connection can at best be construed by analogy. 
Then, if Art. 19 PILA is applied to the overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae, all the criteria of this provision will need to be met. In addition, the 
end effect will be only the consideration of such overriding mandatory rules 
(«considered» – Art. 19 PILA), and not their application as in the case of uni-
form connecting. What is more, this effect will not be certain like that of the 
uniform connection – it will depend on the discretion of the adjudicator (Art. 
19 PILA uses the verb «may» while Art. 13 PILA uses imperative language).  
III. Opting for the uniform connection 
It is true that the uniform connection is unable to explain how come it connects 
rules, which by nature are to be connected independently on their belonging-
ness to the lex causae, on the basis of such belongingess. However, the preser-
vation of the systemic nature of the lex causae, and in particular the giving of 
the opportunity to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae to place 
borders to the ordinary rules of the lex causae, which is achieved through such 
uniform connection, is here perceived as more vital than the described logical 
problem – the latter is not underestimated, even less so denied, but a priority 
is set in the face of the need to make a (difficult) balancing; the less bad solu-
tion is opted for. Besides, it is easier from a practical point of view to effectuate 
the uniform connection than the special connection. First, it at least has some, 
even if not unambiguous, legal basis – Art. 13 PILA – whereas the special 
connection lacks such and needs to be applied through analogia legis with Art. 
19 PILA; second, the criterion used is quite simple – whether the overriding 
mandatory rules in question belong to the lex causae or not – whilst the criteria 
of Art. 19 PILA are far more numerous and (mostly because of their subjec-
tivity) complex; third, employing the uniform connection would be in accord-
ance with law’s principle of economy, since the judge would take a connection 
that he or she had already established (through the traditional conflict of laws 
rules).    
–––––––––––––– 








One could try to employ some compromise between the uniform and special 
connection. For instance, one might consider, rather than apply, the overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex causae. This way the overriding mandatory rules of 
the lex causae would be given some effect, through which the unity between 
them and the private law norms of the lex causae would be kept, and at the 
same time this effect would be less strong than the effect given to the ordinary 
private law rules of the lex causae, which would mean conforming with the 
idea that overriding mandatory rules are special, different than the rules con-
nected through the designation of the lex causae and with the idea that a private 
law dispute should be governed only by private law rules. Nevertheless, such 
construction is too unstable. The mere consideration of the overriding manda-
tory rules of the lex causae would not be sufficient to serve the functioning of 
the norms of the lex causae as one single system. All in all, the uniform con-





Chapter 14: Overriding mandatory rules legis fori 
I. Term 
Here «overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori», «overriding mandatory rules 
legis fori», «overriding mandatory rules of the forum», «overriding mandatory 
rules of the seat» and similar will envisage overriding mandatory rules of such 
lex fori which is not at the same time a uniformly connected lex causae. In the 
latter situation, the overriding mandatory rules in question will become appli-
cable by virtue of their belongingness to the uniformly connected lex causae, 
and this will not allow one to make the intended examination – namely whether 
the belongingness of overriding mandatory rules to the lex fori is able to pro-
voke their applicability.297 
II. Preferential connection  
1. Characteristics 
For state courts, there are three categories – overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae, overriding mandatory rules legis fori and overriding mandatory rules 
of a third law.The overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori are treated differ-
ently than the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and the overriding 
mandatory rules of a law which is neither the lex causae nor the lex fori, i.e. 
which is a «third» law: they are governed by a separate rule (Art. 18 PILA298) 
and this separate rule does not make it relevant whether they belong to the lex 
causae or not.        
A difference between the treatment of the overriding mandatory rules of the 
lex fori and the treatment of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae 
–––––––––––––– 
297 The simultaneous qualification of the lex fori as a lex causae would not disturb the current 
analysis where such lex causae is not connected to uniformly, since in this case its overrid-
ing mandatory rules are deemed to be outside such lex causae. 
298 Also, Rome I uses separate provisions, for example, for the overriding mandatory rules of 
the forum and the overriding mandatory rules of a third law – respectively Art. 9 (2) and 








is that the former attain applicability also when they do not belong to the gov-
erning law. The distinction between the addressing of overriding mandatory 
rules of the lex fori and overriding mandatory rules of a third law is, first, that 
the overriding mandatory rules legis fori are applied not only in the presence 
of legitimate and manifest preponderant interests of a party requiring that and 
a connection of those rules to the case (actually such connection is reckoned 
to be there because the rules make part of the law of the state in which the 
adjudication over the case takes place) but in any circumstances and, second, 
that the overriding mandatory rules legis fori will be applied, not merely con-
sidered.299  
On the one hand, in private international law cases, state courts are allowed 
(and where the conditions for that are met, are obliged) to resolve the substance 
according to a law other than the law of the forum, i.e. difference in the identity 
of the bearer of the competence to adjudicate and the bearer of the competence 
to regulate is permissible. On the other hand, a state judge has a duty to protect 
the legal order of the bearer of adjudicating competence because they adjudi-
cate in its name. According to SCHNYDER, it is unclarified whether state courts 
can turn only to a foreign law whose content is largely equivalent to the lex 
fori or to any foreign law that does not violate the ordre public of the forum300. 
Here the first option is considered too restrictive and lacking a legal basis, and 
the second option is considered the better one, since it can be rested on Art. 17 
PILA – although, due to the order of Art. 18 PILA, it needs to be supplemented 
by the requirement that no overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori are vio-
lated.  
All in all, with regard to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori, one can 
say that they are treated preferentially – their connection can be called a «pref-
erential connection».  
2. Legal basis – Art. 18 PILA 
–––––––––––––– 
299 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 316. 
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It became clear also above that Art. 18 PILA is the one that gives precedence 
to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori over foreign (ordinary and 
overriding mandatory) law301. 
–––––––––––––– 





Chapter 15: Overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law 
In Switzerland, the question on the application or consideration of overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law is the main question, with that on the effect of 
overriding mandatory rules legis causae being, if not solved, at least domi-
nated by one opinion – that in favour of the uniform connection based on Art. 
13 PILA. 
I. Term 
«Third law» in the case of a (private international law) state court procedure 
means a law which is neither the lex causae nor the lex fori. For international 
arbitration courts (as will be seen in detail later below), it means a law that is 
not the lex causae. 
II. Special connection 
1. Characteristics 
In the current system of internationalised economies, one cannot afford oneself 
a full disregard of the interests of a third state in having its law applied or 
considered even if such law is namely a third law. These interests shall be 
relevant on a conflict of laws level – in particular, general and special rules on 
a special connection shall address them.302 
The special connection is the only option for the overriding mandatory rules 
of a third law. Those cannot be addressed through a uniform connection be-
cause the latter is a connection of the lex causae – it connects only the latter. 
That special connection will be the same as the one through which overriding 
mandatory rules legis causae were addressed under one of the theories regard-
ing their treatment discussed above – see Chapter 13, II. This connection does 
not take into account the belonging of the respective overriding mandatory 
–––––––––––––– 
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rules to the lex causae – here there is no belonging – but resorts to its own 
criteria (contained in Art. 19 PILA).                    
2. Legal basis – Art. 19 PILA 
Art. 19 PILA enjoys rather narrow application due to the numerous and strict 
conditions it imposes. The Court has reiterated that this provision is to be ap-
plied as an exception. For instance, in its view, application should not take 
place when Swiss law itself already observes the interests pursued by the for-
eign legislation and makes available means for their protection.303         
2.1 Comparison with Art. 9 (3) Rome I 
Whilst, as established above, Art. 19 PILA followed the principle of the rele-
vant EU provision (at the time Art. 7 (1) Rome Convention, today Art. 9 (3) 
Rome I) when it indirectly described the characteristics of overriding manda-
tory rules, it approached the criteria for the connection of the overriding man-
datory rules of a third law differently304. It has a narrower field of application 
than Art. 9 (3) Rome I in as much as it (in particular, its German and Italian 
translation) requires that legitimate interests of the parties are affected in order 
that it is applied305, and in as much as it provides for the taking as a starting 
point a Swiss concept of law306. For the rest, and with regard to the effect given 
(to the third law’s overriding mandatory rules), however, Art. 19 PILA is 
wider than Art. 9 (3) Rome I. It gives effect to a greater number of overriding 
mandatory rules of third laws – namely to any overriding mandatory rules of 
any third law (Art. 9 (3) Rome I gives effect not to the overriding mandatory 
rules of any third law, but only to the overriding mandatory rules of the law of 
the country in which the contract is to be performed, and not to any overriding 
–––––––––––––– 
303 Amongst others, 4C.332/2003 of 7 May 2004 cons. 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 (corresponding to DSC 
130 III 620, 630 and 631). 
304 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 315. 
305 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 315. 
306 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 315. 
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mandatory rules of such law, but only to those of them that render such con-
tract unlawful307). This narrow scope of Art. 9 (3) Rome I is often criticised308. 
Indeed, it is not clear why only the overriding mandatory rules of the place of 
performance are given effect309. Also, the requirement that the overriding man-
datory rules in question render the performance unlawful might be burden-
some, especially in the case of financial markets overriding mandatory rules 
(these meet it rarely)310. Art. 19 PILA has actually been given as an example 
which can be followed in case of an EU law reform seeking to extend the scope 
of Art. 9 (3) Rome I311. 
2.2 Subject matter  
There are different «readings» of the subject matter of Art. 19 PILA. Some see 
it as envisaging an overriding mandatory rule of a law different than the lex 
–––––––––––––– 
307 The narrowness of the possibility to consider a third law’s overriding mandatory rules was 
confirmed in the CJEU’s judgement Case C-135/15 of 18 October 2016. In this judgment, 
CJEU rejected any opportunity that overriding mandatory rules of a law which is not lex 
causae or lex fori or the law of the place of contract’s performance be considered by virtue 
of Art. 9 Rome I. In order to reach this conclusion – namely that the list of the overriding 
mandatory rules to be considered under Art. 9 Rome I is exhaustive (para 49 of the judge-
ment) – the court observed that, in accordance with Recital 37 Rome I, the consideration of 
overriding mandatory rules of a third law is to take account of «public interest in exceptional 
circumstances» (para 43), that Art. 9 Rome I should be interpreted strictly because it is a 
«derogating measure» (para 44) and that a referral to overriding mandatory rules of third 
laws other than those indicated in Art. 9 (2) and (3) Rome I would impair the legal certainty 
(para 46). At the same time, the court left open the possibility that the overriding mandatory 
rules not handled under Art. 9 Rome I are considered as facts within the application of the 
lex causae where the latter has a substantive rule ordering this (material law approach) – 
such proceeding fell outside the scope of Rome I, the latter dealing solely with conflict of 
law problems, but not with substantive solutions of the lex causae (para 51 and 52). 
308 See LEHMANN, who even calls for a reform, and SCHNYDER, Eingriffsnormen im 
Versicherungskollisionsrecht, 622. In fact, LEHMANN, 545 criticises that Rome I gives too 
limited effect to all overriding mandatory rules, not only to the third law’s overriding man-
datory rules. 
309 See also SCHNYDER, Eingriffsnormen im Versicherungskollisionsrecht, 622. 
310 LEHMANN, 535. 
311 LEHMANN, 545. 
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fori. For VISCHER, it deals with overriding mandatory rules not belonging to 
the lex causae312 313. A third opinion is that Art. 19 PILA refers to a rule which 
originates neither from the lex fori nor from the lex causae. Here, the latter 
theory is supported. The adjective «foreign» in the title specifies that Art. 19 
PILA deals with a law other than Swiss law, or, keeping in mind that the latter 
is the lex fori (Art. 19 PILA regulates legal procedures which take place in 
Switzerland since the whole PILA regulates such procedures), a law other than 
the lex fori. The expression «instead of the law that is designated by this Act» 
in Art. 19 PILA narrows down further this foreign law (this law other than the 
lex fori) to that which is not the lex causae (a law «designated» by PILA cannot 
mean other than a law to which PILA has granted some function which is 
namely the already mentioned lex fori but also the lex causae). In addition, 
Art. 19 PILA covering a law that is neither the lex fori nor the lex causae is 
the only possibility if one, as here, accepts the uniform connection theory – 
within the latter the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae represent a 
law «designated by this Act» whilst Art. 19 PILA handles a law which is not 
«designated by this Act»314.             
2.3 Requirements 
The conditions for the application of Art. 19 PILA are not uncontroversial.  
a Connection    
In order to attain consideration, the third overriding mandatory law in question 
should be connected to the facts of the case. This is an objective criterion 
which, as SCHNYDER puts it, constitutes a «first filter» for disallowing unjus-
tified interferences with the lex causae315. The applicability of the law of an 
–––––––––––––– 
312 This is clear from VISCHER, ZK IPRG, Art. 19 N 18. 
313 That might at the first sight appear odd because VISCHER applied Art. 19 PILA in relation to 
overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae – see Chapter 13, II., 2. However, he applied 
it only by analogy – he applied only its conditions, not Art. 19 itself (see again Chapter 13, 
II., 2.). 
314 See also MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 19 N 13. 
315 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 337. 
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overriding mandatory rule to a party participating in the transaction would not 
represent a sufficient connection316, but the latter would be present, for exam-
ple, where the lex fori would have claimed applicability in a comparable situ-
ation317. 
b «That wants to apply mandatorily» 
In order to be subsumed under Art. 19 PILA, a rule needs to want itself to be 
applied mandatorily. Such willingness is one of the components of an overrid-
ing mandatory rule; see above – Chapter 9, V. 
c «Interests of a party so require» 
That the interests of a party require the consideration of the third law’s over-
riding mandatory rule means that the legal situation of such a party would im-
prove or at least would be less rigorous if that rule is considered.         
d «Legitimate and manifestly preponderant interests»                         
Art. 19 PILA refers to interests that are «legitimate», which is interests that 
deserve to be protected by the legal system – bona fide interests – to the ex-
clusion, for example, of interests in circumventing a law (no one can benefit 
from their own illegal behaviour). The interests concerned need to be also 
«manifestly preponderant».  
e Interests «of a party»  
The different language versions of Art. 19 PILA are inconsistent: its German 
and Italian version refers to «interests of a party» («Interessen einer Partei» in 
German, «interessi … di una parte» in Italian) whilst the French version refers 
solely to «interests» («des intérêts») without identifying the bearer of these. 
That constellation renders it unclear whether only interests of a party or any 
interests (i.e. also interests e.g. of a state) constitute a criterion. Art. 19 PILA 
should be amended in order that its translations are harmonised and clarity is 
–––––––––––––– 
316 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 337, including fn. 184 which cites a case. 
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brought in this regard: either the words «of a party» («einer Partei», respec-
tively «di una parte») can be removed from its German and Italian versions or 
the words «of a party» («d’une partie») can be added after the word «prépon-
dérants» in its French version. 
On the one hand, there are objections against the condition in the German and 
Italian text that the interests that should require the consideration of the over-
riding mandatory rule should be those of a party. It is said that the considera-
tion of a rule protecting public interests, such as an overriding mandatory rule, 
cannot be made dependent on private interests like the interests of a party to 
the dispute.  
On the other hand, one can see the point of such criterion due to the following.  
First, the overriding mandatory rule in question is a rule of a third law, i.e. not 
of a law that is principally applicable. The condition that a party is interested 
in the consideration of the third law’s overriding mandatory rule might be a 
fair compromise between the need to protect the public interests which are the 
subject matter of the respective third law’s overriding mandatory rule and the 
need to stay as close as possible to the usual manner in which private law dis-
putes are resolved – through application of the lex causae, and not of other 
laws.  
Second, the reference to the interests of a party corresponds to the main mis-
sion of private international law, and thus of PILA – to regulate private legal 
relationships318, i.e. to make justice for private parties. The adjudicator under 
PILA is not an enforcer of the interests of public parties, such as states; he or 
she might be so only as an exception.     
Third, sometimes the third law’s overriding mandatory rule might serve «self-
ish»319 ambitions of the third state, e.g. those of a purely political nature, which 
one might not want to validate. The requirement that a third law’s overriding 
mandatory rule concerns the legitimate interests of a party in order to be con-
–––––––––––––– 
318 See also VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 70, 71. 










sidered prevents such validating, since consideration of such a «selfish» over-
riding mandatory rule would not be of a party’s legitimate interest and hence 
would not be proceeded to. On the other hand, the requirement that the party’s 
interests in question are «legitimate» prevents the conferral of exaggerated at-
tention on individual interests. For instance, an interest of a party in the cir-
cumvention of rules legis causae through the consideration of a third law’s 
overriding mandatory rules will not be legitimate.  
Last but not least, conferring attention on the interests of the parties is not 
necessarily equal to ignoring the interests of the state author of the overriding 
mandatory rules; it can even at the same time mean respecting the latter. For 
instance, when a party is released from a contractual obligation which it is 
prohibited by an overriding mandatory rule from entering into, not only the 
interests of this party (in not being sanctioned for incompliance with a con-
tract) but also the interests of the state having issued the overriding mandatory 
rule (in seeing the prohibition being enforced) are protected. SCHNYDER is of 
the same opinion320, but he sees a difference where the interests of the party 
that wants the foreign overriding mandatory rule not to be applied prevail. It 
is believed here that this should not be a problematic situation because for a 
third law’s overriding mandatory rule to be considered under Art. 19 PILA it 
suffices that the interests of a party require such consideration – they do not 
need also to prevail over the interests of the counterparty that wants the foreign 
overriding mandatory rule not to be considered (there will be consideration 
even if the latter interests prevail).   
2.4 Power conferred 
a «May» 
Like Art. 9 (3) Rome I, Art. 19 PILA anchors only a right but not an obligation. 
It reads «may be considered» (emphasis added). 
b «Consider»  
–––––––––––––– 
320 See also SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 255, in fine. 
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Both in the title and in the text321 of Art. 19  PILA, the Swiss legislature uses 
the concept of «considering» instead of the classical «applying».322  
There are opinions that «consideration» and «application» are the same in their 
core, in particular that consideration is «selective «application»» which 
«sounds friendlier»323. Indeed, one may contend that a rule is either applied or 
not, and anything in the middle does not exist or is at least a confusing half-
solution, so that consideration coincides with application. 
Nevertheless, it is here believed that a middle ground might be possible. It 
would exist where solely some of the legal consequences envisaged by the 
overriding mandatory rule (e.g. unenforceability but not nullity) or different 
–––––––––––––– 
321 In their original German text, both the first and the second paragraph of Art. 19 PILA talk 
about consideration, rather than application. The first paragraph is usually translated into 
English accordingly but the second paragraph is often not, with words such as «applied», 
«applicable» or «to apply» being used (see e.g. KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.99). 
322 Also Art. 9 (3) Rome I does not order the application of the overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law but the giving of effect to them, which might encompass both application or con-
sideration, thus being wider than just consideration. Accepting that giving of effect to a rule 
is not necessarily equal to applying it would be compatible with the theory that Art. 9 (3) 
Rome I was based on the English case Ralli Brothers. In that case the judges did not apply, 
i.e. enforce, the overriding mandatory of the third law but gave effect to it – they did not 
declare the concerned contract null but only left it unenforced. Also BRIGGS, 203, fn. 56 
gives that case as an example of something different than enforcement of non-English law 
– he gives it as an example of recognition of a non-English law (in the context, the author 
is making a clarification that the «revenue rule» – the prohibition on English courts to en-
force a non-English penal or revenue rule – covers only the enforcement (direct and indi-
rect), but not the recognition, of such non-English penal or revenue rule). 
      One can note that in its second sentence, Art. 9 (3) Rome I orders that one of the criteria for 
deciding whether to proceed to the giving of effect of the third law’s overriding mandatory 
rule should be the consequences of the «application or non-application» of such a rule – 
which is unexplainable because one is ordered to take into account the consequences of 
something (application) different than that which one is contemplating doing (giving ef-
fect); however, this seems to be rather unintentional inaccuracy. 








consequences than those foreseen by the overriding mandatory rule (e.g. mod-
ification of the contract instead of nullity) are applied.  
Then, whilst «application» is a term with an established meaning in private 
international law doctrine and practice – it is known which adjudicators’ ac-
tions it includes – «consideration» has only its general meaning as «taking into 
account». Application is a strictly predetermined process which consists of the 
strict drawing of all consequences envisaged by an overriding mandatory rule, 
whilst consideration is more flexible – it comprises the giving of effect only 
to some of the consequences attached to the overriding mandatory rule. Also, 
for KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, an arbitral tribunal which considers the 
overriding mandatory rule has «a broad freedom in choosing how to imple-
ment the mandatory rule. For instance, where the foreign rule provides for the 
nullity of the contract, it may limit itself to modifying the contractual obliga-
tions»324.  
Consideration allows that due regard is taken of the concrete case and that the 
different interests involved are balanced against each other. For the arbitral 
tribunal in ICC Case No. 8528325, for example, the consideration provided for 
in Art. 19 PILA is a call for the adjudicator to make such a balance: «It is the 
arbitrators [sic] duty to see how to harmonize the agreement, the lex causae 
and the Turkish law. This duty of harmonization is expressed by the words ‘to 
take into account’ contained in Art. 19 PILA. Thus the arbitrators are not com-
pelled to strictly apply the Turkish law but to find a reasonable solution.»326. 
In fact, the balancing of the interests involved – which is possible within the 
consideration as understood here – fits international cases very well because 
in the latter both public and private interests are affected, and moreover deeply 
mingled, so that it would be unfair to serve only the ones or the others of them. 
Next and very importantly, if «to consider» was the same as «to apply», the 
Swiss legislator would have simply used the latter concept, as it did in Art. 44, 
48-49, 52-55, 61, 65c, 68-69, 72, 82-83, 90-95, 99-107, 108c, 110, 116-126, 
–––––––––––––– 
324 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.99. 
325 The issue of application by analogy of Art. 19 PILA is mostly dealt with in para 25-39. 




Chapter 15: Overriding mandatory rules of a third law 
 
134 
128, 132-142, 149c, 154-155, 187 of PILA with regard to the lex causae. It is 
a legislative technique to use one and the same term for the same concept 
throughout an entire legal act – the aim to prevent ambiguous interpretations 
of a law prevails over linguistic considerations of avoiding repetitions.      
An understanding of the law’s «consideration» under Art. 19 PILA as some-
thing different than a law’s «application» is not precluded by the fact that the 
title of the section – Sec. 3 – in which Art. 19 PILA is situated refers to «ap-
plicable law» and with this to the concept of application. As explained in 
Chapter 6, I., the expression «applicable law» has a wide sense of law which 
in any manner, not necessarily through being applied, influences the decision 
regarding the substance of the case.                                
Next, it is logical that a legislator would want to give less intensive effect to 
rules which do not belong to the lex causae than to rules which do. The lex 
causae is namely the law commissioned with the task of governing the case – 
the governing law: one wants to make as few compromises with this commis-







Chapter 16: Competition between the overriding 
mandatory rules of the different laws 
There is no rule whatsoever on a conflict between the overriding mandatory 
rules of different laws. 
I. Competition between overriding mandatory rules 
legis causae and overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law  
Under the uniform connection, overriding mandatory rules legis causae obtain 
effect automatically by virtue of their origin, and they will be applied, not only 
considered, whereas under Art. 19 PILA, the overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law will not be given effect automatically – and when they are, they will 
only be considered, not applied, from which one can conclude that within a 
conflict between overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law, the former will have a greater chance to «sur-
vive». However, the outcome of this competition should not be predetermined, 
i.e. the third law’s overriding mandatory rules should be left the opportunity 
to be considered also where overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae are 
applied. Otherwise the application of Art. 19 PILA would be limited. Besides, 
the latter article does not mention that it would not be applicable where next 
to the third law’s overriding mandatory rule an overriding mandatory rule of 
the lex causae is applicable. SCHNYDER also seems to believe that the consid-
eration of the overriding mandatory rules of a third law is capable of suppress-
ing to some extent the application of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae because he defines the cumulation between the uniform connecting of 
the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and the special connecting of 
the overriding mandatory rules of a third law, which (cumulation) he sees in 
288 
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PILA, as «attenuated», amongst others, due to this possibility that the overrid-
ing mandatory rules of a third law suppress the regulatory law of the lex 
causae327.  
The conflict between overriding mandatory rules legis causae and overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law can be solved in the same way as a conflict 
between the overriding mandatory rules of one third law and the overriding 
mandatory rules of another third law is solved, whilst one puts up with the 
probability that the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae obtain greater 
effect than the overriding mandatory rules of the third law due to the former, 
as mentioned above, being automatically applicable and namely applicable ra-
ther than only to be considered. 
II. Competition between overriding mandatory rules 
legis fori and overriding mandatory rules of a third 
law  
–––––––––––––– 
327 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 304. However, it is here believed that the possibility 
that the effect of the overriding mandatory rules legis causae is limited through a third law’s 
overriding mandatory rules being considered does not cause the cumulation of the uniform 
and the special connection to become «attenuated» – because this possibility is inherent in 
the cumulation anyway, i.e. it exists in the case of any, not only of «attenuated», cumulation 
– since under the uniform connection the overriding mandatory rules contained in the lex 
causae constitute an integral part of the lex causae, everything, including specially con-
nected overriding mandatory rules of a third law, that is capable of limiting the legal effect 
of such lex causae is capable of limiting the legal effect of these overriding mandatory rules 
contained in the lex causae. 
      The other reason for which SCHNYDER believes that the cumulation between the uniform 
and the special connection is «attenuated» is that (even if invoked regardless of their con-
tent) the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae could be self-limited since Art. 13 
PILA (first sentence) referred to the application only of those norms of the lex causae which 
were considered by such lex causae applicable (SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 247, 
including inter alia fn. 26). However, here no self-limitation is seen in this fact – the fact 
that only those overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae which the lex causae considers 
applicable are applied – since anyway every rule is applicable only when the law to which 
it belongs reckons it applicable; in other words, that is the application itself, and not some 
self-limitation. 
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Thanks to Art. 18 PILA, overriding mandatory rules legis fori would override 
the overriding mandatory rules of a third law. This article orders the applica-
tion of overriding mandatory rules legis fori under any circumstances (its 
wording is firm – «reserved remain»), which is different than Art. 19 PILA’s 
granting of (anyway solely) a right (anyway merely) to consider the overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law only upon the fulfilment of certain (in fact, quite 
a few) conditions.  
A state court would not control the content of a domestic law which it imposes 
over the lex causae, as it would do with the content of a non-domestic law 
seeking to interfere with the latter328.  
III. Competition between overriding mandatory rules 
legis fori and overriding mandatory rules legis 
causae  
Again, due to Art. 18 PILA, overriding mandatory rules legis fori would over-
ride overriding mandatory rules legis causae. This article orders application of 
the overriding mandatory rules legis fori without mentioning any conditions, 
which cannot be interpreted as anything but an order for application under any 
circumstances, including where the overriding mandatory rules legis fori in 
question compete with overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae. 
IV. Competition between overriding mandatory rules 
of one third law and overriding mandatory rules of 
another third law 
Here one can follow, to a great extent, the solution suggested by SCHNYDER, 
who seems to propose that a conflict between the overriding mandatory rules 
of different laws is remedied through conferring to each of the competing over-
riding mandatory rules effect which is confined within the territory of the state 
that has enacted such overriding mandatory rule, and where that is not possi-
ble, through giving effect to the overriding mandatory rule which is worthiest 
–––––––––––––– 









of being protected; but where also that is not possible (because none of the 
competing overriding mandatory rules can be qualified as worthiest of protec-
tion), through giving effect to all the competing overriding mandatory rules 
cumulatively329. 
–––––––––––––– 
329 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 322, 323 
(with regard to overriding mandatory rules that compete in international arbitration, which 
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Subpart 1: Problem 
Overriding mandatory rules become relevant also in international arbitration, 
even if the latter is a dispute resolution mechanism governed by private law, 
as they intrude into (international) private law cases. For instance, «business 
crimes» which become relevant in international arbitration (money launder-
ing; bribery; currency exchange law violations; fraud, coercion, usury, abuse 
of power; price fixing, cartels and other violations of competition or antitrust 
laws; tax evasion; securities fraud; perjury, forgery or other obstruction of jus-
tice)330 cannot avoid being regulated by overriding mandatory rules. Indeed, 
overriding mandatory rules have been faced increasingly in international arbi-
tration331.  
However, such rules often pose great «discomfort» for international arbitra-
tion. They tangle it up in an «identity crisis»332: on the one hand is its nature 
as a private law dispute resolution mechanism dominated by the will of the 
private law parties owing to which it should respect the parties’ will with re-
gard to the choice of law; and on the other hand is its character as an instrument 
of delivery of justice which requires preventing circumvention of law, includ-
ing circumvention which might result from the parties’ choice of law. It is also 
pointed out that in an arbitration, «countries are not parties to the dispute so 
–––––––––––––– 
330 KURKELA makes a list of such business crimes (KURKELA, 285). 
331 See PIETH who admits: «My personal involvement as an expert on money laundering in the 
IPOC case and on corruption in the Fraport and the Piatco cases have [sic] opened a new 
world to me. I have been able to experience how as a consequence of an ever more global-
ised economy notions of economic crime may become decisive in civil litigation even under 
arbitration.». (Here, «litigation» is apparently used in its wide sense.) According to the foot-
notes of the cited work, the «IPOC» case refers to IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd. v 
LV Finance Group Ltd., Partial Award of 19 October 2004 in an ad hoc Arbitration, Zurich, 
the «Fraport» case refers to Fraport AG v Philippines (ICSID case No. ARB/03/25), and the 
«Piatco» case refers to Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCO) v Philip-
pines (ICC case No. 12610). 







they cannot defend themselves»333, i.e. they cannot argue the need for appli-
cation or consideration of the overriding mandatory rule enacted by them. 
However, this should not have a great impact. An international arbitrator is 
enough of a «adult» to be able to appreciate on their own whether the condi-
tions for application or consideration are met, and this is, moreover, included 
in their duty to resolve the case (resolving a case means subsuming the facts 
of the case under the appropriate law, be it overriding mandatory law or any 
other). In addition, it cannot be expected that a state would have a say in an 
international arbitration, since it is not a party to the dispute – it is true that it 
is interested in the enforcement of the overriding mandatory law which it has 
enacted, but it is interested in the enforcement of any of its laws, not only an 
overriding mandatory law, and it is not a party to each legal procedure that is 
in place. 
In Switzerland, unlike the law on international private law proceedings before 
state courts (see Art. 13, 18 and 19 PILA), the law on international arbitration 
– Chapter 12 PILA – does not «dare» to define the treatment of overriding 
mandatory rules. Hence, it is not legislatively asserted whether a Swiss inter-
national arbitrator is obliged to, allowed to or even prohibited from applying 
or considering overriding mandatory rules; neither whether a duty would be 
triggered ex officio or upon invocation by a party, what the borders of a possi-
bility would be, and what the sanctions for trespassing as well as the means 
for counteracting the vacuum caused by a ban would be. As a result, interna-
tional arbitrators adjudicating out of Switzerland stand at the same crossroads 
at which state judges stand (the treatment of overriding mandatory rules is dif-
ficult also when regulated in the law) – but without any guidance whatsoever. 
With regard to the borders of the problem of overriding mandatory rules in 
international arbitration, one should note the following. First, the issue does 
not occur when the ex aequo et bono considerations from Art. 187 (2) PILA 
represent the lex causae (accordingly, that type of lex causae will not feature 
in the present analysis). Such lex causae cannot contain overriding mandatory 
rules. It contains rules of some other system, e.g. of morals, not of law, and 
–––––––––––––– 







overriding mandatory rules are rules of law. Second, overriding mandatory 
rules of a third334 law would not have effect where Art. 187 (2) PILA applies. 
Parties’ authorisation under the latter excludes the effect of rules of law, except 
of rules of law which have an international ordre public character335, ergo, it 
excludes the effect of overriding mandatory rules, including overriding man-
datory rules of a third law – again, overriding mandatory rules are rules of law. 
It is true that the rules of law whose effect is preserved (by way of exception) 
– the international ordre public rules – constitute at the same time overriding 
mandatory rules, but it is not their overriding mandatory character that ensures 
such preservation; rather it is their international ordre public character.   
–––––––––––––– 
334 Strictly speaking, here there is no «third» law, since there is no «first» (i.e. main) law – the 
causa is not a law (it is ex aequo et bono considerations). 
335 This exception is owed to the fact that Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA sets limit to all international 










Chapter 17: Method 
Since the legislation does not provide explicit rules on the status of overriding 
mandatory rules within international arbitration, Swiss jurisprudence and lit-
erature had to manage the situation alone, and the results are quite heteroge-
neous. The following approaches have been employed. 
I. Conflict of laws approach  
1. Characteristics 
Under the conflict of laws approach, the conflict between the law regulating 
the private law relationship and the overriding mandatory law is handled 
through applying conflict of laws rules which resolve this conflict. 
Within the conflict of laws approach (following the application of the respec-
tive conflict of laws rule), the overriding mandatory rule is applied as such and 
directly. For comparison, under the material law approach, the consequences 
of the overriding mandatory rule for the parties’ relationship are qualified un-
der a rule of the lex causae which is not a conflict of laws rule. At the end, 
only this rule of the lex causae, but not the overriding mandatory rule itself, is 
applied. 
The conflict of laws approach does not have to take place within the lex 
causae. The application or consideration of the overriding mandatory rules 
could be a part of the application of the lex causae, but only with regard to the 
overriding mandatory rules legis causae and only where these are connected 
through the uniform connection and anyway it only could, but it does not have 
to, be a part. It will be a conflict of laws rule of the lex fori that will order the 
application or consideration of the overriding mandatory rules – even where 
overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae are connected through the uni-
form connection that will happen because a conflict of laws rule of the lex fori 
has ordered such uniform connecting, and not only because of the lex causae’s 
view on the respective rule as overriding mandatory. Thus, the conflict of laws 
approach is not necessarily dependent on the lex causae; it goes beyond the 
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effect to overriding mandatory rules only if rules and concepts of the overning 
law order so (force majeure etc.). 
The conflict of laws approach is also the method employed in PILA’s Chapter 
1, in particular in Art. 13, 18 and 19 PILA. It is the approach through which 
the characteristics of overriding mandatory rules were addressed above in Part 
3: the uniform, preferential and special connections for connecting respec-
tively the overriding mandatory rules legis causae, the overriding mandatory 
rules legis fori and the overriding mandatory rules of a third law are in fact 
instruments of the conflict of laws approach.  
2. Legal basis  
A conflict of laws rule of the lex fori is needed in order for the conflict of laws 
approach to be employed (whether by a state judge or, as here, by an interna-
tional arbitrator)336.   
2.1 Objective law’s conflict of laws rules  
a National rules’ conflict of laws rules 
The law on Swiss international arbitration – Chapter 12 – does not contain a 
basis for the conflict of laws approach, which naturally creates great uncer-
tainty337. One can attempt to interpret only Art. 187 (1) PILA as containing 
some conflict of laws approach towards overriding mandatory rules, but that 
is difficult.  Chapter 1 PILA has the legislative «infrastructure» in the face of 
Art. 13, 18 and 19 PILA, but it is questionable whether it applies to interna-
tional arbitration courts apart from state courts or only to state courts. In any 
case, some international arbitrators who want to take the path of the conflict 
of laws approach apply these rules of Chapter 1 PILA, directly or indirectly, 
expressly or implicitly. It will be examined later on (in Chapters 19 and 21) 
whether that is sustainable and, if so, in what form.         
b International public law’s conflict of laws rules 
–––––––––––––– 
336 See also SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 166. 




Chapter 17: Method 
 
146 
It is not certain whether conflict of laws rules contained in international public 
law acts, such as conventions, will make part of the lex arbitri (of the state that 
has signed the respective international instrument) and thus bind international 
arbitration courts (seated in that state). As international public law, such con-
flict of laws rules become part of the national law of the signatory (and take 
precedence over the latter’s internal law). However, not all of its internal rules, 
but only those especially destined for this purpose, constitute the lex arbitri of 
a state. For instance, Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement338 becomes part 
of PILA’s Chapter 1 (and prevails over Art. 19 PILA, towards which it is a lex 
specialis339 (it deals with exchange control regulations, whilst the latter with 
overriding mandatory rules (of a third law) from any area))340 but it does not 
for certain become part of the Swiss lex arbitri in Chapter 12 PILA. Besides, 
the idea of an international public law instrument might be to have states, and 
not private parties like international arbitrators, as genuine addressees (the 
case with the IMF Agreement considered here).       
In fact, even if they become part of the lex arbitri, conflict of laws rules in 
international public law’s legal acts will play a limited role in the conflict of 
laws approach employed by international arbitrators towards overriding man-
datory rules. First, they are a rarity. Second, they often lack binding force: 
international public law, especially in the financial area, is frequently soft law 
only (Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement, discussed here, is a rare hard 
law example). BRUMMER argues that non-binding instruments can still extract 
certain coercive power from non-legal sources which are «a range of reputa-
tional, institutional, and market disciplines»341 but this is difficult to prove. 
Third, some instruments of international public law might not really regulate 
the status of overriding mandatory rules. For instance, the (anyway soft law) 
Hague Principles on Choice of Law make a reservation in favour of overriding 
–––––––––––––– 
338 As apparent from a large volume of case law, however, Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agree-
ment brings with it its own difficulties: e.g. the definition of exchange contract or exchange 
regulation. 
339 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 83, fn. 153. 
340 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 19 N 31 with references. Hence, the domestic Art. 19 
PILA would apply only if Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement does not apply, e.g. if the 
contract at stake does not come within the (in fact, narrow) concept of an exchange contract. 
341 BRUMMER, 284. 
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mandatory rules but condition this reservation on the existence of a right or 
obligation («… if the arbitral tribunal is required or entitled to do so» – Art. 
11 (5)), thus leaving the clarification on such existence to a hard law act. 
2.2 Contractual conflict of laws rules 
Further, the parties’ contract can provide a conflict of laws rule on overriding 
mandatory rules. That will be a much easier constellation for the international 
arbitrators because they will not need to conduct the difficult search for a spe-
cific legal basis in order to give effect to such rules. In any case, also here the 
ultimate legal basis for the conflict of laws approach will be the lex fori (in 
particular the lex arbitri) because the respective conflict of laws rule will have 
been adopted (in the contract) namely on the ground that such lex fori has 
empowered the parties to contract with regard to the substantive law.  
a Standardised contracts’ conflict of laws rules 
Standardised contracts in the financial and international arbitration sphere 
have diverse approaches towards overriding mandatory rules. Some of them 
are not very helpful. The ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement avoids the 
question of the relation between its rules and overriding mandatory rules – in 
its footnote 9, it makes a reservation that the proposal in it for the governing 
of an international arbitration by the ICC Rules does not guarantee the com-
pliance of the latter with Sharia rules, which probably includes Sharia’s over-
riding mandatory rules. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules recognise the 
power of mandatory rules, although only of procedural mandatory rules342. On 
–––––––––––––– 
342 Their Art. 1 (3) reads: «These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of 
these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which 
the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail». Under «the law applicable to the 
arbitration», procedural and conflict law is understood because it must be a law that regu-
lates the same issues as the issues which the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules regulate and 
the latter, as any other arbitration rules, give only a procedural and conflict law basis to the 
international arbitration; besides, interpretation of that wording which encompasses also 
substantive applicable law would be reductio ad absurdum: the UNICITRAL Arbitration 
Rules refer to the application of a certain substantive law (through Art. 35, in particular Art. 
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the other hand, the Loan Market Association Facility Agreement for pre-ex-
port finance transactions343 delivers an opportunity for the stipulated (in Sec. 
12) arbitral tribunal to apply or consider financial overriding mandatory rules. 
Its clause 27.19 «Convertibility/Transferability» which, amongst other things, 
deals with restrictions, prohibitions or delaying of payments, covers, for ex-
ample, borrowers not in a position to repay their pre-export loans because they 
were not paid by Greek buyers of the goods they exported into Greece after 
(in the summer of 2015) a local law suspended the export of capital; clause 
27.20 addresses such a moratorium on payments.  
b Individual contracts’ conflict of laws rules  
There are some examples of individual agreements for which international ar-
bitration is a possible jurisdiction and which provide for the precedence of 
overriding mandatory rules over their stipulations. The agreement between 
Mitsubishi and Morgan Stanley, for example, provides that overriding manda-
tory rules have precedence over the agreed confidentiality. Then, Art. XI, 
clause 11.15 of the Shareholders’ Agreement that Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Ar-
gentaria has with several Turkish companies344 prescribes (a) that Turkish law 
(the law of incorporation of the company whose shareholders are concluding 
the agreement) prevails over a provision of the contract, and (b) that fiduciary 
and good faith duties of a company’s directors take precedence over the con-
tract345.  
3. Cases 
3.1 ICC Case No. 8528  
–––––––––––––– 
35 (1)) and the rule which under that law is applicable to the case «is in conflict» with 
another provision of the same law (Art. 1 (3)). 
343 This is a model agreement for pre-exporting financing contracts. Such contracts are loans 
(ordinary or syndicated) granted by a bank/banks to an exporter for financing the production 
and supply (when the exporter is the producer) or the purchase (when the exporter buys 
from the producer) of goods to be exported. The Loan Market Association Facility Agree-
ment for pre-export finance transactions is intended to master syndicated loans. 
344 BBVA 20-F-Form for 2011, Exhibit 10.3. 
345 Article XI, clause 11.10 of the Agreement stipulates jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. 
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ICC Case No. 8528 (which will be discussed below in relation to the argu-
ments for and against application of PILA’s Chapter 1 to overriding mandatory 
rules in international arbitration) involves a conflict of laws approach, since 
within it a conflict of laws rule – Art. 19 PILA – is applied. The case will be 
discussed in more detail below; here it is mentioned only as an example of the 
use of the conflict of laws approach. 
3.2 Megafon case 
The so-called «Megafon case», which has given rise to several procedures, 
involved two contracts dated 10 April 2001 and 12 December 2001 granting 
call options on company shares. English governing law and Swiss seated arbi-
trations had been stipulated. An international arbitration procedure based in 
Geneva was initiated by the buyer after it exercised the options, but the seller 
refused to perform and sold the shares which were subject to the options to 
other persons. The seller contended that the exercise of the options and the 
options themselves were invalid. The buyer won this international arbitration 
with an arbitrators’ decision from 16 August 2004. The seller could not obtain 
annulment of this award (DSC 4P.208/2004 of 14 December 2004) but suc-
ceeded with a request for its revision based on newly revealed evidence 
demonstrating that it had been influenced or procured by a crime (DSC 
4P.102/2006 of 29 August 2006).                                                            
Within a parallel international arbitration seated in Zurich, actions for perfor-
mance of the call options or alternatively for damages for non-performance 
were dismissed, with some of the requests declared moot and with two partial 
arbitral awards from 19 October 2004 and 16 May 2006. The object and pur-
pose of the call option agreement of 10 April 2001 had been illegal, ergo, the 
agreement was unenforceable. The action had been made ex turpi causa and 
because of that was in breach of public policy. The award from 16 May 2006 
was unsuccessfully challenged before the Court (see judgment of 19 February 
2007 in 4P.168/2006) with allegations that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded 
its powers in establishing a violation of Russian criminal law and that there 
had been an infringement of the right to be heard. With regard to the (here 
relevant) assertion about the arbitral tribunal exceeding its powers, the curia 
pointed out that the legal ground for such a challenge must be Art. 190 (2) (b) 
PILA – an arbitral tribunal wrongly assuming powers. In such a situation, the 
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Court first examined whether the claim was arbitrable according to Art. 177 
(1) PILA. Its finding was positive. The dispute evolved over pecuniary inter-
ests. That was not changed by the fact that the presence of potential (which i.c. 
turned out actual) committal of a criminal offence was examined, because such 
examination had only preliminary purposes for the main question, which re-
mained one of a pecuniary nature – that of performance of call options over 
company shares. Since only valid agreements could give rise to proprietary 
rights, before enforcing the rights that an agreement is said to confer, one had 
to appreciate whether such an agreement had produced legal effect. This ap-
preciation included control for the existence of grounds for invalidity of the 
contract, such as the committal of a crime in relation to the contract. That ar-
bitrator’s evaluation of grounds for invalidity was not hindered by the fact that 
one of those grounds (the committal of a crime) had other legal consequences 
(criminal law consequences) to be enforced by another adjudicator (a state 
court), since the arbitrator did not take away the exclusive prerogative of this 
other adjudicator in imposing such other consequences – through this evalua-
tion he or she did not impose these other consequences but only considered 
the influence of the ground for them (the committal of the crime) on the valid-
ity of the contract. 
The international arbitrators and the Court here applied a (third law’s) over-
riding mandatory rule – a money-laundering prohibition – to a financial trans-
action (call option). The conflict of laws approach was used. The fact that its 
violation was seen as rendering the contract invalid means that the foreign 
overriding mandatory rule in question was treated as a law and a foreign over-
riding mandatory rule was treated as a rule within the conflict of laws approach 
– the material law approach perceives a foreign overriding mandatory rule as 
a fact (if it was employed here, the contract would have been characterised as 
impossible or immoral rather than illegal).                    
3.3 The English cases Ralli Brothers and Foster 
Ralli Bros. v Compania Naviera Sota Y Azinar (1920).26 («Ralli Brothers») is 
a famous English decision creating a rule that has become known as the «Ralli 
rule» (or the «Ralli principle»), according to which contracts whose perfor-
mance is illegal under the law at the place of performance are unenforceable 
in England except where the foreign law that would be breached is revenue or 
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fiscal law346. I.c. an English-governed contract stipulated a certain amount of 
freight due from charterers to Spanish shipowners upon the delivery of a cargo 
in Spain, but after the conclusion of the contract its performance became ille-
gal under Spanish law, since the latter set a limit on freights to be charged by 
shipowners which was exceeded through the freight agreed on. The English 
court refused to order recovery of this stipulated freight. The case is interesting 
for the topic of the conflict of laws approach in particular because there is a 
heated dispute as to whether it created a conflict of laws or a substantive rule 
– which is the same as a dispute as to whether the conflict of laws or the ma-
terial law approach was taken. Here, the first possibility is viewed as more 
plausible347. The judgment refers to illegality, and not impossibility or immo-
rality, of the performance, which means that the foreign law is understood as 
a law (which is how the conflict of laws approach perceives foreign law) and 
not as a fact (which would have been the view of the material law method). 
Then, the fact that the established rule envisages exceptions for revenue and 
fiscal rules of the foreign law speaks for a conflict of laws nature, since such 
exceptions would not have been necessary within a material law approach – 
for the latter it would not have mattered whether it was a foreign rule which 
expressed the foreign state’s sovereignty intensively, like a revenue or fiscal 
rule, or another rule that hindered the contract’s performance. It is true that the 
English court did not grant entire nullity of the contract, but only unenforcea-
bility, which is less intense protection of the concerned overriding mandatory 
rule (because, unlike nullity, it does not, for example, entail the returning in 
accordance with unjust enrichment rules of what was surrendered under the 
contract); but a weaker degree of effect, as here, is something the conflict of 
laws approach knows of – for example, Art. 19 PILA gives effect to a foreign 
overriding mandatory rule in the form of consideration of such rule.                
The English case Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 («Foster») also deals with 
illegality under foreign law. The literature debates whether the principle es-
tablished in the case supplements or coincides with the Ralli principle, and the 
–––––––––––––– 
346 Actually, there is a discussion whether the Ralli rule is superseded by Art. 9 (3) Rome I 
(another sign that the rule deals with overriding mandatory rules), a debate which might 
become superfluous if after its exit from the EU, Rome I ceases to apply to Great Britain. 
347 – and that is why the case is discussed here when dealing with the conflict of laws method. 
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majority appears to see separateness. In Foster, a group of persons, aiming at 
making profits, had planned to ship whisky to North America, where at the 
time a prohibition on alcohol was in force. A dispute arose between them and 
they brought it to the court, which refused to give assistance for the perfor-
mance of the contract, establishing the principle that: «An English contract 
should and will be held invalid on account of illegality if the real object and 
intention of the parties necessitates them joining in an endeavour to perform 
in a foreign and friendly country some act which is illegal by the law of such 
country notwithstanding the fact that there may be, in a certain event, alterna-
tive modes or places of performing which permit the contract to be performed 
legally.». Foster, like Ralli Brothers, is ambiguous on the approach it uses – 
the conflict of laws or the material law approach. Like in Ralli Brothers, more 
indications of the former method are seen. Firstly, the court recognises the 
foreign law as law – it talks about invalidity of the contract – «on account of 
illegality» (an argument found in Ralli Brothers as well). Second, that the 
court’s reasoning is «notwithstanding the fact that there may be, in a certain 
event, alternative modes or places of performing which permit the contract to 
be performed legally» shows that whether the contract is unacceptable in view 
of the foreign law is relevant independently of whether the contract is valid 
under the lex causae; in other words, that the «opinion» of the lex causae is 
not enough, as it would have been under the material law approach. 
3.4 Castillo Bozo 
The US case Juan José Castillo Bozo v Leopoldo Castillo Bozo and Gabriel 
Castillo Bozo, 12-cv-24174-Williams, in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida, 2013 (referred to as «Castillo Bozo brothers») 
is here attributed a discussion which is less traditional, for it deals with argu-
ments that could have been, but were not, raised. The case involved a stock 
purchase agreement concluded in 2008 by the Venezuelan citizen Juan José 
Castillo Bozo with his brothers (also Venezuelan citizens) Leopoldo Castillo 
Bozo and Gabriel Castillo Bozo, according to which the former was to transfer 
to the latter his shares in various Venezuelan companies (part of a financial 
group) against consideration. The stock purchase agreement provided for the 
application of Florida law and for the resolution of disputes through arbitration 
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in Miami (Florida) before the American Arbitration Association under the lat-
ter’s International Arbitration Rules. The price for the transfer was not paid, 
and Juan José Castillo Bozo claimed it in a Miami arbitration, obtaining, on 
13 November 2012, a favourable award. On 21 November 2012, he requested 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to enforce 
this award in accordance with the Inter-American Convention348 and with US 
law, prompting the (positive) judgment from 2013 discussed here. Venezuelan 
financial markets law required that transactions causing change of control over 
companies such as the transfer of shares stipulated in the stock purchase agree-
ment in question be authorised in advance by two Venezuelan authorities (Su-
perintendencia de la Actividad Aseguradora – «SUDESEG» – which super-
vises insurance activities, and Superintendencia de las Instituciones del Sector 
Bancario de Venezuela – «SUDEBAN» – which monitors banking institu-
tions). Such authorisations were not obtained. This incompliance with Vene-
zuelan financial regulations is why the case is considered here.        
The Venezuelan requirements for authorisations could have been regarded as 
overriding mandatory rules; even as overriding mandatory rules of ordre pub-
lic character.  
As overriding mandatory rules, they could be seen because they dealt with 
issues of public interests – they regulated a business (in particular the change 
of control over companies participating in a business), which impacted the 
wellbeing of the public at large – the financial services’ business.  
This overriding mandatory rules character of the Venezuelan authorisation re-
quirements could have been invoked by the defendants in the arbitration, in 
particular with the contention that these requirements had to be applied in their 
capacity as overriding mandatory rules of a third law which was closely con-
nected to the case. One could have contended that there was such close relation 
of the third law to the case because this law was the law of the country in which 
the companies, whose shares were being transferred through the arbitrated 
stock purchase agreement, were incorporated. In other words, the respondents 
–––––––––––––– 
348 The Convention does not, for example, mention that it applies only to foreign awards, which 
makes one conclude that it applies also to domestic awards – as in the current case, where 
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could have demanded that the international arbitrators conduct (the difficult) 
balancing between the stock purchase agreement (in particular the obligation 
under it to pay the price), the lex causae and the overriding mandatory Vene-
zuelan authorisation rules – balancing analogous to that which the Swiss 
seated international arbitrators delivering the award in ICC Case No. 8528 
characterised as the arbitrators’ task349. It is not known whether the defendants 
made such a point, and in fact it is more probable that they did not if one con-
siders that their argumentation before the enforcing court did not address the 
Venezuelan requirements as a third law350.  
As far as the enforcement proceedings before the US state court are concerned, 
within them the overriding mandatory character of the Venezuelan financial 
regulations would anyway not have brought a successful argument for the de-
fence because the violation of overriding mandatory rules was not a ground 
for refusing enforcement (only the infringement of ordre public was – Art. 5 
(2) (b) of the Inter-American Convention). 
One could have gone even further and argued that the Venezuelan authorisa-
tion requirements were not simpliciter overriding mandatory rules but overrid-
ing mandatory rules of ordre public character; in particular that those rules not 
only dealt with issues of public interest (because they regulated a business 
which influenced the wellbeing of the general public – the financial services’ 
business), as elaborated above, but that they also made part of the rules and 
concepts without which a legal order did not exist.  
The defendants could have provided such argumentation within the arbitration 
procedure. Again, there is no information whether they did so.  
In any case, the invocation of the ordre public status of the requirements in 
question was more vital in the enforcement proceedings before the US state 
court than in the arbitration procedure; there, that was the only characteristic 
of these rules which (of course, together with the fact of the violation of such 
–––––––––––––– 
349 See para 32 of the award: «…It is the arbitrators [sic] duty to see how to harmonize the 
agreement, the lex causae and the Turkish law.» 
350 – but as lex causae, obviously wrong treatment since a choice of law clause in the stock 
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rules) could have paralysed the enforcement of the award – an overriding man-
datory nature would not have sufficed. The defence could have argued that the 
award’s enforcement had to be refused, since the Venezuelan authorisation 
requirements made part of the ordre public within the meaning of Art. 5 (2) 
(b) of the Inter-American Convention and the incompliance with them in-
fringed such ordre public. The ordre public whose invocation could have 
brought some argument for the defence was not that of Venezuela – Art. 5 (2) 
(b) of the Inter-American Convention which provides that the violation of the 
ordre public can be a ground for refusal of enforcement refers to public policy 
of «that State» where «that» refers to the state in which recognition and en-
forcement is sought; which is here the US, not Venezuela. Hence, a violation 
of the Venezuelan ordre public could be taken into consideration only out of 
a sense of loyalty. Contending a breach of the international ordre public would 
also not have represented the most beneficial strategy. Even if one accepted 
that (despite its phrase «that State» (emphasis added)) Art. 5 (2) (b) of the 
Inter-American Convention envisaged the international (not the enforcing 
state’s) ordre public (because this was how the practice and literature read the 
ordre public contained in another convention whose interpretation served as a 
model for the interpretation of the Inter-American Convention – the ordre pub-
lic in Art. V (2) (b) of the New York Convention351), it would have been dif-
ficult to demonstrate that the Venezuelan authorisation requirements made 
part of the international order public, since financial regulations rarely reach 
the high rank of ordre public. The safest way to go was to interpret Art. 5 (2) 
(b) Inter-American Convention’s wording («that State») as referring to the 
state seized with the request for recognition and execution of the award – the 
US. With such a starting point, one could argue that the award violated US 
public policy, since it ordered the performance of an obligation (that to pay the 
–––––––––––––– 
351 Such interpretation by analogy of the provision of another convention is quite brave but is 
justified since the court itself stated that one needed to read the two conventions in question 
in the same way (II. «Analysis», p. 3 and 4 of the judgment and the authorities cited there), 
and, moreover, the court alone applied interpretation of a concept contained in the New 
York Convention to a concept provided for in the Inter-American Convention (it read «law» 
in the expression «according to the law of which the decision has been made» in Art. 5 (1) 
(e) of the Inter-American Convention in the same way as the term «law» in Art. V of the 
New York Convention was read – as «procedural law» (II. «Analysis», point 3., p. 9 and 
10 of the judgment)). 
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price) whose synallagmatic obligation (that to transfer the shares) was not 
complied with (in particular because the legal requirements for such comply-
ing were not fulfilled; these were the legal requirements of the place where the 
shares’ transfer was to take place, which was Venezuela, for the transfer could 
not take place other than in the country in which the companies whose shares 
were being transferred were incorporated). That would have been a logic sim-
ilar to that of the Reteitalia international arbitral tribunal, with the difference 
that here the impossibility would have been subsequent, not initial – it would 
have occurred after the conclusion of the contract (at the time of the conclu-
sion, it was still possible that the authorisations could be obtained) – and that 
the impossible contractual obligation would have been the one synallagmatic 
to the contractual obligation whose performance was sought rather than the 
contractual obligation whose performance was sought352. However, the de-
fendants invoked the Venezuelan requirements through the wrong angle. On 
the one hand, they invoked the incompliance with these requirements as if it 
was incompliance with the lex causae353 stating in this way that Venezuelan 
law was the lex causae, which was obviously untrue. On the other hand, in-
stead of deriving an infringement of the ordre public from the infringement of 
the Venezuelan requirements, they argued that ordre public (in particular US 
ordre public) would have been violated if a Venezuelan state court judgment 
which condemned this infringement354 was ignored – a contention which was, 
moreover, destined to fail because the concerned Venezuelan court was in-
competent and which was, in addition, unnecessary since the nature of rules 
as ordre public rules, and thus the characterisation of the violation of such 
–––––––––––––– 
352 Though the logic with regard to contractual impossibility would be similar to that used in 
Reteitalia, the approach would be different. Not the material law (like in the latter case) but 
the conflict of laws method would be employed. The public policy, violation of which 
would be proved, would be invoked not in its capacity as the public policy of the lex causae 
(like in Reteitalia) but in its capacity as the public policy of the forum – the invoked Art. 5 
(2) (b) of the Inter-American Convention talks about the public policy of the state asked to 
enforce the award i.e. of the forum. The fact that in this concrete case the public policy of 
the forum was also public policy of the lex causae because the parties had nominated the 
law of the court as applicable law would not have changed anything. 
353 See II. «Analysis» of the judgment. 
354 The defendants had filed a successful request for the annulment or vacation of the arbitral 
award with a state court in Venezuela. 
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rules as a violation of ordre public, does not depend on confirmation by any 
court. One should note that also the US judges might have had to raise the 
relevance of the Venezuelan authorisation requirements since, upon interpre-
tation a contrario from the first paragraph, the second paragraph of Art. 5 of 
the Inter-American Convention, including specifically Art. 5 (2) (b), seems to 
be applicable sua sponte (it does not, like the first paragraph, contain the 
phrase «at the request of the party»). 
4.  Evaluation  
4.1 Pro 
The conflict of laws method is the most natural approach towards overriding 
mandatory rules which become relevant in a dispute submitted to international 
arbitration; it is the approach which one thinks of first, which one chooses 
subconsciously. This is so because private international law which regulates 
international arbitration utilises predominantly conflict law. Besides, it is most 
logical that one first tries to resolve the status of overriding mandatory rules 
through the means used for the other rules relevant in international arbitration 
(the ordinary rules), which is namely the conflict of laws approach, including 
by adapting these means; one goes for another strategy solely if this turns out 
unhelpful (i.e. at any case one should first try with the conflict of laws method). 
Undertaking the conflict of laws approach is logical also because of the pres-
ence of a conflict of laws element in the composition of overriding mandatory 
rules. Last but not least, foreign overriding mandatory rules can exist merely 
within the conflict of laws approach as only this approach recognises them as 
rules which they by default are («overriding mandatory rules»).   
4.2 Contra 
Even if theoretically correct, in Switzerland the conflict of laws method is 
fragile. For international arbitration courts it does not have any legal basis, and 
its legal basis for state court procedures features certain unclarities (e.g. in Art. 
13 PILA, second sentence).        




Chapter 17: Method 
 
158 
The material law approach is the second choice. It is employed where there is 
no possibility of using the conflict of laws method. 
1. Characteristics 355 
Through the material law method, the application or consideration of what un-
der the conflict of laws approach represents overriding mandatory rules is re-
alised as part of the application of the lex causae, i.e. as if it constitutes appli-
cation of the lex causae. The «overriding mandatory rules» are deemed as facts 
which are subsumed under certain rules and concepts of the lex causae. Ex-
amples of such rules and concepts are legal impossibility (e.g. resulting from 
force majeure), clausula rebus sic stantibus, violation of the bonos mores, 
lapse of legal basis356. Directly applied is this rule or concept of the lex causae; 
the overriding mandatory rule is applied or considered only indirectly and only 
under the ultimate control of the lex causae. Since a rule or concept of the lex 
causae is applicable, it is the latter’s ideas of what leads to legal impossibility, 
what contravenes the bonos mores, etc. that are relevant. Thus, in a strict sense, 
the material law approach utilises the content of the rule which under the con-
flict of laws approach would be an overriding mandatory rule – not the rule 
itself.              
Within the material law method, the foreign overriding mandatory rule is a 
rule solely for the foreign law. For the lex causae, it is merely a fact, and it is 
subsumed under a rule of the lex causae in the same way as any other fact.   
Not only is the «overriding mandatory rule» not considered a rule, but further, 
the characteristic of «overriding» becomes pointless under the material law 
approach. The foreign rule in question does not override any domestic rule: 
domestic rules are what gives effect to the content of the foreign rule, hence, 
it would be absurd if these domestic rules are overridden by the latter. The 
domestic rules refer to the solution of the foreign rule, so there cannot be con-
tradiction between them and the latter – even less can the latter be overriding. 
–––––––––––––– 
355 See SCHNYDER, Vertragsstatut, 683, 691. 
356 – some enumerated in SCHNYDER, IPR der Leistungsstörungen, 212. See also MÄCHLER-
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In addition, no «going outside» of the borders of the lex causae takes place, 
hence, there is no encounter of such lex causae with the foreign law. 
The material law approach is, in fact, nothing else than an artificial «pouring» 
of the foreign law into the lex causae. That is apparent, for example, from the 
case Privredna Banka Zagreb and in particular from the (here contended) pres-
ence of a conflict of laws «nuance» (next to the dominating material law ap-
proach) in it (see below at 5.2, a.). 
Since within the material law method it will always be the application of the 
lex causae that will trigger the de facto effect of the content of «overriding 
mandatory rules», i.e. since all that will be applied or considered357 will be the 
lex causae, it will not matter whether the «overriding mandatory rules» belong 
to the lex causae or not. Accordingly, division into rules legis causae and rules 
of a third law will be pointless.                       
2. Material law approach towards the reflexive effect of 
«overriding mandatory rules»                
The material law approach can be used for the reflexive (side, indirect, de-
rived) effect of the rules that under the conflict of laws approach would have 
constituted overriding mandatory rules. Here the material law approach re-
veals more usefulness than with regard to the direct effect of «overriding man-
datory rules».                 
The reflexive effect of overriding mandatory rules is the impact which the 
original (underlying) effect of overriding mandatory rules – their effect on a 
relationship coming within their scope – would have on another relationship 
which does not come within their scope. For instance, through restricting the 
export of capital, an overriding mandatory rule hinders A in making a payment 
to B (who is situated abroad) under an existing contract between A and B, and 
that influences a contract between B and C which (contract) is otherwise not 
covered by the overriding mandatory rule in question because B was relying 
on the financial means that it was to receive from A under its contract with A 
–––––––––––––– 
357 – actually only applied, since it is all lex causae and this is always applied; there are no third 
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in order to pay C under its contract with C so that it invokes the failure by A 
to pay it as an excuse for its failure to pay C.                         
This reflexive effect might at first sight seem to be precluded by the principle 
of relativity of contracts according to which a contract binds only the signing 
parties, which means that it is independent from any other contract. However, 
this principle does not prevent non-legal (e.g. economic) connections between 
contacts to be reflected in the legal regime of the latter. Moreover, such con-
nections might be strong, especially in the financial sphere, where contracts 
would often be concluded with the sole purpose of ensuring the financial 
means necessary for the performance of another (frequently non-financial) 
contract (e.g. a loan that a business enters into in order to be able to pay the 
company which is to construct a factory for it).  
3. Legal basis 
Below are some examples of concepts of Swiss law which are capable of being 
used for the material law method. They will be available where the lex causae 
is Swiss law.  
3.1 Impossibility of the contract’s terms 
The impossibility of the contract is actually the impossibility of the perfor-
mance of the contract. In Germany, for example, the impossibility of the per-
formance (§ 275 (1) GCC358) is referred to.  
The impossibility of the contract’s performance can be ab initio or subsequent. 
The ab initio impossibility is present already upon the conclusion of the con-
tract. In Switzerland, its consequences are regulated in Art. 20 (1) CO, first 
hypothesis. The subsequent impossibility, or under the English legal doctrine 
the frustration of the contract, is present when the subject matter of the contract 
becomes impossible after its conclusion, i.e. in the time between the contract’s 
conclusion and the planned start of its performance. The subsequent impossi-
bility to perform, which is not caused by the debtor, i.e. the objective subse-
quent impossibility to perform, is regulated by the Swiss legislation through 
–––––––––––––– 
358 Art. 275 (1) GCC reads: «The claim on performance is precluded in so far as such perfor-
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Art. 119 CO. The debtor is released from such impossible performance. Thus, 
for example, a non-Swiss law’s ban on the export of capital abroad can be 
reckoned as causing the impossibility of the performance of a contract gov-
erned by Swiss law. If the ban was in force already at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract, the latter will be null under Art. 20 (1) CO, first hypothe-
sis, and, if it has been enacted only after such conclusion, Art. 119 CO can be 
applied to release the debtor from the (now impossible) performance of its 
obligation. 
The cause of objective subsequent impossibility, known as force majeure (or 
superios force), is an extraordinary circumstance which is beyond the control 
of the party that had to perform. Because it is outside the control of the party, 
the force majeure exempts the latter from the obligation to perform. In the real 
economy, force majeure is invoked often; it is capable of being relied on in 
finance as well. Force majeure can be a natural event or occurrence (or an act 
of God, as it is known in the English-speaking legal literature), an act of hu-
mans, such as a war or strike, and an act of a parliament, such as a law (the so-
called act of state). The act of state is considered by some as an autonomous 
doctrine separate form force majeure. It is questionable whether, next to those 
of states, the acts of other bodies possessing public law powers, like interna-
tional organisations, can constitute force majeure. Where these acts, as is fre-
quently the case, are soft law, the answer would be rather negative. This un-
certainty is evidenced by the decision of the arbitrators that adjudicated out of 
Switzerland in the international arbitration regarding which the Court rendered 
judgment 4A_16/2012 of 2 May 2012 (rejecting an application for annulment 
on procedural grounds not relevant here). I.c. a UN expert commission’s rec-
ommendation was not recognised as a force majeure which could exculpate a 
Luxembourg trading company from its liability for premature termination of a 
Swiss-governed contract with a Congolese supplier of cassiterite. In relation 
to a resolution of the UN Security Council establishing that illegal exploitation 
and trade of natural resources were connected to distribution and trafficking 
of weapons which brought about deterioration of the conflicts in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa, the UN expert commission had recommended to the 
Luxembourgish company to terminate the agreement because of lack of proof 
of the origin of the traded material. 
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Illegality under foreign law is impossibility under one’s domestic law. It can-
not be illegality under one’s domestic law, since the latter does not consider 
foreign law as law – only as fact – and it cannot, thus, see a violation against 
such foreign law as an unlawful act (illegality under the second hypothesis of 
Art. 20 (1) CO is contradiction with domestic law359). The conflict of laws 
approach is less problematic in this respect, as under it, foreign law is law 
(whose applicability the domestic (conflict) law orders).  
3.2 Immorality of the contract 
The substance of the foreign law (which is again a fact, not law) can be con-
sidered part of the bonos mores and be protected where domestic law confers 
protection to the latter. For instance, under Swiss law, a contract that violates 
the bonos mores is invalid (Art. 20 CO).  
4. Cases 
4.1 Reteitalia 
Reteitalia was an unsuccessful challenge of an international arbitral award 
which declared a selling option void because the sale subject matter of the 
option was impossible since it would have violated mandatory requirements 
of a third law under which the company whose shares had to be sold was in-
corporated. The mandatory requirements set a maximum threshold of partici-
pation in a company within the media industry. In 1990, Hachette S.A. (after-
wards Matra-Hachette S.A. and here «Hachette»), a French company, stepped 
in the capital and became the operator of La Cinq, a French TV channel. The 
same year Hachette entered into a contract with the Italian company Reteitalia 
SpA («Reteitalia») in which it promised, under certain terms and conditions, 
to purchase itself or cause a third person to purchase the shares of Reteitalia in 
La Cinq. The agreement provided for Swiss law to govern it and for Geneva 
arbitration to resolve potential disputes. In 1992, the French media supervisory 
authority Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel («CSA») withdrew the broadcast 
licence of La Cinq. Already in 1991, Reteitalia had availed itself of its right to 
sell the shares to Hachette and invited the latter to pay it the sum agreed on in 
–––––––––––––– 
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the contract. Hachette refused to do so, putting into question the validity of the 
contract and arguing that the conditions for the exercise of the promise had not 
been met. In 1992, Reteitalia initiated arbitration which ended with an award 
from 1999 rejecting the claim, inter alia, on the basis that the contract was null 
under Art. 20 CO due to initial impossibility. The purchase of shares by 
Hachette would have increased its participation in the capital of La Cinq to a 
percentage above 25 %, which was the limit set by French public media law. 
A simple payment by Hachette of the agreed price without the simultaneous 
transfer of the shares would have rendered Reteitalia a straw man, which was 
equally prohibited by that law. The alternative of Hachette causing a third per-
son to purchase the shares was also excluded ab initio, for the fixed price in 
the contract hindered the finding of such a third person, and an acquisition by 
a third person would have indispensably led to the withdrawal of La Cinq’s 
broadcast licence by CSA, who had proclaimed the remaining of Reteitalia as 
one of the shareholders an absolute condition for preserving this licence. Such 
selling option being null, the arbitrators deemed its «exercise» by Reteitalia 
was also void. In addition, the tribunal denied Hachette’s precontractual lia-
bility, since the contractors were completely aware of the French law’s prohi-
bitions. Reteitalia challenged the decision of the arbitrators, alleging that the 
latter’s refusal to apply the contract violated the public policy under Art. 190 
(2) (e) PILA, more precisely the principle pacta sunt servanda. The Court re-
jected this contention of Reteitalia, basically saying that it was in line with that 
principle to refuse to enforce a contract which one deemed void, as done here. 
The principle would have been contravened if the arbitral tribunal had refused 
to enforce a contract which they thought was valid.  
4.2 BIS case 
Also worthy of note is an interesting non-Swiss arbitral award: the decision of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in Dr. Reineccius et al. v 
BIS. The dispute in question evolved between the Bank for International Set-
tlements («BIS» or «Bank») and some of its private shareholders. BIS was 
created through an international treaty as a company limited by shares held by 
sovereign states with an option for the latter to issue or cause to be issued to 
the public their shares (Art. 16 of the Statutes of the Bank). Some of the states 
took advantage of that option so that there were also private, apart from public, 
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law persons amongst the Bank’s shareholders. In September 2000, the BIS 
Board of Directors decided to exclude such private shareholders (at that time 
possessing 13.73% of the shares) against compensation. Three of those share-
holders put into question the size of the compensation, in particular the method 
for appreciating the basis for the determination of such size – the value of the 
shares. One of them also challenged the lawfulness of the shares’ recall. The 
latter challenge was rejected by the arbitral tribunal. As for the former, the 
arbitrators agreed with the petitioners that the method used was incorrect, but 
they disagreed that the right one was that which rested on the logic that a com-
pany acts for the welfare of its shareholders and therefore maximises the div-
idends for them. In the tribunal’s view, BIS was of a sui generic nature, being 
at the same time an international organisation with «a public international 
mandate» and a company limited by shares; a nature distinct from that of 
«most domestic and private sector corporations in advanced capitalist sys-
tems» for which the mentioned logic of maximisation of profits to the benefit 
of the shareholders was indeed valid. The tribunal underlined that according 
to the Board, the public international mandate of the Bank was to be best 
served if a significant part of its profits were accumulated into its statutory 
reserves instead of being paid out as dividends. Moreover, BIS’ privately held 
shares had had additional encumbrances360 (resulting from the public law com-
ponent in its legal nature).  
Even if it does not have the classical elements of the hypothesis analysed here, 
since it involves corporate (next to financial markets private) law and interna-
tional (rather than national) public law, this case is an example of the giving 
of precedence to law serving public interests over a private law principle (the 
principle on the determination of value of private law companies’ shares). The 
method through which such precedence was given was the material law ap-
proach: the very contract – the treaty through which BIS was created – con-
tained the law serving the respective public interests. Unlike in other cases, the 
use of this approach here cannot be criticised. The reason is that it was the only 
–––––––––––––– 
360 The shares could be sold solely with the consent of BIS and of the central bank to whose 
national issue they belonged (an encumbrance which was also reflected in the discount of 
75 % given by the markets to their net asset value); they did not confer governance rights 
on their holders; and they entitled their holders only to profits as determined by the General 
Meeting and by the Board of Directors rather than any profits. 
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possible method. The contract – the treaty through which BIS was created – 
was not subordinated to any objective law (as a contract between typical pri-
vate parties would have been), for in international public law, parties are not 
subject to the power of any higher jurisdiction (they are equal) and all rules 
that can bind them, except for the principles of international public law which 
were irrelevant i.c., are contained in the contracts concluded between such par-
ties (in «treaties»).  
4.3 Last sentence of cons. 5, c), bb) of DSC 118 II 193 
The reasoning of the Court in the last sentence of cons. 5, c), bb) of DSC 118 
II 193 that an arbitrator had to examine a law which could have rendered in-
valid a contract whose performance they were asked to adjudge, as otherwise 
they would not be capable of such adjudging since they would not know 
whether they had to carry it out with regard to performance of a valid or an 
invalid contract, is also application of the material law method. 
5. Evaluation  
5.1 Pro 
The persons who criticise the material law approach at the same time recognise 
its significance361. For instance, SCHNYDER rightly underlines that the material 
law approach has led to some reasonable individual results (e.g. to the consid-
eration of foreign prohibitions regarding the protection of cultural goods)362 
and that: «from the point of view of the respective decision’s result and the 
state and private interests involved in a case it is in the first instance not sig-
nificant whether foreign overriding mandatory law is considered on the ground 
of a conflict of laws reference or at a material law level – within the application 
of the substantive law which according to PILA is governing law. Important 
in all these cases seems to be the recognising of a foreign legitimate (regula-
tory) interest which is reflected in the imperative willingness for applicability 
–––––––––––––– 
361 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 315, in initio. 
362 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 315. 
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of the foreign overriding mandatory rule.»363. Thus, one cannot deny that the 
material law approach is a convenient method. Its practicality is all the more 
valuable where its opposite – the conflict of laws approach – creates many 
troubles because it lacks the necessary legislative «infrastructure», as is the 
case in Switzerland. Moreover, in SCHNYDER’s view, Art. 19 PILA does not 
hinder the subsuming of foreign overriding mandatory rules under material 
law concepts where special conflict of laws connecting of such overriding 
mandatory rules was rejected364. Also, in Germany, as reported by LEHMANN, 
the majority of authors favour the employing of the material law approach for 
addressing foreign rules which deal with public interest, such as foreign finan-
cial markets rules365.  
In addition, in some specific cases, such as Dr. Reineccius et al. v BIS, touched 
upon above, (for the reasons provided there) the material law approach is the 
only possibility.  
5.2 Contra  
The material law approach has certain drawbacks. Its application to foreign 
overriding mandatory law is criticised, for example by KARRER366 and SCHNY-
DER367. The latter summarises the main points on which the critics rest368. First, 
the material law approach is contrary to the territoriality principle. Second, 
with it conflict of laws results are achieved «without that being named and 
reflected on» from which a deficit of regulatory (conflict) law dogmatisation 
of interests in application arises, and in extreme cases such deficit can lead to 
–––––––––––––– 
363 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 190 (first paragraph thereof), own translation from 
German. By foreign law or interest, the author seems to mean a law or an interest that not 
only does not belong to the legal system whose law is the lex causae but also does not 
belong to the legal system which offers the forum; however, the logic can be applied here 
as well. 
364 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 352, 353. 
365 LEHMANN, 520, fn. 571. 
366 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 289. 
367 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisisonsrecht, 315. 
368 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisisonsrecht, 315. 
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disoriented and arbitrary case law. Third, granting privilege to overriding man-
datory law which belongs to the lex causae towards overriding mandatory law 
derived from a third law only on the basis of such belonging is not feasible. 
Fourth, it could be that the material law approach is not possible because the 
material law in question contains no «gateways» for the consideration of the 
foreign law (i.e. no concepts of immorality, impossibility or similar). Also, 
LEHMANN objects to the use of the material law method for supervisory finan-
cial markets law even if, as mentioned, in Germany this method is supported; 
in his opinion, while the material law method is effective for supervisory fi-
nancial markets rules of the lex causae, it does not guarantee the consideration 
of supervisory financial markets provisions belonging to other laws369. To 
those arguments of the literature, one can add that the concept of «foreign 
overriding mandatory rule» cannot exist within the material law approach 
since the latter does not recognise a foreign rule, including a foreign overriding 
mandatory rule, as a rule (but only as a fact) – hence, strictly speaking, what 
is done under the material law approach is not application or consideration of 
an overriding mandatory rule.        
a Privredna Banka Zagreb 
The material law approach is even more inapt where it is artificially imposed 
on a case that is otherwise suitable for being treated through the conflict of 
laws approach. Privredna Banka Zagreb demonstrates this. The case was de-
cided by a state court but the choice between the material law approach and 
the conflict of laws approach is not so different for international arbitration 
courts, which is why it makes sense to analyse it here. Privredna Banka Za-
greb was on an (unsuccessful) appeal before the Court from the commercial 
court of Zurich, which had refused to enforce a Swiss-governed promissory 
note issued by the Croatian bank Privredna Banka Zagreb («PBZ») (instructed 
by the Republic of Croatia) to Intersystems, Inc. («Intersystems»), a company 
based in Beirut, in connection to (though as a promise independent from) a 
1992 purchase of weapons by the Republic of Croatia (at that time in a war 
conflict with Serbia) from Intersystems. The latter had ceded its right under 
the promissory note to Beverly Overseas SA (established in the British Virgin 
–––––––––––––– 
369 LEHMANN, 521. 
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Islands) which, following PBZ’s refusal to pay, filed a lawsuit with the com-
petent (in accordance with a concluded jurisdiction clause) Swiss courts. 
These held that, due to the abstract character of that type of relationship, an 
obligor under a promissory note could not make objections extracted from the 
underlying relationship, with few exceptions such as very grave and evident 
abuse of law. The Court found here that such abuse of law had taken place. 
The claimant should have known that it could not derive any right from the 
trade of weapons which underlined the promissory note. While such trade in 
itself was not against Swiss law, it violated Swiss bonos mores. First, it vio-
lated foreign370 mandatory rules – the (then in force) UN embargo on the de-
livery of weapons to the territories of (now ex-) Yugoslavia – which consti-
tuted such fundamental legal principles that their violation was contrary to 
bonos mores from a Swiss point of view371. Second, under the concrete cir-
cumstances – a war between Croatia and Serbia – the underlying sale of weap-
ons was contrary to the principle embedded in Swiss law and in international 
public law that weapons should not be delivered to territories in which an 
armed conflict or tensions probably leading to such were taking place, and 
since (regardless of whether the case was connected to Switzerland372) that 
principle was a part of the bonos mores, the sale was contrary to the latter. As 
it was considered immoral, the sale was void under Art. 20 (1) CO.  
This subsuming of the foreign law (the UN embargo) under the bonos mores 
of the (Swiss) lex causae is in fact the material law approach. However, that 
method seems to have been implemented here unnaturally, as if trying to avoid 
having to apply the conflict of laws rule of Art. 19 PILA. This unnaturalness 
is visible, first, from the fact that a nuance of the conflict of laws approach 
remained – the concept of universal (in addition to the Swiss) public policy 
which is not part of the Swiss lex causae was used when bonos mores were 
defined (in fact, it is not clear why public policy was involved at all in defining 
–––––––––––––– 
370 – for Switzerland, foreign, as the country was not a member of the UN at that time. 
371 According to the Court, a condition for a violation of foreign mandatory rules to constitute 
a violation of morals in Switzerland was that the violated rules represented fundamental 
legal principles. 
372 – with this note, the Court leaves the impression that it considers the said principle in its 
capacity as a Swiss, rather than an international, principle. 
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bonos mores – these are two different concepts – but the fact remains that the 
Court goes out of the borders of the lex causae). Second, superfluous argu-
ments were used, probably because the judges were seeking to compensate 
(through providing as many arguments as possible) for some instability of the 
material law approach. In particular, the sale was not declared void already on 
the basis of it violating the international and Swiss principle that no weapons 
should be delivered into territories of actual or potential war, but also contra-
diction of that violation with bonos mores was argued – which is unusual, be-
cause already the violation of a principle of the lex causae (present here373) 
must render a sale null, and Art. 20 CO also contains the ground of illegality 
(apart from that of immorality) of the contract’s performance.  
5.3 SCHNYDER’s proposal for subsidiary use 
Whilst continuing to consider it inadequate for the consideration of foreign 
law, SCHNYDER suggests that the material law approach serves as an «excep-
tional or subsidiary remedy … where the special conflict law does not suffi-
ciently observe the parties’ interests touched upon in a particular case»374 (it 
seems that for the author the special conflict law observes sufficiently the par-
ties’ interests when it defines the involvement of these interests as one of the 
criteria for connecting375 – as Art. 19 PILA in its German and Italian versions 
does). Such subsidiary use of the material law approach is a good compromise, 
reflecting both the theoretical inaccuracy and the practicality of the approach.  
III. «Avoiding the problem» 
1. Characteristics 
Often adjudicators (both international arbitrators and state judges) who exam-
ine an arbitration case attempt to avoid dealing with the concept of overriding 
–––––––––––––– 
373 – it is present since except international, the infringed principle is a Swiss principle and 
Swiss law is the lex causae. 
374 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 315 (especially the last paragraph), 352, 353, own 
translation from German. 
375 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 353, passim, e.g. in the third paragraph of point 9.) 
of «Gesamtzusammenfassung in Form von Leitsätzen und Thesen» (p. 439). 
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mandatory rules. That is not really a solution and is thus not a «method» (in 
the proper sense of the word) for treating overriding mandatory rules. How-
ever, one cannot blame the judiciary too much for this approach, since the 
described lack of express conflict of laws legislation leaves it with few alter-
natives. Especially when they adjudicate out of a civil law jurisdiction such as 
Switzerland, where objective law constitutes a very important source of crite-
ria for a judicial decision, the absence of explicit conflict of laws rules is very 
cumbersome for adjudicators. This is so even for international arbitrators, who 
have more freedom in general, as when it comes to conflict of laws issues they 
are still bound by objective law (in particular by the lex arbitri).  
Logically and similarly to the material law approach, the avoiding of the con-
cept of overriding mandatory rules is performed only where the conflict of 
laws approach does not function.    
The material law approach, in fact, also represents «avoiding the problem» – 
it is nothing other than an example of giving the problem another name376, 
which is one of the forms of avoiding the problem discussed in 2.1 below. That 
is also why it was possible to give judgment DSC 118 II 193 as an example of 
a judgment in which the adjudicators gave the problem another name (see 2.1, 
a. below) and at the same time to give one argument from that judgment as an 
example of the use of the material law approach (see Chapter 17., II., 4.3). 
However, since it reveals a certain typology – avoiding through the application 
of material law norms of the lex causae – and since it is the most used of all 
ways to avoid the problem, the material law approach is here analysed auton-
omously from the approach of avoiding the problem.  
2. Forms and cases 
2.1 Giving the problem other names 
Very often the case is put into the framework of another concept which is less 
controversial for international arbitration than that of overriding mandatory 
rules – e.g. jurisdiction. Even if sometimes leading to a successful outcome, 
–––––––––––––– 
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such an approach is not sustainable in the long run, as it mixes different con-
cepts.        
a DSC 118 II 193               
In DSC 118 II 193, one of the parties argued that a contract was incompatible 
with Community competition law. By virtue of Community law, this Commu-
nity competition law was a part of Belgian law which i.c. was the lex causae377. 
The arbitrator viewed themselves as incompetent to decide on the alleged in-
compatibility, for Community competition law had been public policy law. On 
a challenge of the resulting arbitral award, the Court ruled that the arbitrator 
had had jurisdiction to investigate the issue raised and that by refusing to do 
so they had wrongly denied competence within the meaning of Art. 190 (2) 
(b) PILA. This case is an example of giving the issue of overriding mandatory 
rules, here overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae, another name – «com-
petence». It is here deemed that Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA was not applicable to 
the arbitrator’s rejection of competence to apply a law, since it did not cover 
such competence. It covered only the competence to resolve a dispute in a 
legally binding manner but not also the competence over the means for this 
resolving, amongst which namely the applying of and/or refusal to apply a law. 
The competence to resolve a dispute is present when the dispute is pecuniary 
and covered by a valid arbitration agreement, which was the case here. This 
competence is examined only in the beginning of the proceedings – indeed, 
Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA speaks of «declaring», which is an action typical for the 
outset of a legal procedure (during the middle and end of such a procedure, 
mostly constitutive actions are accomplished). In other words, one can here 
disagree with the opinion expressed by the Court in the third sentence of cons. 
5, a) of the judgment that Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA envisages both competence in 
–––––––––––––– 
377 That Belgian law was the lex causae cannot be inferred from the official publication of the 
judgment – only from an unpublished part, which is printed in RabelsZ, Vol. 59, 1995, 
309ff. – see p. 309 and 310 thereof (on p. 310, see in particular cons. 4, a)). Also SCHNYDER, 
Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 312, 313 (this work 
originally appeared in RabelsZ, Vol. 59, 1995, where the part of the judgment which was 
not in the official publication was printed), and MÖHLER, 714, fn. 900 rely on that un-
published part of the decision. They underline the fact that the invoked EU competition law 
was a part of the lex causae, as does IDOT, 982, para 12. 
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general to resolve the dispute and competence on separate points. It regulates 
solely the former; if it regulated also the latter, there would have been no need 
of Art. 190 (2) (c) PILA – ultra petita and infra petita would have represented 
wrongful declaring of competence and incompetence respectively and been 
submitted under Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA – or of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA – the 
applying of a law that infringes the international ordre public would have con-
stituted wrongful affirmation of competence within the meaning of the first 
hypothesis of Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA. Also, the literature criticises that Art. 190 
(2) (b) PILA was not the proper legal basis for the judgment378.  
The Court seems to have resorted to Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA only because it 
wanted to give effect to the Community competition law but was lacking the 
means (not, as contended by the critics, in order to avoid application of Art. 
190 (2) (e) PILA – the latter was anyway not applicable, as Community com-
petition law did not represent international ordre public). The Court seems to 
have considered Community competition law a domestic ordre public of the 
Community – it cited an author referring to this law as to ordre public of the 
Community (cons. 5, c), bb))379. The Court could not impose application by 
the arbitrator of such ordre public of the lex causae380 via Art. 190 (2) (e) 
PILA, since, as established, that article encompassed solely international (but 
not domestic) ordre public (as already mentioned, the view that Art. 190 (2) 
(e) PILA was the proper basis for the judgment is disagreed with here). Then, 
one might think that the judges could have had the arbitrator apply the Com-
munity competition law by relying on the latter’s quality as the lex causae’s 
overriding mandatory law (this option being the reason this case is discussed 
here). This quality is present since (whilst whether overriding mandatory rules 
are at the same time domestic ordre public is not certain) it is certain that the 
–––––––––––––– 
378 For instance, in the view of KARRER (who seems to consider overriding mandatory rules the 
same as positive ordre public) the Court in DSC 118 II 193 was right in ruling that when a 
party relied on such rules, the arbitrator had to decide whether to apply or consider overrid-
ing mandatory rules; but was wrong in holding that not doing so constituted a violation of 
the jurisdictional provision in Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA – because jurisdiction had been differ-
ent than applicable law – KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 236. 
379 See also the Court’s later decision Terra armata (cons. 3.1, fourth paragraph). 
380 – as per Community law, the ordre public of the Community is also ordre public of Belgian 
law, which was the lex causae. 
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domestic ordre public rules (which here the Community competition law rep-
resents) are overriding mandatory rules of the respective law. However, the 
judges again did not possess the necessary ground in Art. 190 (2) PILA; also 
Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA (which the critics assert to be the provision that must 
have been applied) could not help, since it did not address overriding manda-
tory rules. And the problem was the lack of a rule on overriding mandatory 
rules, not in Chapter 12 PILA in general but in Art. 190 (2) PILA in particular; 
even if a rule in Chapter 12 PILA had obliged arbitrators to apply or consider 
overriding mandatory rules, the Court could not annul an award in which ar-
bitrators had disobeyed this duty if Art. 190 (2) PILA did not foresee such 
disobedience as a reason for annulling.     
Since in DSC 118 II 193 this matter was given another name, the frequent 
pointing by the doctrine at the case as proof for applicability of overriding 
mandatory rules legis causae or of overriding mandatory rules in general is 
not correct. It is true that in a subsequent case – Terra armata (cons. 3.3) – the 
judges defined this infringing of Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA in DSC 118 II 193 as 
infringing in relation to Art. 187 PILA; a provision which governs substantive 
law of which overriding mandatory rules make a part. However, that does not 
change the fact that, strictly seen, the judgment had dealt with jurisdiction, and 
not with overriding mandatory rules’ applicability. In addition, for the reasons 
mentioned above, one does not agree that the proper ground for the decision 
was Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA. Even if it was, this would not have led to applica-
bility of overriding mandatory rules by international arbitrators because this 
provision did not address this applicability. If any of the grounds under Art. 
190 (2) PILA was to be invoked, that should have rather been the second hy-
pothesis of Art. 190 (2) (c) PILA – one could argue that through refusing to 
scrutinise the contract against Community competition law, the arbitral tribu-
nal left a petitum unadjudged. Even if it is seen to handle the treatment of 
overriding mandatory rules within international arbitration, as SCHNYDER un-
derlines, DSC 118 II 193 does not specify the conditions of such treatment or 
to what extent the Court itself (within challenge proceedings) would tackle 
overriding mandatory rules and, in fact, as SCHNYDER  foretold in 1995 (the 
time of his publication), having regard to the restrictive Art. 190 PILA and the 
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reserved jurisprudence of the Court, no great activism has been seen from the 
Court with regard to that complicated issue381. 
b Case No. CC/2009/APP/0385, the Queen's Bench Division of 
the High Court of Justice, 30 October 2009 
Even though it originates from a foreign jurisdiction, one can mention the 
judgment of 30 October 2009 of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High 
Court of Justice in Case No. CC/2009/APP/0385, reported in YCA, Vol. 
XXXV, 2010, 460ff., since it illustrates the trend discussed here – the giving 
of other names to the problem of overriding mandatory rules. This decision 
declared an arbitration clause null, viewing it as contradictory to mandatory 
(what is most probably meant is overriding mandatory) EU competition law 
protecting commercial agents inasmuch as the contract containing it incorpo-
rated also a choice of law clause in favour of Ontario law and through this 
prevented the applicability of the concerned EU provisions. The arbitrators 
had found that the choice of law and arbitration clauses were valid because the 
EU rules did not restrict the parties’ freedom to choose applicable law. The 
English court felt that the EU mandatory rules had to be applied notwithstand-
ing the parties’ choice of another law. This opinion of the English judges is 
understandable. However, it is difficult to comprehend why they did not sat-
isfy themselves with a ruling in this sense – a ruling that the arbitrators should 
apply the involved mandatory rules despite the choice of law – but, in addition, 
held that the arbitration clause was null, in this way denying the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction. Even if it had sought to, the arbitration clause could not prevent 
the application of mandatory EU provisions. This clause did not deal at all 
with the determination of applicable law, including mandatory law. It only 
provided for a forum. Determining the applicable law was done by another, 
separate clause – the choice of law clause. An arbitration clause and a choice 
of law clause have discrete subject matters – the former deals with jurisdiction 
and the latter with applicable law – which means that invalidity of one of them 
does not cause invalidity of the other. Besides, the invalidity of the choice of 
law clause i.c. should have been only partial, i.e. it should have concerned only 
–––––––––––––– 
381 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 324. 
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the issues regulated by EU law in an (overriding) mandatory manner, but not 
further matters. 
2.2 Not addressing the problem 
Sometimes adjudicators find a solution on a more general level at which over-
riding mandatory rules have not yet claimed applicability.  
a DSC 4A_520/2015 of 16 December 2015 
In DSC 4A_520/2015 of 16 December 2015 banking mandatory rules (most 
probably banking overriding mandatory rules) which were invoked in interna-
tional arbitration were deemed irrelevant and left undiscussed. The dispute re-
lated to a share and purchase transaction. Company X, a subsidiary in a bank-
ing group, was sold by company B to bank A. The Bank of Y and Z granted 
the necessary authorisations for the transaction under the condition that B re-
capitalised X. The respective share and purchase agreement («SPA») included 
an adjustment mechanism which had to be applied if such recapitalisation by 
B was to go beyond the demands of Y, and in particular if a certain ratio for 
assessing bank solvency was set by Y under 10%. According to that mecha-
nism, A had to pay to B a particular ratio adjustment. Indeed, subsequently Y 
set the relevant ratio at 9%. In an ICC arbitration in Switzerland, B success-
fully claimed the ratio adjustment from A. One of the ways in which the latter 
defended itself was by claiming that the adjustment mechanism clause was 
invalid in view of mandatory rules, in particular of Z’s guidelines and another 
unspecified provision of law. However, according to the arbitrators, the valid-
ity of the clause under those rules was irrelevant because Z, Y and other insti-
tutions had approved the transaction, including the disputed clause382. Hence, 
the tribunal deemed a «complex» analysis of the law applicable to the validity 
of the clause not decisive for the resolving of the case and did not proceed to 
it383. A filed an appeal with the Court alleging a violation of its right to be 
heard under Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA, since the arbitral tribunal had failed to ex-
amine its objection. The appellant claimed that the question of the approval of 
–––––––––––––– 
382 – citation of the arbitral award in cons. 3.1 of the Court’s judgment. 
383 – again there: citation of the arbitral award in cons. 3.1 of the Court’s judgment. 
360 
361 
Chapter 17: Method 
 
176 
the transaction by the competent authorities was different from that of the com-
patibility of the clause with the respective mandatory rules and that in any case 
such authorisation of the transaction could not have cured a defect resulting 
from a violation of the public order. The Court found that there was no breach 
of the right to be heard, as the arbitral tribunal had specified the reason why it 
was not going into the issue of the clause’s compatibility with public policy – 
because it viewed it as irrelevant. According to the Court, this clarification by 
the tribunal was equal to respecting the complaining party’s right to be heard. 
The correctness of this (the tribunal’s) statement – whether it could really be 
taken as granted that the issuance of the authorisations by the banking super-
vision authorities guaranteed the absence of a violation against the public order 
– was outside the scope of the review of the Court, so the latter did not provide 
its opinion on it.   
Indeed, the legal ground on which the appellant based its challenge – a viola-
tion of the right to be heard – presupposes only the Court’s check as to whether 
the arbitral tribunal addressed the appellant’s arguments but not whether such 
addressing was correct or incorrect. Instead of or in addition to contending that 
the tribunal did not «hear» it on the compatibility of the contract’s clause with 
the mandatory rules, the appellant could have complained about the tribunal’s 
argument for not doing so (for not «hearing» it): in particular, it could have 
invoked the logic of the Court in the last sentence of DSC 118 II 193, cons. 5, 
c), bb) and contended that it could not have been irrelevant whether a con-
tract’s clause giving rise to a dispute was contrary to mandatory rules because 
incompatibility with the latter could have rendered such a clause invalid – and 
an arbitrator, when called upon to rule on the performance of a clause, needed 
to know if such clause was valid or not. The appellant could have further 
claimed that the principle of division of public powers rendered an authorisa-
tion of a transaction by an executive authority incapable of preventing a judi-
cial authority (be it an arbitration or a state court) from scrutinising such a 
transaction against a law, especially against a law of a public policy character: 
if the judiciary is competent to scrutinise acts of the executive power directly 
(private law persons can challenge such acts in courts (in some countries there 
are also courts specialised in such procedures – administrative courts), a forti-
ori it must have the capacity to scrutinise administrative acts indirectly, by 
examining the compatibility with mandatory rules of a transaction authorised 
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through such acts. It is true that this proposed argumentation would not have 
rested on the overriding mandatory character of the rules concerned (but on 
Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA and Art. 190 (2) (c) PILA or both), but the appellant 
does not have many alternatives, keeping in mind that Art. 190 (2) PILA does 
not sanction incorrect treatment of overriding mandatory rules.     
Whatever the outcome of the procedure for the annulment of the award ren-
dered in it, this arbitration is an example of arbitrators’ refusal to deal with 
overriding mandatory rules, and that is why it is mentioned here. VOSER is 
right in her comment that it would have been better if the arbitral tribunal had 
conducted the (in its view, complex) analysis of the law applicable to the va-
lidity of the clause. If after such analysis it had «…come to the same conclu-
sion as with its first and main argument, there would probably have been a 
higher acceptance of the award by the parties and no reason to appeal it. If the 
public policy analysis had come out differently, this might well have prompted 
the tribunal to carefully balance the two outcomes against one another, which 
would lead to a more solid decision.»384 One can add that the issue of public 
policy, given its complexity, is anyway difficult to evaluate without a «com-
plex» analysis. 
3. Evaluation  
It is obvious that avoiding the problem is not a solution; it is avoiding a solu-
tion. As such, it cannot be supported.  
IV. Opting for the conflict of laws approach 
The avoidance of overriding mandatory rules is not a solution. The material 
law approach is not a long-term but only a temporary solution. The conflict of 
laws method is the proper solution in the long run, but it is currently «under-
developed» because of the lack of conflict of laws rules in Chapter 12 PILA. 
In fact, it is this deficit that makes Swiss international arbitrators and judges 
turn to the material law method or the avoidance of the problem. Since this is 
–––––––––––––– 
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considered to be the most suitable method, the conflict of laws approach is 





Chapter 18: Chapter 12 PILA 
The first «place» to search for conflict of laws rules regulating the treatment 
of overriding mandatory rules by Swiss international arbitrators is PILA’s 
Chapter 12, as that is the lex specialis on Swiss international arbitration. The 
only articles of that chapter which deal with substantive law of which law 
overriding mandatory rules make a part are Art. 187 and 190.  
I. Art. 187 PILA 
Art. 187 PILA deals with «applicable law» (that is its title). Hence, first this 
provision is to be examined for potential stipulations on overriding mandatory 
rules. Art. 187 (2) PILA is to be excluded from the examination, since it does 
not refer to legal rules in the first place (only to non-legal considerations – 
such ex aequo et bono); this leaves Art. 187 (1) PILA.  
1. Overriding mandatory rules legis causae 
1.1 Uniform connection        
PILA’s Chapter 12, and in particular Art. 187 which makes the reference to 
this lex, does not feature an explicit rule on the uniform connecting of the lex 
causae as PILA’s Chapter 1 in Art. 13 does. In fact, one could argue that such 
an explicit rule is not necessary, since uniform connecting of a law is accom-
plished merely through the interpreting of a reference to a law. Nevertheless, 
an express norm in Chapter 12 PILA would be useful, as it would lead to con-
sistency with Chapter 1 PILA and more certainty (which is also why the pro-
posal for new provisions made below includes such an explicit rule).                               
1.2 Special connection 
KARRER has an idea to connect the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae through the objective connection prescribed in the second part of Art. 
187 (1) PILA385, i.e. to qualify the overriding mandatory rules legis causae as 
«the law with which the disputed matter is most closely connected» referred 
–––––––––––––– 
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to in the latter. This approach seems to be special connecting even though 
KARRER does not characterise it like that (or in any other way) because it im-
plies the principal capability of the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae to be subsumed under a conflict of laws rule (here the second part of 
Art. 187 (1) PILA) different than the conflict of laws rule under which the 
ordinary rules of the lex causae are subsumed (here the first part of Art. 187 
(1) PILA), and that capability is present only where such overriding mandatory 
rules of the lex causae are regarded as a law separate from the ordinary rules 
of the lex causae, which is the case solely within the special connecting (under 
the uniform connecting, the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae are 
considered to be one together with the ordinary rules of the lex causae).  
However, the following speaks against such a course of action.  
The exceptional nature of the special connecting of overriding mandatory rules 
legis causae renders their qualification under Art. 187 PILA inappropriate. 
First, the latter determines the law to govern the principal deciding of the case, 
of «the disputed matter», and not the law that governs the case only exception-
ally and partially like the overriding mandatory law. Second, overriding man-
datory rules that are connected through the special connection cannot be the 
law most closely connected to the case again because their relevance for the 
case is «exceptional» – if they were most closely connected to the case they 
would have been applied principally, not exceptionally. Admittedly, they 
would be connected (otherwise even their applicability by way of exception 
would not have been present); they would even be closely connected; but they 
would never be most closely connected. Solely the rules that govern the case 
principally would be most closely connected.  
The second part of Art. 187 (1) PILA is subordinated to the first part of Art. 
187 (1) PILA: it applies only «in the absence of a choice of law» – this choice 
of law is the hypothesis of the first part. The Italian version of Art. 187 (1) 
PILA additionally underlines such subordination by using the expression «in 
subordine» («subordinately»). This subordination means that the second part 
of Art. 187 (1) PILA can be applied only if the first part was not applied, and 
this means not applied at all, i.e. including not applied to a law different than 
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overriding mandatory rules legis causae through the objective connection un-
der the second part of Art. 187 (1) PILA is possible only where no choice of 
law under the first part of Art. 187 (1) PILA was made. Keeping in mind that 
parties who submit their disputes to international arbitration often make such 
choices, this connecting would be rarity. 
Then, if a choice of law was made, the chosen law (rather than just the over-
riding mandatory rules of the chosen law) would qualify as the law most 
closely connected to the case. Its choosing by the parties connects (to the case) 
a law in the strongest manner. (That is also why the legislator sets the closest 
connection of a law to the case as a criterium subordinate to the choice of law 
– if there is a choice of law, a search for the law most closely connected to the 
case is not needed because that law is the chosen law.) 
2. Overriding mandatory rules of a third law 
The overriding mandatory rules of a third law cannot be qualified under Art. 
187 (1) PILA because they are a «third» law, i.e. a law different than that pro-
vided for by PILA, including by Art. 187 (1) PILA. That is evident with regard 
to the first part of Art. 187 (1) PILA – overriding mandatory rules of a third 
law are simply not chosen by the parties. However, it is true also in respect of 
the second part of Art. 187 (1) PILA, because if those rules are subsumed un-
der the latter, they would cease to be overriding mandatory rules of a «third» 
law and become overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae.  
3. Conclusion 
It is possible to read the reference of Art. 187 (1) PILA to a lex causae as 
encompassing the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae when the lex 
causae is connected to through the uniform connection. However, there is no 
explicit legal basis for the latter connection.    
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Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA cannot be invoked to prove that overriding mandatory 
rules have to be applied or considered by an international arbitrator386, since it 
deals with ordre public and, as was seen in Chapter 11, IV., ordre public is 
something different to overriding mandatory rules. Only the overriding man-
datory rules that reach the level of ordre public can be subsumed under this 
provision, but that will happen on the basis of their ordre public, not their 
overriding mandatory, character.  
III. Conclusion 
Chapter 12 PILA does not expressly treat overriding mandatory rules. There 
is only a possibility to read Art. 187 PILA as encompassing the overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex causae. However, this is not based on an explicit 
rule but on a theory (that of uniform connecting to the lex causae). Conse-
quently, a legislative gap, lacuna, which is a «true» gap387, exists in Chapter 
12 with regard to overriding mandatory rules.        
–––––––––––––– 
386 See also PFISTERER, Art. 190 N 86. 






Chapter 19: Chapter 1 PILA as lex generalis 
Since the part of PILA which is specialised in international arbitration – Chap-
ter 12 – does not contain conflict of laws rules on overriding mandatory rules, 
one naturally looks at other chapters of the Act to see if they contain such 
conflict law rules and whether any such rules could be applied in an interna-
tional arbitration procedure.  
Chapter 1 PILA does so. Its Art. 13, 18 and 19 represent conflict of laws rules 
regarding overriding mandatory rules (whereby Art. 13 deals with the scope 
of a conflict of laws reference to lex causae in particular). Potential direct388 
application of these norms to international arbitration might be only in the 
form of application as lex generalis, i.e. according to the principle lex specialis 
derogat legi generali. (When an issue is not regulated in the lex specialis but 
it is in the lex generalis and such regulation by the latter does not contradict 
the characteristics which the issue manifests within the special situation, the 
lex generalis is applied389.) It should first be proven that Art. 13, 18 and 19 
PILA are general law. One might argue that they are valid for private interna-
tional law procedures in general, i.e. for both international litigation and inter-
national arbitration dealing with private international law disputes; yet, that is 
not so clear from PILA – it might be that they concern only international liti-
gation. Second, a gap in the lex specialis should be established. That will not 
–––––––––––––– 
388 – the indirect will be discussed in Chapter 21. 
389 That the solution of the lex generalis does not contradict the special characteristics mani-
fested by the issue within the special situation is required because the application as lex 
generalis is direct application, hence, no adjustment to the special circumstances is possible 
(there is some indirectness in the fact that one first examines whether the lex specialis reg-
ulates the matter (since if it does, it would be the law to apply), but once confirmed the 
applicability of the general law is direct applicability). The logic behind the application as 
lex generalis is that the concerned issue when occurring in the special situation should be 
treated in the same way as it is treated when occurring in the general case because the 
specificities that have rendered the enactment of lex specialis necessary regard other aspects 
of the respective topic. The lex generalis is applied as it is – if one makes modifications to 
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be difficult – Chapter 12 PILA does not regulate overriding mandatory rules. 
Last but not least, the solutions offered by Art. 13, 18 and 19 PILA will need 
to qualify as apt for international arbitration. This is far from being certain. 
I. Legislative text 
In order to find out whether Chapter 1 is applicable to the effect of overriding 
mandatory rules in international arbitration in a capacity of lex generalis, one 
should first consider the wording, structure and spirit of the legislative text. 
These three are to be studied together and as factors of equal significance. The 
grammatical interpretation of the law (i.e. the wording of the law), for exam-
ple, should not have precedence over the other means of interpretation – Art. 
1 (1) CC uses the preposition «or» («wording or interpretation»)390. At the 
same time, interpretation in accordance with the structure and spirit of the law 
cannot go against the latter’s clear wording. 
1. Wording 
1.1 Pro 
The strict interpretation of Chapter 1 PILA’s wording might lead to the con-
clusion that this chapter covers the ratio materiae of the whole PILA, i.e. that 
it is a lex generalis for the individual special situations regulated by the differ-
ent parts of PILA – such as the situation of international arbitration (regulated 
in Chapter 12). First, Chapter 1 PILA bears the title «General provisions». 
Second, its text – e.g. in Art. 14 (1), Art. 15 and specifically in the here relevant 
Art. 13, 18 and 19 – refers to a law designated by «this Act», and «this Act» 
includes Chapter 12 of the respective Act.   
1.2 Contra 
–––––––––––––– 
390 «Under «law» one should understand in equal measure the wording and the interpretation of 
the law’s wording. «Law» is the interpreted law.» – SCHWANDER, ZGB Kommentar, Art. 1 
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Chapter 1 PILA uses too many times the word «court», which might be under-
stood as a state court, particularly if it is interpreted a contrario to the wording 
of Chapter 12 PILA, which refers to an «arbitration court» (emphasis added).  
2. Structure                     
2.1 Pro 
First, the Swiss lawmakers regulated international arbitration in an act – PILA 
– in which they also regulated international litigation. If they had wanted to 
split international arbitration from international litigation completely, they 
would have regulated it through a separate law, as the UK legislator did (in the 
English Arbitration Act 1996). Next, it is not that only one of PILA’s Chapters 
applies at a time. Some of them can and/or must apply cumulatively. Chapter 
2 «Jurisdiction» and Chapter 3 «Applicable law» certainly apply simultane-
ously, since in an international litigation both jurisdiction and applicable law 
have to be determined. Thus, Chapter 1 and Chapter 12 must also be capable 
of being applied at the same time. Then, it is not an unknown legislative prac-
tice to place provisions which are more general and apply throughout a whole 
act into the first chapter of the act, even if this chapter is «only» equal to the 
other chapters. That is done for the sake of avoiding repetitions. Last but not 
least, whilst it is true that the fact that the legislator regulates some topics in 
both Chapter 1 and Chapter 12 means that the legislator wanted such topics to 
be addressed differently by state courts and by international arbitration tribu-
nals (see the last argument in 2.2. below), that does not necessarily mean that 
the legislator wanted all topics to be subject to this different treatment. It 
means that it wanted this for the topics regulated in both chapters but not that 
it wanted it for the topics – like «overriding mandatory rules» – which are 
regulated only in Chapter 1; it might even be that the lawmaker regulated in 
both chapters solely the topics which it wished to be handled differently, and 
regulated only in Chapter 1 the topics which it wanted to be handled in the 




Chapter 19: Chapter 1 PILA as lex generalis 
 
186 
First, the Swiss legislature appears to have wanted to treat international arbi-
tration in an autonomous manner391 because it separated the rules on the latter 
into an individual chapter. Second, Chapter 1 and Chapter 12 are equally 
footed in the hierarchy of PILA’s norms, as they represent the same structural 
unit (a chapter) – from which one can assume that they exclude each other (i.e. 
that either Chapter 1 or Chapter 12 applies). Third, there are issues regulated 
in Chapter 1 and then again in Chapter 12, which means that the lawmaker did 
not want the same treatment of such matters in state and in arbitration courts 
– otherwise it would not have regulated the same topic also in Chapter 12 
(there would have been no need for that). For instance, the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judicial decisions is addressed in Sec. 5 of Chapter 1 
but also in Art. 194 PILA within Chapter 12.  
3. Spirit 
3.1 Pro  
It might have been that through leaving the status of overriding mandatory 
rules undefined by the lex specialis on international arbitration – Chapter 12 
PILA – the legislature was submitting it to a lex generalis, as which Chapter 1 
PILA could be perceived. The lawmaker could have simply seen overriding 
mandatory rules reveal no specificities, and hence need no special regulation, 
when arising within international arbitration.  
3.2 Contra 
On the other hand, overriding mandatory rules might have been «skipped» in 
Chapter 12 in order to let the international arbitration practice handle them. 
That is likely, since in most cases the Swiss lex arbitri (inspired also by inter-
national trends) seeks to leave to international arbitrators as much room as 
possible. If that holds true, there would be no space for application of Chapter 
1 PILA as lex generalis, since the necessary intention would be missing.  
–––––––––––––– 
391 The literature speaks of «autonomy» of Chapter 12 – see, for example, 
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Another possibility is that, because of the private law focus of international 
arbitration, the lawmaker did not at all foresee overriding mandatory rules’ 
becoming relevant in international arbitration. Here again, the legislator’s in-
tention for application of Chapter 1 PILA as lex generalis would be missing.     
4. Conclusion 
PILA is not clear on whether its Chapter 1 is lex generalis with regard to mat-
ters occurring within international arbitration which is (otherwise) regulated 
in its Chapter 12. 
II. Case law 
1. Pro 
Although not keen on doing this and sometimes while not «admitting» it or 
even while denying it, international arbitrators and judges reviewing interna-
tional arbitrations have sometimes applied Chapter 1 PILA as lex generalis.  
The case examined ad hoc and available in ASA Bull., Vol. 24, Issue 3, 2006, 
471ff., Madame X v Madame Y, award from 19 June 2005 invokes Art. 19 
PILA’s concept of legitimate and manifestly outweighing interests392. Art. 19 
PILA is mentioned expressly – in fn. 20. The fact that such mentioning is 
«solely» in a footnote does not change anything because, constituting from a 
linguistic perspective an integral part of a text, a footnote possesses the same 
legal value as the rest of such a text.  
Chapter 1 PILA is relied on also in K Ltd. v M S.A., ICC Award of 1989 in the 
context of bribes (ASA Bull., Vol. 11, Issue 2, 1993, 216ff., 231). Again, Art. 
19 is pointed to.  
In the international arbitration which was challenged before the Court in DSC 
4A_388/2012, a CAS arbitral tribunal applied a non-Swiss (Bulgarian) man-
–––––––––––––– 
392 In fact, it was found that i.c. such interests were not present and the taking into consideration 
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datory rule – Art. 19 (1) of the Bulgarian Civil Procedure Code – which ex-
cluded arbitrability of the (i.c. employment) dispute393, despite being aware of 
the applicability of the Swiss Art. 177 PILA. The tribunal justified this, inter 
alia, with the fact that PILA allowed the consideration of foreign mandatory 
rules394. Such proceeding by the arbitral tribunal, i.e. including the relying on 
the permission by PILA for consideration of non-Swiss mandatory rules, was 
found by the Court inadmissible because of the mentioned Art. 177 PILA – 
the existence of a Swiss rule had meant that the respective issue had to be 
govern exclusively by this Swiss rule, including where the award’s enforcea-
bility abroad would be threatened (which was the other concern of the arbitra-
tors), and that a foreign rule could derogate from Art. 177 PILA only excep-
tionally where it (the foreign rule) was a part of ordre public (cons. 3.3). 
Apparently, for the judges, its mandatory nature was not sufficient to render a 
foreign rule capable of derogating from Art. 177 PILA395. The reliance by the 
arbitral tribunal in this case on the permission by PILA for the consideration 
of non-Swiss mandatory rules appears as an implicit application of PILA’s 
Chapter 1 because such permission is contained in that chapter (Art. 13 and 19 
PILA). In particular, it seems to be an implicit application of Art. 13 PILA 
because this article concerns overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and 
the foreign rule i.c. was a part of the latter396. It is true that the Court rejected 
such implicit application as it rejected the application of the concerned foreign 
–––––––––––––– 
393The translation of Art. 19 (1) Bulgarian Civil Procedure Code used in the Court’s decision 
(Sec. A.) reads as follows: «The parties to a property dispute may agree that it be settled 
by a court of arbitration, unless the dispute has as its subject property rights or possession 
of immoveable property, alimony or rights as per employment relationship.». 
394 «Facts», B., in fine, of the Court’s judgment. The panel applied, not only considered, the 
Bulgarian mandatory rule – it regarded the latter as «applicable» («Facts», B. of the Court’s 
judgment), even if it relied on a possibility given by PILA (only) to consider. 
395 In fact, at the end the award was upheld but on another (here irrelevant) ground – invalidity 
of the arbitration agreement. 
396 According to «Facts», A. where cipher 16 of the disputed (employment) contract is cited 
and to cons. 3.4.1 (even if the latter is not so firm on that since it uses the expression «in so 
far as») of the Court’s decision, the law applicable to the main contract (and to the arbitra-
tion agreement) was Bulgarian law. 
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rule, but the case is brought here as an example that, when they consider them-
selves to be in a delicate situation (here due to inarbitrability under the lex 
causae), international arbitrators apply Chapter 1 PILA. It also holds true that 
the latter was implicitly applied to overriding mandatory rules on arbitrability, 
and not to overriding mandatory rules concerning substantive law, but the lat-
ter can be expected to be treated by international arbitrators analogically – an 
arbitral panel in another case (ICC Case No. 8528397) sees analogy: «The ques-
tion of arbitrability is not in this respect different from the question at stake 
where the Arbitral Tribunal has to decide which is the applicable law to the 
merits of the case….» (para 32)398.     
2. Contra 
The application of Chapter 1 PILA to international arbitration as lex generalis is, in 
any case, not stable.  
When relying on Chapter 1 in DSC 4A_388/2012, the international arbitrators did 
not do so explicitly, which is a sign that the application of this chapter to in-
ternational arbitration as lex generalis cannot function properly. The arbitra-
tors did not base the invoked possibility for consideration of foreign manda-
tory law on Art. 13 PILA or on Chapter 1 PILA but on PILA generally (the 
Court’s judgment, «Facts», B.). Most probably they were aware of the deli-
cateness of the relationship between Chapter 1 and Chapter 12 PILA and did 
not dare to rely on Chapter 1’s Art. 13 or more generally on Chapter 1. In 
addition, this decision demonstrates also that the Court is not cooperative in 
–––––––––––––– 
397 Application by analogy of Art. 19 PILA is mostly dealt with in para 25-39. 
398 In fact, it is here believed that the arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No. 8528 did not prove 
this analogy, for example because one of the state courts’ rulings on which it relied – «So 
ciété La-binal c/ Société Moss et Société Westland Aerospace Ltd, Journal du Droit Inter 
national (1993) p. 957» (para 31 of ICC Case No. 8528) – did not at all deal with overriding  
mandatory rules on arbitrability (but only with overriding mandatory rules on, ironically,  
applicable law: it confirmed the preservation of arbitrability in the presence of relevance of  
such overriding mandatory rules on applicable law). However, this reasoning of the tribunal  
is here cited as an indication that international arbitrators see overriding mandatory rules  
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establishing whether the possibility to consider foreign mandatory rules is 
open for international arbitrators. It did not address this problem directly but 
only implicitly – it stated that Art. 177 PILA, which i.c. the international arbi-
trators viewed as overridden by a foreign mandatory rule, could be derogated 
from only by ordre public rules, and it rejected en blanc the arbitral tribunal’s 
decision on derogation (cons. 3). More elaboration on the role of the manda-
tory nature of the concerned foreign rule would have been more logical, espe-
cially since this nature was the main ground of the arbitral decision399.  
Then, naturally, the fact that there are other cases (to be discussed in Chapter 
21 here) in which adjudicators apply Chapter 1 PILA to international arbitra-
tion only by analogy shows that there exist doubts with regard to direct appli-
cation, hence, with regard to application as lex generalis. (As already con-
tended, application as lex generalis is a type of direct application.)  
3. Conclusion 
Generally, the jurisprudence denies the applicability with regard to the prob-
lem of overriding mandatory rules (and any other applicability) of Chapter 1 
PILA to international arbitration as lex generalis. It also tries to avoid the need 
for application. However, it sometimes (whether it admits this or not) resorts 
to the latter, being forced to do so due to the lack of regulation in Chapter 12 
PILA.  
III. Literature  
1. Pro 
Despite the principal rejection by the literature of any application of Chapter 
1 PILA to international arbitration, similarly to the jurisprudence, some aca-
demics have resorted to such application. After not having obtained an answer 
from Chapter 12 PILA to the problem of the effect of overriding mandatory 
–––––––––––––– 
399 In fact, the Court does not discuss much the potential (domestic) ordre public status of the 
foreign rule, which according to it could have led to derogation from Art. 177 PILA either, 
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rules in international arbitration, they started to look for help outside that chap-
ter and arrived at Chapter 1 PILA because the latter is at least contained in the 
same act as Chapter 12 PILA.  
KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI apply both Art. 13 and Art. 19 PILA to inter-
national arbitration without even debating the applicability or non-applicabil-
ity of Chapter 1 PILA400, and it seems401 that they do so directly.  
2. Contra                           
In SCHNYDER’s view, international arbitrators are not strictly bound by the 
connections under the rest (apart from Chapter 12) of PILA provisions402. 
Then, as much as they seem to be applying Art. 13 and 19 PILA directly, as 
contended in 1. above, KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI also cite authorities (the 
Court and the literature) which apply, for example, Art. 19 PILA by analogy, 
i.e. indirectly403 – and they even do this right after the paragraph through which 
they left the impression of applying directly404. In addition, the authors want 
to take out from Art. 19 PILA the requirement for a Swiss concept of law, 
when that article is applied to international arbitration, which can solely hap-
pen within indirect application. 
Most applications of Chapter 1 PILA to which scholars resorted took the form 
of application by analogy rather than direct application – a type of which ap-
plication as lex generalis is. 
3. Conclusion 
The question on the capability of PILA’s Chapter 1 of being applied to inter-
national arbitration and in particular to overriding mandatory rules becoming 
relevant in this type of dispute resolution is one of the eternal questions in the 
–––––––––––––– 
400 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94. 
401 – from the last sentence of this para 7.94 and the second sentence of fn. 162. 
402 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 314. 
403 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.95. 
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literature. The general view is that international arbitration is regulated exclu-
sively by PILA’s Chapter 12 so that direct application of Chapter 1 PILA (as 
well as of any other chapter of PILA apart from Chapter 12) is inadmissible405.   
IV. Further arguments pro and contra 
1. Pro 
1.1 Cases of application of other provisions that are situated outside 
Chapter 12 PILA apart from Chapter 1 PILA’s provisions on over-
riding mandatory rules                   
There exist cases in which rules that were situated outside Chapter 12 PILA 
and were not the rules of Chapter 1 PILA on overriding mandatory rules – 
rules of Chapter 1 PILA that dealt with other (than overriding mandatory rules) 
topics, rules of Chapters 2 to 11 PILA and rules of acts other than PILA – were 
applied to international arbitration. This might be evidence that for interna-
tional arbitration PILA’s provisions which are outside Chapter 12 are general 
provisions, hence, that for international arbitration the provisions of PILA’s 
first Chapter are general provisions. At any rate, it shows that the «sover-
eignty» of PILA’s Chapter 12 over international arbitration is not sacred – or 
at least that its sanctity has been encroached on (apparently, when there is a 
need, there is readiness to accept a solution contained outside this chapter). 
And if an exception was made for some, it must be available to others.  
a Application of rules of Chapter 1 PILA that dealt with other (than 
overriding mandatory rules) topics             
Chapter 1 PILA’s Art. 1 (1) (e), for instance, certainly applies to international 
arbitration – it renders PILA applicable to the latter.        
–––––––––––––– 
405 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 314 as well 
as many others an overview of whose opinions is provided in CHRISTEN, 19; VOSER, 
Vorlesung, slide 130 (arbitral tribunals do not have to apply the conflict of law rules applied 
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Then, before a special rule on this was inserted into Chapter 12 in 2006 – Art. 
186 (1bis) PILA – the Court had considered that the lis pendens rule of PILA’s 
first chapter – Art. 9 PILA – was applicable to international arbitration – DSC 
127 III 279 of 14 May 2001.            
Further, no one doubts that the reference in Art. 187 (1) PILA to a law covers 
only the substantive provisions of such a law. However, neither that article nor 
any other in Chapter 12 PILA explicitly indicates this406. Hence, some other 
rule must have been consulted. This rule cannot be anything else but Art. 14 
PILA because this is the only provision in PILA which deals with renvoi. 
Moreover, the acceptance that there is no renvoi in Art. 187 (1) PILA corre-
sponds to the solution of Art. 14 PILA: the latter prohibits renvoi with two 
exceptions – where PILA expressly refers to renvoi and where, in the area of 
family and personal matters, the renvoi points to Swiss law (Art. 14 (2) PILA) 
– and, since Art. 187 (1) PILA does not fulfil the hypothesis of either of these 
two exceptions (it neither provides explicitly for renvoi nor leads to the appli-
cation of Swiss law in family and personal matters407), renvoi is prohibited. 
b Application of rules of Chapter 2 to 11 PILA  
Effectively Art. 154 (1) and 155 (c) of Chapter 10 PILA were applied in the 
international arbitration under scrutiny in DSC 4A_414/2012 of 11 December 
2012 (see «Facts», C. of the judgment). 
Then, the arbitrators in the international arbitration examined in Vivendi El-
ektrim applied Art. 154 and 155 PILA (Vivendi Elektrim, «Facts», cons. B.c). 
What is more, as per the judgment, the arbitrators resorted to these provisions 
as to «general» conflict of laws rules of PILA (Vivendi Elektrim, «Facts», 
cons. B.c; own translation from German). In addition, also the Court applied 
the articles (Vivendi Elektrim, cons. 3.2). It should be admitted that the role of 
this Court’s decision for the ensuing practice is questionable because the fact 
that it was not published in the official court reporter suggests that it was not 
–––––––––––––– 
406 – unlike Sec. 46 (2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which addresses renvoi (at least) 
for the lex causae chosen by the parties. 
407 – family and personal matters are anyway not even arbitrable because they are not pecuniary 
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intended to be relied upon as a décision de principe. Nevertheless, the case 
shows that, when PILA does not offer them any alternative, international arbi-
trators and judges ruling upon international arbitrations have a recourse to 
PILA’s provisions outside Chapter 12.       
c Application of rules of acts other than PILA 
Not only rules other than the rules of the first chapter of PILA, which dealt 
with overriding mandatory rules, and rules other than the first and the twelfth 
chapters of PILA, but even acts other than PILA acts are applied to interna-
tional arbitration. For instance, currently the Federal Supreme Court Act of 17 
June 2005 is considered as the legal basis for revision of international arbitral 
awards. The recently proposed bill on changes in PILA’s Chapter 12408 intro-
duces such revision (Art. 190a), but that is still in draft form only.  
2. Contra 
2.1 Inappropriateness of some solutions of Chapter 1 PILA for inter-
national arbitration 
Chapter 1 PILA’s rules on overriding mandatory rules might contain solutions 
that are incompatible with the way overriding mandatory rules «behave» 
within international arbitration and are thus incapable of being directly applied 
within the latter409. One example is the Swiss point of view in Art. 19 PILA. 
Another is the priority granted to Swiss, as compared to non-Swiss, overriding 
mandatory rules, visible from the separate treatment – respectively in Art. 18 
PILA, on the one hand, and in Art. 13 and 19 PILA, on the other410.  
2.2 Parties’ reference to Chapter 12 PILA  
–––––––––––––– 
408 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht (IPRG), Änderung vom …, Entwurf, 2018-
1229, BBI 2018, 7213ff. 
409 In the case of overriding mandatory rules, the different starting points of a state court and an 
arbitration court do not allow automatic application to international arbitration of the con-
cepts adopted for state courts – CHRISTEN, 20 and fn. 112 there. 
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It could be that the parties refer expressly to Chapter 12 PILA. For instance, 
the international arbitration scrutinised by the Court in DSC 118 II 193 was 
submitted «à la convention des Parties et à la loi fédérale du 18 décembre 
1987 sur le droit international privé (chapitre 12 sur l'arbitrage interna-
tional)» (DSC 118 II 193, cons. 5, c), aa)). It is questionable whether such 
special mentioning of Chapter 12 PILA incorporates the will of the parties that 
their arbitration is governed exclusively by this chapter without any other 
chapters of PILA or «just» a principal indication of which the most relevant 
part of PILA is.  
2.3 International trend towards independency of international arbitra-
tion laws from the rest of the seat’s laws 
Independence of Chapter 12 PILA from the rest of the PILA chapters would 
correspond to the international expectations towards modern arbitration law.  
2.4 Chapter 1 PILA does not regulate all issues 
Applying Chapter 1 PILA would anyway not be a panacea, as that chapter 
does not contain all answers. For instance, it does not address the conse-
quences of application or consideration of overriding mandatory rules. 
V. Conclusion  
The admissibility of the application of Chapter 1 to overriding mandatory rules 
in international arbitration as lex generalis cannot be proven with certainty, 








Chapter 20: Conclusion  
Chapter 12 PILA does not regulate overriding mandatory rules relevant in in-
ternational arbitration, and Chapter 1 PILA cannot be applied to them as lex 






Subpart 3: New solution 
The legislative gap that exists with regard to overriding mandatory rules in 
international arbitration can be addressed, in the first place, through applica-
tion by analogy – statutory or legal analogy. This is a frequent method of clos-
ing legislative gaps and the one usually started with411. 
Application by analogy is of two types – statutory analogy and legal analogy. 
Statutory analogy has priority; legal analogy is used only if statutory analogy 
is impossible, i.e. when there is no legal provision regulating a factual situation 
similar to the factual situation with respect to which a legislative gap exists. 
Statutory analogy (analogia legis) is the mutatis mutandi application of a legal 
provision which covers a factual situation similar to the factual situation re-
garding which a legislative gap exists to the latter factual situation412. The ap-
plication should be mutatis mutandi since one needs to compensate for the 
differences between the factual situation for which a legislative gap exists (and 
to which the concerned legal provision is applied by analogy) and the factual 
situation to which the concerned legal provision applies in principle – such 
differences exist because whilst similar, these two factual situations are not 
identical. In the case of legal analogy (analogia iuris), the regulatory content 
of more than one legal provisions which are related to each other (because they 
treat the same topic, form a branch of law or even represent the whole positive 
law) is applied to the factual situation with respect to which a legislative gap 
exists; in particular a general principle is extracted from the spirit of this reg-
ulatory content and is applied to this factual situation. In this type of analogia, 
adaptations are not necessary because the principle that is being applied (by 
–––––––––––––– 
411 THURNHERR, 690, in another context (application of civil procedure rules to administrative 
procedure), states that the application of other rules by analogy and the developing of law 
by the adjudicator (in her discussion – a judge) are general principles on the filling of gaps. 
For her, the application by analogy is to be used before the development of law by the 
adjudicator – THURNHERR, 693. Also, VOSER, Lois d’application immediate, 79, 80 in initio, 
turns first to application by analogy (of Art. 19 PILA) when addressing the legislative gap 
she sees in respect of overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae. 







analogy) has been adapted already during its «creation» – it has been extracted 





Chapter 21: Analogia legis of Chapter 1 PILA                
I. Rules concerned  
The rules of Chapter 1 PILA that have the potential to be applied by analogy 
to overriding mandatory rules in international arbitration are Art. 13 and 19. 
They namely deal with the destiny of overriding mandatory rules. Whilst it 
also addresses this destiny, Art. 18 PILA will have to be omitted, since it cre-
ates a privilege for the overriding mandatory rules legis fori which is incom-
patible with the international arbitration’s conceptual distance from national 
laws, including from the seat’s law, especially in cases of a neutral seat.413 
Both Art. 13 PILA and Art. 19 PILA could be applied by analogy to overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex causae. If one wants to connect these rules through 
the uniform connection, one should apply by analogy the former. (In the view 
of the majority of authors, this provision implements that connection). Should 
one want to connect them through the special connection, it would be better to 
execute the analogia legis with Art. 19 PILA. If a choice must be made, Art. 
13 PILA is preferable (and has been chosen here) because the uniform con-
nection is less problematic.   
To overriding mandatory rules of a third law, only Art. 19 PILA could be ap-
plied by analogy. It incorporates the sole possible connection for these rules – 
the special connection.     
II. Admissibility 
1. Similarity 
Apparently, in order for analogia legis to be admissible, there should be sim-
ilarity between the factual situation for which the legislative gap being filled 
exists and the factual situation which is directly covered by the rule to be ap-
plied by analogy.     
–––––––––––––– 









Both when occurring in PILA’s international arbitration and when occurring 
in PILA’s international litigation, overriding mandatory rules concern interna-
tional private law disputes. (Both types of legal procedures resolve this kind 
of dispute.) Then, in both cases, the topic arises in a procedure which is a 
means of delivery of justice414. Admittedly, international arbitration is a more 
flexible means (it does not feature many of the strict rules applicable in litiga-
tion), but it is still a means of delivery of justice and is, thus, based on the same 
fundament as state court proceedings are – the right to fair trial, the right to be 
heard etc. Furthermore, the differences between the two types of dispute reso-
lution are not so great as to be incapable of being compensated for through the 
modifications that anyway accompany every application by analogy.    
1.2 Contra  
On the other hand, one can argue that even if they both represent mechanisms 
for the delivery of justice, PILA’s international litigation and international ar-
bitration are alternative mechanisms (to each other), and the similarities be-
tween them are not sufficient to render the solution regarding overriding man-
datory rules adopted for the former apt for the latter.  
2. Analogia legis is the primary means of overcoming legisla-
tive gaps 
As mentioned above, application by analogy is given priority amongst the 
means for filling gaps, and analogia legis is given priority between the two 
types of analogia.                   
3. What is not enough for direct application might be enough 
for indirect application 
–––––––––––––– 
414 Also arbitrator Judge Lagergren talks about «the machinery of justice» meaning both state 
courts and arbitral tribunals: «…Parties who ally themselves in an enterprise of the present 
nature must realise that they have forfeited any right to ask for assistance of the machinery 
of justice (national courts or arbitral tribunals) in settling their disputes.» (emphasis added) 
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Whilst the direct application of Chapter 1 PILA as lex generalis could not be 
proven (see above), some sense in it was seen. This renders the probability 
high that indirect application of this chapter, such as application by analogy, 
would be admissible – what is not enough for the more intense effect might 
suffice for the less intense effect. (Also, in contract law, a contract which is 
not concluded in the stricter, obligatory form is sometimes qualified as another 
type of contract, the form required for which it complies with – for example a 
«sales» contract for the transfer of a real estate property entered into in a writ-
ten, and not in the necessary notary, form is treated as a preliminary sales con-
tract.)                  
4. Application by analogy of other (than Chapter 1’s) rules of 
PILA which are also outside Chapter 12  
Application by analogy to international arbitration of the rules of Chapter 1 
PILA on overriding mandatory law should be admissible also because other 
rules outside Chapter 12 PILA apart from them are already applied by analogy 
to that procedure. An example is the use of a solution with regard to the formal 
validity of a choice of law agreement which coincides with the solution of Art. 
116 (2) PILA – the agreement is valid where it is made expressly, tacitly or by 
conduct415. Then, international arbitrators sometimes apply by analogy provi-
sions outside Chapter 12 PILA in order to «concretize» Art. 187 PILA, for 
example in order to construct the latter’s objective connection, which was 
moreover approved by the Court in an obiter dictum416 417, and this even if Art. 
187 PILA is «the only provision that arbitrators need to consider to determine 
the applicable substantive law»418. 
5. Lack of alternative 
–––––––––––––– 
415 GIRSBERGER /VOSER /COLACINO /DONCHI, 1386. 
416 GIRSBERGER /VOSER /COLACINO /DONCHI, 1414 and the case cited therein. 
417 GIRSBERGER /VOSER /COLACINO /DONCHI, 1414 consider that proceeding is «justified» be-
cause the objective connection under Art. 187 PILA – the law most closely related to the 
case – is encountered in other parts of PILA and, as a matter of fact, is a basic principle 
behind all the Act’s conflict of laws rules. 
418 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1413. 
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With Chapter 12 PILA being completely silent on the matter, one does not 
have much choice but to turn to Chapter 1 PILA, and since the latter’s direct 
application is not an option, its application by analogy remains. It is easy to 
say that the provisions outside Chapter 12 PILA do not apply in international 
arbitration when solutions are available in that unit of PILA – e.g. it is easy to 
say that Art. 116 and 117 from Chapter 9 PILA, which govern the law appli-
cable to a contract, do not apply when Chapter 12 PILA has Art. 187 which 
regulates such law. But where the matter at stake, like that of the effect of 
overriding mandatory rules, is not clarified in Chapter 12 PILA, things become 
more difficult, and resorting to chapters other than the latter becomes less of a 
«sin».  
6. Urging and complex nature of the problem 
The problem here is of an urging nature (overriding mandatory rules). In fact, 
the current work would not have proposed the approach of resorting to Chapter 
1 PILA but would have favoured directly the adoption of new rules suggested 
below, if it was not for this nature. In addition, the matter is complex – it in-
volves oppositive principles such as the private law nature of international ar-
bitration and its public law function to deliver justice; the principle of parties’ 
autonomy and the need to respect rules serving the general interests; etc. In 
such a situation, one should be prepared to accept solutions that are not ideal.                          
7. Case law  
Though not keen on doing so, in some cases international arbitrators and state 
courts have effectuated application by analogy of Chapter 1 PILA – in fact, it 
was one of the most frequent conflict of laws instruments used by them for 
counteracting the gap. 
For instance, the Swiss arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No. 8528 examines and 
applies Art. 19 PILA by analogy to a third mandatory tax law419. The tribunal 
–––––––––––––– 
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talks about applying the principle contained in Art. 19 PILA, not about apply-
ing the article, and it even expressly characterises the application as such by 
analogy420.  
The application by analogy of Chapter 1 PILA is more often application by 
analogy of Art. 19 PILA than of Art. 13 PILA. That is probably due to the fact 
that the latter’s content is not unambiguous421 and the fact that adjudicators 
feel themselves less obliged to point to a particular legal basis when applying 
the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae than when considering over-
riding mandatory rules of a third law. 
8. Literature 
Academics often used Chapter 1 PILA’s solutions, which cannot be anything 
but application by analogy of this chapter. Similarly to the jurisprudence, the 
literature resorts more often to analogia with Art. 19 PILA422 than with Art. 
13 PILA, again due to the greater need to justify the giving of effect to a third 
law’s overriding mandatory rules than the application of overriding mandatory 
rules legis causae.   
For instance, SCHNYDER (even if pleading for the connecting of overriding 
mandatory rules legis causae through a newly built special connection which 
would be valid for all – overriding mandatory rules of a third law, overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex fori and overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae423) seems to admit a possibility for application of Art. 13 PILA by anal-
ogy. He talks about the possibility to «fructify the thought» from the latter (by 
which, in his view, this article would come «to the arbitration law provision 
–––––––––––––– 
420 See e.g. para 25 (point II.), para 33 and 33 (b) in particular. 
421 It seems that also for SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch 
Schiedsgerichte, 314 that is one reason not to «fructify» Art. 13 PILA’s idea of comprehen-
sive application of the lex causae in international arbitration. 
422 For an overview e.g. of the literature on potential application by analogy of Art. 19 PILA, 
see KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 263. 
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on applicability of Art. 187 PILA as concretization»)424. Further, he suggests 
the «considering» within international arbitration of Art. 19 PILA according 
to «its principal regulation and connection intention», «not in the form in 
which it became a law»425. In fact, it is not clear whether by such considering, 
he means application by analogy of Art. 19 PILA or embedding of the latter’s 
solution into the special connection which he proposes – but in any case, he 
appears to deem the former possible. In addition, he states that it is «thinkable 
and even probable» that a rule like Art. 7 Rome Convention (at that time in 
force – today Art. 9 (3) of Rome I) or Art. 19 PILA be fructified above all by 
arbitration426. 
KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.96-7.101 seem to apply Art. 19 PILA by 
analogy as well, even if that is not so clear since (as discussed above in Chapter 
19, III., 1.) at another place they appear to apply it directly427.  
KARRER raises the questions: «…Art. 18, 19 by analogy?...»; «…Art. 15 by 
analogy?...»; «…Art. 18 by analogy?…»; «…Art. 19 by analogy?...»428. He 
sees Art. 19 PILA as applicable with «substantial modifications»429. 
GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI seem to be against Chapter 1 PILA’s 
application by analogy. With some sort of an a contrario logic, they read the 
fact that Art. 18 and 19 PILA explicitly limit the parties’ choice of law as «an 
indication that any limitations to the principle of party autonomy in arbitration 
must be considered with caution, in particular where the parties have expressly 
–––––––––––––– 
424 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 313, 314, 
own translation from German. 
425 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 315 (in fine), 
316, own translation from German. 
426 SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 340, own translation from German. 
427 At KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94, last sentence and fn. 162, second sentence. 
428 Parts of the titles of, respectively, heading «a», heading «aa», heading «bb» and heading 
«cc» in KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 256-284. 
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chosen the law applicable to the substance of their dispute»430. This interpre-
tation was supported through the wording and history of Art. 187 PILA as well 
as through the existence of the possibility for the parties, by agreeing on having 
the decision rendered ex aequo et bono under Art. 187 (2) PILA, to cause the 
international arbitrator not to consider any law at all431. 
All in all, different voices are «heard» in the doctrine, but the majority are in 
favour of application by analogy; most probably since no other way out is seen. 
III. Appropriateness   
1. Pro 
1.1 Compromise 
Application by analogy of the conflict of laws rules of Chapter 1 PILA would 
come as a good compromise between the signs for applicability as a general 
law of Chapter 1 PILA and the legislator’s will to regulate the arbitration under 
Chapter 12 PILA differently than the litigation under Chapter 1 PILA.   
1.2 Adaptability 
Application by analogy allows adaptation to the particulars of international 
arbitration. The necessary adjustments to Art. 13 and 19 PILA can be under-
taken and Art. 18 PILA can be left «un»applied.                  
2. Contra 
2.1 Too many adaptations necessary 
While adaptations go along with application by analogy, one cannot make too 
many adaptations since that would not be application by analogy but applica-
tion of new rules. 
2.2 No rule on consequences     
–––––––––––––– 
430 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1393. 
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Another argument against application by analogy of Chapter 1 PILA is that 
the latter does not contain rules that govern the consequences of giving effect 
to overriding mandatory rules. Hence, it does not offer comprehensive regula-
tion of overriding mandatory rules anyway.   
IV. Temporary solution  
Because there is another, better solution – the adoption of new explicit rules – 
it would be the best to apply by analogy Chapter 1 PILA’s conflict of laws 
rules only temporarily.   
V. Conclusion 
Application by analogy of Chapter 1 PILA’s conflict of laws rules that regulate 
overriding mandatory rules for state courts is a possible way to fill the lacuna 
existing with regard to overriding mandatory rules in international arbitration. 
However, it is not an ideal solution. That is why it is appropriate only as a 







Chapter 22: Analogia iuris 
Since analogia legis did not turn out to be an ideal solution, one can attempt 
to address the problem through analogia iuris. The latter will consist of ex-
tracting conflict of laws rules on overriding mandatory rules from the general 
principles of international arbitration law and of law in general.                              
I. Right to give effect to overriding mandatory rules 
1. Ordinary limitation of freedom of contract  
Giving effect to overriding mandatory rules within international arbitration is 
nothing odd. It is equal to limiting the parties’ freedom to agree on the sub-
stantive law applicable in the international arbitration432, and since this free-
dom is a sort of a freedom to contract, it can be limited in the same way as any 
freedom to contract can be limited, which is in the name of the interests of 
others – Sec. 1 (b) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, for example, states: 
«the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, sub-
ject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest».  
Hence, the giving of effect to overriding mandatory rules by the international 
arbitrator does not mean that he or she fails to respect the parties’ freedom to 
contract but only that the latter was limited for the sake of public interests – 
those public interests which are protected by the overriding mandatory rules 
in question433. As in any other private law transfer of rights, the parties cannot 
transfer to the arbitral tribunal more rights than they themselves have434 – if 
their freedom to choose applicable substantive law was limited by overriding 
mandatory rules, then the circle of substantive law norms which an interna-
tional arbitrator could determine as applicable will also be restricted. 
–––––––––––––– 
432 It was discussed also above in connection to mandatory rules in general that the effect of 
those rules is to limit the freedom of contract. 
433 See also CHRISTEN, 21. 
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2. The essence of overriding mandatory rules as suppressing 
the applicable law 
The very essence of overriding mandatory rules consists of them suppressing 
the law applicable to the case (they are to be applied or considered regardless 
of the latter law). If this power is the core of their nature, they must possess it 
while in any type of legal procedure, including in international arbitration435.   
3. Prohibition of a parties’ stipulation that solely the contract 
regulates the relationship between them 
An argument in favour of an arbitrator’s right to give effect to overriding man-
datory rules can be the rejection by most authors of the possibility that the 
parties exclude the effect of any other rules of law outside the contract by stip-
ulating that the latter is the only document regulating the relationship between 
them436. What is actually feared here is that rules of law which have to be 
applied or considered in any circumstances – such as overriding mandatory 
rules – remain unapplied or unconsidered. It would make no sense to try to 
ensure the application or consideration of overriding mandatory rules and at 
the same time to prohibit it.  
4. Private law persons can also participate in the establish-
ment of new policies  
DALHUISEN defends the right of arbitration to take part in the process of es-
tablishing new policies, i.e. to apply new policies, including those in the 
quickly developing financial markets area. In his view, such a process is not 
«a government monopoly» and «in civil society it would be a sad day indeed 
if citizens had to wait solely for government (and their courts) to take action 
in these matters.»437              
–––––––––––––– 
435 CHRISTEN, 26. 
436 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1362. 




Chapter 22: Analogia iuris 
 
209 
II. Obligation to give effect to overriding mandatory 
rules                                          
The existence of a right to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules does 
not exclude the existence of an obligation in this regard – one can have a right 
and at the same time a duty to exercise this right. Proving an obligation is 
difficult here, since there are no legal sanctions for not applying or not consid-
ering overriding mandatory rules; non-legal «sanctions», such as non-appoint-
ment of the arbitrator in future cases, are possible, but do not prove the exist-
ence of a legal obligation.   
1. Inherent in the task of international arbitration to resolve a 
dispute 
One can make the case that the application or consideration of overriding man-
datory rules is inherent in the very task of international arbitration to resolve 
the dispute. To do so, one can contend, means, inter alia, to subsume the case 
under the law that governs such a case (legal qualification), and this law might 
be, or include, overriding mandatory law438. If this subsuming is not executed, 
there will be a violation of the second hypothesis of Art. 190 (2) (c) PILA 
(infra petita). Thus, the international arbitrator needs to apply or consider 
overriding mandatory rules; not in order to protect some law (which, unlike 
state courts, he or she does not need to do) but in order to perform the very 
task with which he or she has been entrusted – to resolve the dispute. This all 
holds true even where the parties have chosen the applicable law and the latter 
is different than the overriding mandatory law, since the presence of such 
choice neither changes the fact that the international arbitration has been put 
into motion for the resolving of a dispute439 nor «reduces» or «neutralises» the 
–––––––––––––– 
438 See also CHRISTEN, 22. 
439 CHRISTEN, 21, 22 seems to have a similar view: «Although the parties can choose on which 
legal order the arbitrator should base this judgement, the authorisation to settle the dispute, 
in my view, namely comprises that the arbitrator detects such overriding mandatory rules 
that want to apply to the facts of a case regardless of the law otherwise applicable, i.e. also 
regardless of a choice of law by the parties.»; own translation from German. 
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effect of overriding mandatory rules, as those are independent of the law prin-
cipally applicable to the case.  
2. Part of the merits  
The application or consideration of overriding mandatory rules is a part of the 
deciding of the merits of a case, and the international arbitrator is the person 
called upon to perform this deciding. Hence, he or she cannot be anything other 
than obliged to conduct such application or consideration. 
In the US case Civ. 283 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. March 04, 2013)440, the determina-
tion by arbitrators of applicable law and of applicability of overriding manda-
tory rules was found to be a matter of substance and thus a prerogative of ar-
bitrators which was outside the court’s review. In Goldman Sachs 
International v Novo Banco SA [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm)441, an English 
court ruled that the potential influence of a banking regulator’s resolution 
measure on a loan could be examined only as part of the merits, and not as a 
question of jurisdiction (para 92, inter alia, in conjunction with para 89). In 
fact, here a state court was the holder of jurisdiction, but by analogy, the im-
pact of a banking regulator’s resolution measure on a loan must be qualified 
as a substantive issue also where competence was assigned to an arbitral tri-
bunal.  
3. International arbitration is a method for the delivery of jus-
tice 
The private law nature of international arbitration does not reduce its function 
as a means for the delivery of justice. International arbitration is of a «hybrid 
–––––––––––––– 
440 The controversy here originated from the financial sphere. The court was looking at a request 
for the vacation of an arbitral award rendered in an ICDR-AAA arbitration in which the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority complained that the value of its investment in Citigroup, 
Inc. was diluted by the latter (through the issuance of preferred shares to other investors 
and the converting of those shares to common stock) and that more favourable terms were 
conferred on other investors. 
441 Thanks are due to Mr. Tiago Ferreira de Lemos, an attorney at law, PLEN – Sociedade de 
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nature»: it «is contractual because it derives from an agreement between the 
parties. At the same time, it is procedural or adjudicative, because it relates to 
a binding dispute resolution process.»442. It is here considered that sometimes 
the contractual side is focused on too much – international arbitration is 
thought of solely as a contract and its adjudicative nature is neglected. In fact, 
contracts only trigger the international arbitration (arbitration agreement) and 
define the procedural (agreement on procedural rules, agreement on an arbi-
trator, etc.) and the substantive (agreement on the choice of law) frame of the 
international arbitration, but they do not do the latter’s job – the resolving of 
the dispute. The mandate from the parties to the international arbitrator is for 
resolving a dispute, and not for resolving a dispute in a particular manner443. 
Besides, if parties could agree on everything in international arbitration, they 
would be able to isolate themselves from the legislative domains of states, 
which the latter cannot have meant to allow444. Next, even if arbitrators do not 
represent a state, they accomplish delivery of justice – they are private law 
persons with public law functions, like, for example, notaries445 – and the cir-
cumvention of overriding mandatory rules through exclusion of their applica-
bility in international arbitration is disturbance to any delivery of justice. 
4. Dependence on state legal orders 
–––––––––––––– 
442 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 2.05; emphasis added. 
443 CHRISTEN, 21 and fn. 120 thereof. 
444 When parties choose international arbitration, they choose who can resolve their dispute, but 
they do not exempt themselves from the domain of the state which enacts legislation oblig-
atory for them – CHRISTEN, 22. 
445 For Guldener, as cited by GENTINETTA, 99: «With empowerment by law arbitration courts 
exercise official functions» (own translation from German). At the same time, one should 
note that the continuation of this statement («and therefore make part of the system of state 
courts») is not agreed with here: the fact that they accomplish activity of official character 
does not necessarily render arbitration courts part of the state judicial machinery – they 
would be performing such activity by reason of empowerment, and not because of belong-
ing to the state apparatus. 
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International arbitration is possible only within the frames of legal orders446. 
Since in principle the state has a monopoly on the legally binding resolving of 
legal disputes, its authorisation is needed in order that someone else, such as 
an arbitral tribunal, resolves a dispute in a legally binding manner. Where it 
feels its legal order to be threatened by such an adjudicator, a state might de-
cide to refuse to grant such authorisation. It might deem the disrespect for 
overriding mandatory rules as such a threat because those rules protect inter-
ests that are paramount to it. If this is the case, international arbitrators will 
need to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules in order to preserve their 
right to deliver justice.447 
5. No space of illegality 
International arbitration is no space of illegality448. That an international arbi-
trator is a private law person and that the parties to the dispute are conferred 
freedom to define many of the aspects of the procedure does not mean that the 
latter is «outside» the law. The legal order granting freedom to the parties and 
to the international arbitrator does not equal it allowing them to act outside it 
(and this is so with any freedom awarded to private law persons). An interna-
tional arbitrator, in addition, performs a public law function – to deliver justice 
– which brings with it certain responsibilities.          
5.1 No circumvention of law 
–––––––––––––– 
446 CHRISTEN, 26. 
447 VOSER, Mandatory rules, 337. According to GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1375 
under certain circumstances arbitrators «must apply mandatory rules of third countries in 
the overall interest of arbitration since not doing so would lead in the longer term to states 
or a community of states such as the EU reducing the scope of arbitrable disputes». MAYER, 
286 points out: «Although arbitrators are neither guardians of the public order nor invested 
by the State with a mission of applying its mandatory rules, they ought nevertheless have 
an incentive to do so out of a sense of duty to the survival of international arbitration as an 
institution.». Also, according to CHRISTEN, 27 the dependence of international arbitration 
on recognition by states brings with itself a duty to apply overriding mandatory rules. 
448 See also CHRISTEN, 22. 
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The need for precautionary measures against circumvention of overriding 
mandatory law is greater in international arbitration than in international liti-
gation, as some of its features – such as the strong bindingness to the parties’ 
selection of law, the possibility to opt for confidentiality of the procedure, or 
the opportunity to agree that no reasons are stated in the award (Art. 32 (3) 
Swiss Rules, Art. 34(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) – can be misused for 
this purpose.              
The general principle of prohibition of abuse of rights is to be invoked against 
circumvention of overriding mandatory law and of law in general449. In ac-
cordance with it, no one is obliged to enforce an act of abuse of law450. Thus, 
an international arbitrator can disregard a choice of law made with the sole 
purpose of circumventing an overriding mandatory law451.  
Then, in some cases, international arbitrators have some concrete tools to use 
against the circumvention of overriding mandatory law. For instance, the 
Swiss Rules (Art. 34 (1)), the ICC Rules (Art. 33) and the P.R.I.M.E. Finance 
Rules (Art. 37 (1)) subject the issuing of a consent award (an award on agreed 
terms) – an award which records a settlement reached by the parties – to the 
acceptance of such settlement by the arbitral tribunal452. Thus, where the latter 
finds that the respective arrangement violates overriding mandatory rules, it 
will be able to refuse to issue the consent award.  
5.2 Unfair to force a party to break a law 
It would not be just to force a party to break an overriding mandatory law by 
which they are bound even if that law is not the law that applies to the contract. 
That would be all the more so where consequences as heavy as criminal law 
sanctions are attached to the breach (as they were, for example, to the infringe-
ment of the Greek laws on capital controls from 2015). 
–––––––––––––– 
449 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 177 N 18c in fine. 
450 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1401; KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 250. 
451 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.30 with further references. 
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5.3 Iura novit curia 
The most obvious argument for recognising a duty to apply or consider over-
riding mandatory rules is the principle iura novit curia. According to it, an 
international arbitrator knows the law and is not limited to choosing from the 
legal qualifications made by the parties but is able to make new ones. In 
4A_446/2013 of 5 February 2014, the Court could, in fact, not be convinced 
that this principle led to an international arbitrator’s duty to examine a provi-
sion (i.c. a rule legis causae on setting off a time-barred counterclaim) which 
was never raised by the parties. However, since (amongst other things) the 
Court saw it as relevant that the arbitration’s terms of reference stated that the 
parties had to prove the applicable law’s content, it is not excluded that in the 
absence of such terms, iura novit curia will be seen as activated.  
6. Trend in legal instruments towards giving effect to overrid-
ing mandatory rules of a third law 
The more legal instruments give effect to them, the more legitimate it is to 
give effect to overriding mandatory rules in international arbitration – the at-
tention paid to them by legal instruments is an indication of their importance. 
Also, the arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No. 8528 supports the solution of Art. 
19 PILA of giving effect to a non-designated law’s overriding mandatory rules 
with the fact that such solution is known to other conflict of laws systems – 
the Rome Convention (Art. 7), The Hague Convention of the Law Applicable 
to Agency of 14 March 1978 (Art. 16) or The Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition of 1 July 1985 (Art. 16 (2))453. 
7. No benefits without obligations  
Where overriding mandatory rules set conditions for the conferring of benefits, 
as in ICC Case No. 8528 where conditions for the granting of tax benefits were 
prescribed, their application is a necessity if one wants to obtain the benefits. 
–––––––––––––– 
453 – ICC Case No. 8528, para 28 and 29. In para 30, the tribunal concludes that «there exists a 
real trend in favour of a more open system whatever the difficulties may be in identifying 
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This is so even where the relationship which the benefits concern is subjected 
to a law different than that which awards them. Whoever grants benefits to 
another party has the right to define the conditions for such granting.  
8. Reconcilability of protection by overriding mandatory 
rules of public interests with protection by international ar-
bitration of individual interests 
8.1 Principal reconcilability of protection of public interests with pro-
tection of individual interests  
Justice for individual interests and justice for public interests can function sim-
ultaneously. They do not exclude each other. That one is protecting individual 
interests does not mean that one is acting against public interests. It does not 
even mean that one is not acting to the benefit of public interests, since justice 
for individual interests might bring about justice for public interests. For ex-
ample, in the case of private enforcement of a public law act, through imple-
menting the latter in relations between private parties, its public law goals are 
also achieved; or, when one of the parties to a contract is released from per-
formance because the law of the state in which it is incorporated prohibits such 
performance, not only the private interests of that party but also the interests 
of the mentioned state are protected454.  
8.2 Reconcilability of protection by overriding mandatory rules of pub-
lic interests with protection by international arbitration of individ-
ual interests, using the example of reconcilability of protection by 
financial overriding mandatory rules of the public interest in pub-
licity with protection by international arbitration of the individual 
interest of the parties in confidentiality 
a Publicity in finance 
–––––––––––––– 
454 See also SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 255, last paragraph as well as ICC Case No. 
8528, para 27 where the tribunal states that, whilst PILA wants to create «a fair balance 
between the opposed interests of two individual parties...», «Art. 19 PILA may indirectly 
protect the interests of a certain country». 
464 
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Financial regulations impose on publicly listed companies a duty to disclose 
certain information (e.g. Art. 958 (1) of the CO, Art. 212-13 of the French 
General Regulation of the Financial Markets Authority, para 20.8 of Annex 1 
to EC Regulation 809/2004 of 29 April 2004455). This obligation serves the 
financial markets law’s purpose of protecting financial markets participants 
through enabling them to make an informed decision whether to invest in such 
companies. The disclosure is accomplished on a regular basis through yearly 
reporting and/or ad hoc by press releases upon the occurrence of specific 
events. Since the end result of a legal procedure which concerns pecuniary 
matters influences the financial condition of a company, the presence of such 
a procedure comes within the scope of this disclosure obligation.                 
b Confidentiality in international arbitration                                   
Even if confidentiality is not intrinsic to international arbitration (but needs to 
be expressly agreed on by the parties or provided for by law)456, it remains a 
frequent choice in it. 
c Reconcilability of publicity in finance and confidentiality in inter-
national arbitration  
It has been feared that agreed confidentiality of international arbitration could 
hinder compliance with the financial markets rules requiring publicity. Under 
human rights law (Art. 6 (1) ECHR), privacy in arbitration is an admissible 
waiver of the right to public trial only where, amongst other things, it does 
«not run counter to any important public interest»457 – and one can argue that 
privacy of financial transactions subject to international arbitration goes 
against such «important public interest».               
On the other hand, complying with the obligation for publicity under financial 
markets law does not exclude abidance by a potentially existing duty to keep 
–––––––––––––– 
455 This Regulation implements Directive EC 2003/71 providing for this disclosure. 
456 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd («Bulbank») v A.I Trade Finance Inc («AIT»), Case No. 
T 1881-99, Judgment of the Swedish Supreme Court, Stockholm, 27 October 2000. 
457 Para 66 of Häkansson v Sweden (1990) 13 EHHR) and the referring to it in Osmo Suovaniemi 
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the international arbitration confidential. First, one could report only the exist-
ence, type of subject matter and approximate sum at stake (or even only the 
sum) without the concrete matter and the counterparty458. Second, often the 
very stipulation of confidentiality makes exceptions for cases where the exer-
cise of legal duties or rights requires surrender of information. Disclosure re-
quired by financial legislation certainly qualifies as a case of the exercise of 
legal duties or rights requiring surrender of information459.  
At any rate, in case of a conflict, precedence should be given to the publicity 
requirement, since the latter safeguards public interests – those of investors, 
savers, etc.; the arrangement for confidentiality protects private interests – 
those of the parties to the international arbitration. Also, the Groupe de Travail 
which rendered Rapport Final supposed that the objective of protecting sav-
ings and investments would prompt a French state judge or arbitrator to view 
Art. 212-213 of the French General Regulation of the Financial Markets Au-
thority or a foreign rule on publicity as a loi de police460.  
9. The duty under Art. 42 ICC Rules to endeavour to deliver 
enforceable awards cannot prove an obligation 
–––––––––––––– 
458 In that sense, also Rapport Final, 67 and the therein (in fn. 69) cited piece of work. Also, 
MAZURANIC /FAVRE (4.2, last paragraph) seem to consider that confidentiality and publicity, 
in particular publicity that contributes to case law, can live together. 
459 E.g. Art. 44 of the Swiss Rules provides for confidentiality only «except and to the extent 
that a disclosure may be required of a party by a legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal 
right, or to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceedings before a judicial authority» 
(Art. 44 (1) Swiss Rules). The ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement provides in its 
Sec. 13 (c) (iii) for an exception from the confidentiality principle in cases where a legal 
duty or the protection or pursuit of a legal right urges upon a party to disclose information. 
An example of an individual agreement that anchors exceptions to the confidentiality prin-
ciple is the integration and investment Agreement between Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Inc. and Morgan Stanley (Art. VIII «Miscellaneous», Sec. 8.2 (e) in connection with 
Sec. 3.3 (b) (exemptions for disclosures required by applicable law)). 
460 Rapport Final, 68 and fn. 72. 
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The duty under Art. 42 ICC Rules to endeavour to make sure that the award is 
enforceable at law461 cannot prove an obligation of Swiss international arbi-
trators to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules (even if relied on in 
ICC Case No. 8528462). This duty is one for efforts, not for a result, and one 
that covers only matters not governed by the ICC Rules. Even if it was for a 
result and it covered also matters regulated by the latter, the situation would 
not have changed. First, in order to be enforceable, an award does not need to 
observe overriding mandatory rules – it suffices that it respects the ordre pub-
lic, and moreover only the international ordre public (Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA 
and Art. V (2) (b) New York Convention). Second, though it is true that in 
practice international arbitrators prefer to comply with rules which could in-
fluence the enforceability of their award, they do not have the opportunity to 
do so, as these rules are not known with certainty at the time of the award’s 
delivery – the place of enforcement can be defined also after such delivery.  
10. The internal procedure for control in ICC arbitration can-
not prove an obligation 
In an internal procedure designed by its internal rules, the International Court 
of Arbitration of the ICC can «draw [the arbitral tribunal’s] attention to points 
of substance» (Art. 34 of the ICC Rules), where practicable, after considering 
the mandatory law of the place of the arbitration (Art. 6 of the Internal Rules 
of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC (attached to the ICC Rules 
as Appendix II) in conjunction with Art. 34 of the ICC Rules). However, this 
scrutiny takes place «without affecting the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of deci-
sion» (Art. 34 of the ICC Rules), and the required approval of the award con-
cerns only the latter’s form (Art. 34 of the ICC Rules, third sentence) so that 
no proof of a duty to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules can be ex-
tracted here. 
–––––––––––––– 
461 Art. 42 ICC Rules: «In all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the 
arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure 
that the award is enforceable at law.». 
462 Para 35 of that award refers to Art. 26 ICC Rules in which at that time the rule of the current 
Art. 42 ICC was contained. 
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11. One specific obligation – anti-money-laundering obligation 
for arbitration practitioners? 
An interesting question is whether arbitrators and counsels in Swiss interna-
tional arbitration are encumbered with anti-money-laundering duties. If the 
latter are deemed to make part of the international ordre public, then the an-
swer is positive, as per Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA. In that case, another discussion 
arises: the anti-money-laundering obligations of which law? The lex causae 
will have the (ratio materiae) competence, for example, to declare the contract 
by which money laundering is tried on void, but it will not have the (ratio 
personae) competence to impose on persons working on an international arbi-
tration, let us say, a duty to report the money laundering attempt. Rather, the 
lex arbitri must have such personal jurisdiction – it is the law that sets the rules 
for the international arbitration, hence, for the participants in the latter. How-
ever, only that part of the law of the seat which was created especially for 
international arbitration is applied to an international arbitration, thus, to an 
international arbitration’s participants, without the rest of that law, i.e. solely 
Chapter 12 PILA, but not AMLA, applies to the persons working on a Swiss 
international arbitration. In other words, one ends up with «no law in their 
hands».                  
In any case, Art. 2 (3) AMLA applies only to the accepting or holding on de-
posit of assets belonging to others or the assisting in the investment or transfer 
of such assets and, with regard to activities outside the scope of Art. 2 (3) 
AMLA, Art. 9 (2) AMLA provides that their professional secrecy obligation 
under Art. 321 CrimC exempts legal professionals from a reporting duty. The 
participation in international arbitration by a legal professional is not an activ-
ity described in Art. 2 (3) AMLA, so it must not entail anti-money-laundering 
obligations463. Persons who have a role in an international arbitration but are 
not legal professionals – e.g. financial professionals, engineers and other ex-
perts appointed as arbitrators – must also be exempted, since this role is the 
same as the function of legal professionals.                                
–––––––––––––– 




Chapter 22: Analogia iuris 
 
220 
III. Ex officio obligation 
In Not Indicated v Not Indicated, cons. 1, a) the Court stated that the existence 
of an obligation of an arbitrator to examine the validity of a contract in the 
light of the i.c. relevant EU competition law provision was certain («en tout 
cas») where the invalidity of the contract was invoked by one of the parties, 
thus leaving it open whether it was certain also in the absence of invocation.   
1. Pro 
1.1 Possibility to limit parties’ freedom to choose applicable law  
An ex officio duty to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules would be 
reconcilable with the freedom of the parties to choose applicable law. As con-
cluded in Chapter 22, I., 1., this freedom may be limited in the name of the 
interests of others. Public interests which overriding mandatory rules protect 
are namely interests of others – the public is persons other than the parties to 
the international arbitration. Hence, the ex officio application or consideration 
of such rules would represent exactly such admissible limitation of parties’ 
freedom to choose applicable law for the sake of the interests of others.  
1.2 Iura novit curia 
If it derives, inter alia, from the principle iura novit curia, an international 
arbitrator’s duty to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules would be an 
ex officio duty. Under that principle it is the adjudicator, and not the party, who 
knows the law which needs to be applied or considered, so invocation by the 
party cannot be a precondition for applying or considering this law464. 
1.3 Interests of a state  
SCHNYDER seems to favour an ex officio obligation of a judge to examine 
whether a foreign state has interests in the application of economic law. Be-
cause they belonged to a state, these interests could not be left to be decided 
–––––––––––––– 
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on by the accident of a party’s invoking them465. Since the overriding manda-
tory rules that would become relevant in international arbitration would also 
protect state interests, SCHNYDER’s logic can also be applied to that type of 
procedure and justify an international adjudicator’s ex officio obligation. 
1.4 Precedence of potential arbitrator’s ex officio duty to give effect to 
overriding mandatory rules over an agreement by the parties that 
he or she settles the dispute solely on the basis of the arguments 
they raise 
In international arbitration, parties may agree that the arbitral tribunal resolves 
the dispute only on the basis of the arguments raised by them. This possibility 
is a type of freedom of contract and can be limited for the sake of interests of 
others, that is to say, of public interests. Since overriding mandatory rules 
namely protect general interests, a potential ex officio duty of the international 
arbitrator to apply or consider them should be able to limit such possibility.   
2. Contra       
2.1 Dominance of parties’ will    
The heaviest argument against an ex officio nature of an obligation of an inter-
national arbitrator to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules is that in-
ternational arbitration is a procedure mostly (if not altogether) reigned by the 
parties’ will. That was its idea – the reason why it was created. Expressions of 
this principle are, for example, the aforementioned possibilities for the parties 
to agree that the arbitrator resolves the dispute ex aequo et bono (to be dis-
cussed next) or that he or she takes into account solely the arguments raised 
by these parties.  
2.2 Possibility to opt out of law altogether through authorisation for ex 
aequo et bono adjudication  
Also here one can make the point of GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI 
and the authors cited by them (see above Chapter 21, II., 8.) that, through the 
–––––––––––––– 
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possibility under Art. 187 (2) PILA to stipulate that the adjudication be ex ae-
quo et bono, parties can exclude any law whatsoever (owing to Art. 190 (2) 
(e) PILA, only law with an international ordre public status would be pre-
served). This shows that, with regard to the causa for the substantive resolu-
tion, the parties have a lot in their hands, which can be an argument that an 
international arbitrator should not be allowed, and even less so be obliged, to 
apply or consider overriding mandatory rules unless some of these parties have 
requested that. 
IV. Consequences of applying or considering overrid-
ing mandatory rules 
The most proper criteria for the determination of the law governing the conse-
quences of an international arbitrator’s giving effect to overriding mandatory 
rules seem to be the type of consequences (direct or indirect) and the form of 
giving effect (application or consideration). The former reveals the intensity 
of the effect and the latter might imply discretion of the adjudicator with regard 
to such determination (when consideration). That the overriding mandatory 
rule envisages consequences shall not automatically mean that those apply – 
those of them which are direct shall, but those which are indirect shall not466.        
V. Conclusion 
There is a general feeling that an international arbitrator has to apply or con-
sider overriding mandatory rules. However, this is only a feeling. A high con-
centration of contradictory principles does not allow extraction of an unam-
biguous principle. Hence, analogia iuris cannot be employed for filling the 
legislative gap discussed here. 
–––––––––––––– 
466 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 272, 277, 278 (272: A. and first paragraph of B.; 277 
continuing on 278: first paragraph of II.) treats in this way the envisaging of consequences 
by lois d’application immédiate in the context of litigation (she applies a foreseen direct 







Chapter 23: New rules in Chapter 12 PILA 
New legislation is always the best way to close a legislative gap, especially in 
civil law jurisdictions, like Switzerland, for which objective law is the central 
source of law. This is also the case with the gap in Chapter 12 PILA regarding 
overriding mandatory rules. New explicit rules dealing with the latter would 
ensure legal certainty – this would be highly beneficial, since the issue is such 
of great importance. Furthermore, by providing legal certainty on a matter 
which poses difficulties to international arbitrations all around the world, 
Chapter 12 PILA might «convince» more parties to arbitrate in Switzerland. 
In addition, the enactment of express rules would render PILA more consistent 
– if the latter’s Chapter 1 regulates overriding mandatory rules and its Chapter 
12 governs a procedure alternative to the procedure governed by Chapter 1, 
then coherence requires that Chapter 12 also addresses such rules.  
In any case, the adoption of new rules is here not only the best but also the 
only solution because, as has been seen, analogia legis and analogia iuris are 
only partially helpful.  
The adoption of new rules has so far not been discussed as a potential method 
for handling the legislative gap on overriding mandatory rules in international 
arbitration. The solutions put forward in the doctrine seek to manage the status 
quo rather than to change the current legislation. For instance, SCHNYDER 
builds a model of an autonomous (from private international law) special con-
nection467 without expressly saying that such a model should be incorporated 
into positive rules. 
The rules proposed below, including the draft texts, do not claim to be ideal, 
and nor is it claimed that they should be adopted in their present form – there 
is room for their improvement, and suggestions in this direction are welcome. 
These rules rather serve as an example of how explicit legislation on the matter 
could look.   
–––––––––––––– 
467 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 317: 









1. When  
New rules can be introduced with the revision of PILA currently under way.  
2. Why explicitly 
2.1 Addressing the problem at its root  
The best way to handle a problem is to extirpate its cause. The latter here is 
the lack of explicit conflict of laws rules in Chapter 12 PILA. Therefore, the 
most reasonable solution would be to adopt such conflict of laws rules.              
2.2 Worthiness equal to that of other issues which are regulated 
The treatment of overriding mandatory rules in international arbitration is as 
significant as other matters which Chapter 12 PILA governs; if not even more 
significant, keeping in mind that public interests are concerned. Hence, it is 
justified to define the modalities of this treatment as well.  
2.3 Another proposal for regulation of the treatment of overriding 
mandatory rules in international arbitration  
A proposal for adoption of express rules in Chapter 12 PILA is not odd. 
DALHUISEN criticises the P.R.I.M.E. Finance Arbitration Rules’ provision on 
applicable law (at that time Art. 35 (1)468, currently Art. 36 (1)) for resting on 
a conflict of laws rule which, because of being used in «an environment of 
contractual (non-financial) disputes only» (meant is Art. 35 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules), was inappropriate for international financial arbitrations 
(like those under the P.R.I.M.E. Finance Arbitration Rules) and apparently 
suggests explicit regulating in this provision (inter alia) of overriding manda-
tory rules469. This proposal has been partially embraced: considering of «the 
–––––––––––––– 
468 In the Rules’ first edition from 16 January 2012. 
469 DALHUISEN, Applicable Law, 7.123, 7.124 (mainly 7.124). A more detailed analysis of the 
author on the applicable law and the international arbitrator’s role in international financial 
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international and/or financial nature of the transaction and/or dispute», which 
corresponds to its first sentence470, was added to the concerned P.R.I.M.E. Fi-
nance Arbitration Rules’ provision. 
–––––––––––––– 
470 The proposal (DALHUISEN, Applicable Law, 7.124) reads: 
     «The arbitral tribunal shall determine the applicable law, taking into account the interna-
tionality and financial nature of the transaction and/or dispute, the rules designated by the 
parties in areas of the law at their free disposition, the relevant property, regulatory and 
bankruptcy laws, as the case may be, as well as the requirements of the international or 
pertinent national public order especially in terms of, but not limited to, financial stability, 
risk management, protection of the commercial and financial flows, transactional and pay-
ment finality, competition, market abuse, other improper market practices, corruption and 
money laundering. 
      In doing so, the tribunal shall consider in particular the fundamental principles and public 
order requirements obtaining in international finance, the customs and practices that have 
developed in the international market place, relevant treaty law, and the general principles 
of law that may be found in the operation of advanced domestic financial markets. 
      The tribunal shall be authorised to raise issues of overriding fundamental principle or pub-
lic order autonomously, subject to the rights of parties to equal treatment and a fair hear-
ing. 
      If the parties have expressly authorised the arbitral tribunal to do so, the arbitral tribunal 
shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono in all matters at the free disposi-
tion of the parties.» 
      DALHUISEN’s idea for the explicit authorising of the arbitral tribunal «to raise issues of over-
riding fundamental principle or public order autonomously, subject to the rights of parties 
to equal treatment and a fair hearing» can be accepted. First, it is well balanced, since it 
ensures that the conferred powers do not interfere with the procedural principles of equal 
treatment and a fair hearing. Second, it keeps the international arbitrator’s «action» as wide 
as possible (he or she can «raise» the respective overriding matter), thus leaving him or her 
the opportunity to choose between applying and considering the overriding mandatory rule. 
Third, it contains an unambiguous order on the ex officio character of the international ar-
bitrator’s acting, which resolves the unclarity in that regard. On the other hand, the proposal 
takes too much of the parties’ autonomy away – the latter is one of the core principles in 
international arbitration and, whilst international arbitration dealing with financial transac-
tions is specific, it is not so specific as to justify complete deviation from one of this legal 
procedure’s basic features. In particular, the draft provides for the taking into account (sic), 
instead of (the more intense) applying, of the rules designated by the parties and confers on 
such rules only the role of one, amongst many, equal factors to be considered by the inter-




The suggested new rules would regulate treatment of overriding mandatory 
rules in international arbitration in particular, and that is why the lex specialis 
on the latter – Chapter 12 PILA – is the most appropriate «location» for them.  
More precisely, the new rules could be embedded in the rule of Chapter 12 
PILA which addresses applicable law: first, because their subject matter – 
overriding mandatory rules – would make part of the applicable law in the 
wide sense and, second, because this would bring about consistency in PILA, 
since also Chapter 1 PILA’s rules on overriding mandatory rules (Art. 13, 18 
and 19 PILA) are contained in the chapter’s structural unit which deals with 
applicable law – Sec. 3. Chapter 12 PILA handles applicable law in Art. 187. 
The new conflict of laws rules could be incorporated in new paragraphs of the 
latter. Such proceeding would require the fewest changes to the structure of 
PILA – except that mentioned, no other provision would be modified.       
In particular, a rule on overriding mandatory rules legis causae can be adopted 
as a new sentence added in Art. 187 (1) PILA, a rule on overriding mandatory 
rules of a third law can be adopted in a new Art. 187 (3), and a rule on the 
competition between overriding mandatory rules can be adopted in a new Art. 
187 (4).   
4. What kind of rules 
The rules to be adopted will be conflict of laws rules, since here the conflict 
of laws approach to the problem is considered as most appropriate. 
Then, the new rules will be autonomous rules. Reference rules that refer to the 
conflict of laws rules of Chapter 1 PILA, for example, would be a suboptimal 
solution, since the imperfections of the latter – such as the lack of clarity as to 
whether the second sentence of Art. 13 PILA only excludes the exclusion of 
overriding mandatory rules from the reference to the lex causae on the sole 
–––––––––––––– 
national arbitrator, i.e. a secondary role. The granting of ex officio powers of an interna-
tional arbitrator with regard to the determination of overriding mandatory rules to be ap-
plied or considered should not lead to the taking away from the hands of the parties the 
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basis of their public law character or whether it automatically includes them 
in such reference – would be «inherited». It is true that such reference rules 
could provide that the application be mutatis mutandi, but still the greatest 
legal certainty would be achieved through autonomous rules. With regard to 
the rule on competition between overriding mandatory rules, an autonomous 
rule is anyway the only possibility, for there is no rule to which a reference 
rule could made. 
5. Prototypes   
The new rules on overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and of a third 
law could follow the terminology and the content of Art. 13 and 19 PILA as 
long as the latter are appropriate for the particularities of international arbitra-
tion and constitute good solutions. That would ensure, at the same time, har-
mony with Chapter 1 PILA and preservation of the spirit of Chapter 12 PILA. 
The new rule on competition between overriding mandatory rules could be 
based, inter alia, on SCHNYDER’s rule of reason.  
6. Terminology 
There is difference in the language versions of Art. 187 (1) PILA as to the 
systems of rules possible to be chosen by the parties as applicable – the current 
German and Italian texts refer to «law» («Recht» bzw. «diritto»), while the 
French one refers to «rules of law» («règles de droit»). It would be better to 
synchronise the different translations of Art. 187 (1) PILA and, as a matter of 
fact, the proposal for amendments to PILA’s Chapter 12 which was in consul-
tation from 11 January 2017 until 31 May 2017 includes a step in this direc-
tion; in particular, it embeds the term «rules of law», currently used in the 
French text, into the German and Italian version of Art. 187 (1) PILA. This 
suggestion is supported here, as it is in harmony with the international trend 
towards expanding the circle of norms able to obtain effect in international 
arbitration – in particular the trend towards granting this ability to other norms 
apart from those of national legal orders. Due to the presence of this proposal 
for changes in Art. 187 (1) PILA, each draft proposed here is elaborated in two 
versions – one which, like the current Art. 187 (1) PILA, uses the word «law» 
and one which refers to «rules of law», as if the suggested amendment was 
adopted. However, for the sake of simplicity, the reasoning behind the drafts 
496 
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is explained only in the language of the current Art. 187 (1) PILA (with a 
reference to «law»).  
The draft provisions refer to the law designated «in the first paragraph» of Art. 
187 PILA without mentioning the law designated by the second paragraph, as 
the latter does not designate a law but non-legal concepts (ex aequo et bono). 
7. Sanctions 
Compliance with the new conflict of laws rules would not be sanctioned. An 
arbitral award through which they are violated will not be annullable under 
Art. 190 (2) PILA, as the latter will continue to guard only ordre public.   
II. Content  
1. Rule on overriding mandatory rules legis causae           
Overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae represent a more acute issue in 
international arbitration than in (private international law) state court proceed-
ings. However, like in the latter, they are less problematic than overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law. The most likely reason is the availability of a 
solution –uniform connecting – which, though not conceptually ideal, is prac-
tical, and indeed the majority of authors consider, for example, the overriding 
mandatory rules of the most often type of lex causae – the chosen law – as 
included in the latter471. 
1.1 Draft 
a If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is not substituted with the 
expression «rules of law» 
If in it the word «law» is not substituted with the expression «rules of law», 
for instance, the following sentence could be added to Art. 187 (1) PILA: 
–––––––––––––– 
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«The reference of this paragraph to a law encompasses all rules which, ac-
cording to that law, apply to the facts of the case, including rules of a public 
law character.»472.           
In that case, Art. 187 (1) PILA would read as follows (with the text not for-
matted in italics representing the current Art. 187 (1) PILA):  
«The arbitral tribunal decides the disputed matter according to the law chosen 
by the parties or, in the absence of a choice of law, according to the law with 
which the disputed matter is most closely connected. The reference of this par-
agraph to a law encompasses all rules which, according to that law, apply to 
the facts of the case, including rules of a public law character.». 
b If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is substituted with the ex-
pression «rules of law» 
If Art. 187 is amended to refer to «rules of law» instead of «law», the sentence 
to be added could be reformulated like this: 
«The reference of this paragraph to rules of law encompasses all rules of law 
which belong to the respective legal system and which, according to the latter, 
apply to the facts of the case, including rules of law which have a public law 
character.»473.      
–––––––––––––– 
472 – in German perhaps: «Die Verweisung dieses Absatzes auf ein Recht umfasst alle 
Bestimmungen, die nach diesem Recht auf den Sachverhalt anwendbar sind, einschliesslich 
Bestimmungen, denen ein öffentlich-rechtlicher Charakter zugeschrieben wird.». (The 
adjective «öffentlich-rechtlich» is spelled hyphenated, even if it is not spelled this way in 
the legislative provision used as a model of the here proposed draft – Art. 13 PILA – and 
in some other official Swiss legal acts, for that is the correct spelling according to 
Rechtschreibung, Leitfaden zur deutschen Rechtschreibung, Schweizerische Bundes-
kanzlei, in Absprache mit der Präsidentin der Staatsschreiberkonferenz, 4., aktualisierte 
Auflage 2017, Bundeskanzlei BK.). 
473 – in German something like: «Die Verweisung dieses Absatzes auf Rechtsnormen umfasst 
alle Rechtsnormen, die zu dem jeweiligen Rechtssystem gehören und nach dem letzteren 
auf den Sachverhalt anwendbar sind, einschliesslich Rechtsnormen, denen ein öffentlich-
rechtlicher Charakter zugeschrieben wird.». (With regard to the spelling of the adjective 
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Art. 187 (1) PILA would then read (the first sentence being one already pro-
posed within the current revision of PILA’s Chapter 12):  
«The arbitral tribunal decides the disputed matter according to the rules of 
law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of a choice of law, according to 
the rules of law with which the disputed matter is most closely connected. The 
reference of this paragraph to rules of law encompasses all rules of law which 
belong to the respective legal system and which, according to the latter, apply 
to the facts of the case, including rules of law which have a public law char-
acter.». 
1.2 Uniform connection      
The proposed rule implements the uniform connection, i.e. it includes the over-
riding mandatory rules of the lex causae into the conflict of laws reference to 
the latter. This connection is preferred here, first, because, as concluded in Part 
3 (see e.g. Chapter 13, III.), it is more practical. Second, there are some signs 
of it having been applied to international arbitration. When in Terra armata, 
cons. 2.2.2., fourth paragraph, in fine they give foreign lex causae and third 
law as examples of the law failure in connection to which is not sanctioned by 
Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA, the judges narrow down the example of third law to the 
overriding mandatory rules of such a third law («immediately applicable man-
datory provision of a third state»), whilst they do not do this with the example 
of foreign lex causae. Per argumentum a contrario the governing law meant 
encompasses all rules of such governing law, including its overriding manda-
tory rules, and this is an indication that the Court considers the latter as appli-
cable by virtue of their belongingness to the governing law. The Hague Prin-
ciples on Choice of Law also seem to connect uniformly the overriding 
mandatory rules of the type of lex causae with which they deal – the chosen 
law – when it comes to an arbitration procedure. In their Art. 11 (5), they pro-
vide that they do not prejudice the effect of overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law and do not mention anything on the effect of the overriding manda-
tory rules of the chosen law, which cannot be explained except with an existing 
perception that the overriding mandatory rules of the chosen law are not at risk 
of being prejudiced – most probably because they are already encompassed in 
the choice of law.   
505 
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1.3 Art. 13 PILA as a prototype  
a Corresponding to Art. 13 PILA 
If installing the uniform connection for the overriding mandatory rules of the 
lex causae, the new rule would overtake the content of Art. 13 PILA as under-
stood by the majority of authors. The content of that article’s first sentence 
would be followed entirely. From the second sentence, the term «public law 
character» would be used.    
b Deviating from Art. 13 PILA   
aa. Structure 
The new rule would consist of one sentence, not of two like the rule in Art. 13 
PILA, and would make part of an article that would contain also other rules – 
Art. 187 PILA – rather than be contained in an autonomous provision. 
bb. Inclusion, not only exclusion of automatic exclusion 
The text would be much firmer than Art. 13 PILA on the action of including 
the lex causae’s rules of a public law character, and with this the lex causae’s 
overriding mandatory rules, into the conflict of laws reference to such lex 
causae, i.e. on the construing of a uniform connection. To that end, the ele-
ments of Art. 13 PILA’s text which cause uncertainty as to whether also such 
inclusion of the lex causae’s norms of a public law character or only the ex-
clusion of their automatic exclusion is meant – Art. 13 PILA’s second sentence 
and the verb «exclude» – would be left away.  
cc. Overriding mandatory rules of the proper law, not overriding man-
datory rules of the proper foreign law  
The new rule would deal with the rules of a public law nature of the «proper 
law», not (like Art. 13 PILA) only of the «proper foreign law». The latter pro-
vision needed to shape the destiny only of the norms of a public law character 
of a foreign lex causae, not also those of a non-foreign, i.e. Swiss, lex causae, 
for a Swiss state court to which it is addressed will at any rate follow the latter 
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lex fori of a Swiss state court) and the lex fori’s rules of public law nature are 
obligatory for a Swiss state court. Because, by contrast, a Swiss international 
arbitration court will not apply Swiss rules of a public law character by virtue 
of their capacity as rules of public law nature of the lex fori (a Swiss interna-
tional arbitration court is not bound by such rules), one needs to provide in an 
objective norm for the inclusion of such rules into the reference to a Swiss lex 
causae, if wishing to see them being applied by a Swiss international arbitrator 
who enforces such Swiss lex causae.   
dd. Definition of the scope of the reference to a law of Art. 187 (1) PILA, 
not of the scope of the reference to a law of PILA 
The new rule would define the scope of Art. 187 (1)’s reference to a law, not 
the scope of PILA’s reference to a law, like Art. 13 does. Yet, this «deviation» 
is actually no deviation – it is there by definition, since the rule proposed de-
termines the scope of the reference to a law that applies in international arbi-
tration, and this reference is made namely solely in Art. 187 (1) PILA.   
1.4 No need for a rule on the law governing the consequences of ap-
plying overriding mandatory rules legis causae 
There is no need to add any conflict of laws rule defining the law to govern 
the consequences, both direct and indirect, of the application of the overriding 
mandatory rules of the lex causae, since such law can only be this very same 
lex causae – solely it (and no other lex) seeks and is able to perform this role. 
Besides, when (as here) the lex causae is uniformly connected to, it is most 
logical that the consequences of the application of its overriding mandatory 
rules are defined by it. If such rules are reckoned a part of it, they should be 
treated in the same way as its other rules, i.e. its ordinary rules. Since the latter 
are applied together with the consequences this law envisages for them, also 
its overriding mandatory rules should be applied together with the conse-
quences which it attaches to such overriding mandatory rules. Further, the fact 
that the overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae are applied legitimises 
the attaching to them of the consequences foreseen by this law, for application 
(unlike consideration) represents giving of full effect to rules. In addition, 
since the direct consequences of the application of overriding mandatory rules 
are tightly connected to such overriding mandatory rules, it is most natural that 
510 
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the law containing such overriding mandatory rules governs them and the in-
direct consequences are suitable for being regulated by the lex causae because 
they anyway pose a question for which that lex is responsible – the balance 
between the parties’ individual interests. The EU legislature, for example, ap-
pears to apply the lex causae to the direct consequences of the application of 
an overriding mandatory rule legis causae which renders a contract null: Art. 
12 (1) (e) of Rome I «Scope of the law applicable» provides that «The law 
applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in particular: 
…(e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.» and nullity of a contract 
might follow, amongst others, from application of an overriding mandatory 
rule of the lex causae.              
2. Rule on overriding mandatory rules of a third law 
For international arbitration courts, «third law» would mean a law that is dif-
ferent than the lex causae, and not, as for state courts, a law that is neither the 
lex causae nor the lex fori. That is so because the lex fori has no special status 
in international arbitration. 
As became clear, the effect of overriding mandatory rules of a third law poses 
bigger problems than that of overriding mandatory rules legis causae, and this 
is so also in international arbitration.  
In the past, worldwide (not only in Switzerland) international arbitrators had 
been seen as not obliged to apply the overriding mandatory rules of a third 
law. First, the applicability of such rules had been something rare already for 
state courts and, second, where (as often happened in this type of dispute res-
olution) the lex causae had resulted from parties’ choice, these adjudicators 
had been too much bound by such choice due to the principle in this procedure 
of dominance of the parties’ will. In 1985, however, a decision of the US Su-
preme Court – Mitsubishi Motors Co. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 
(1985) – opened a new reality. It allowed application by an arbitral tribunal of 
a US antitrust mandatory law, even though Swiss law governed the set of facts.  
Nowadays, some authors support the application by international arbitrators 
of mandatory rules of a third law when these rules are strongly connected to 
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in view of the need to ensure the effectiveness of the award, international ar-
bitrators should apply only the mandatory rules of the law at the place of the 
contract’s performance or of the award’s enforcement.474  
It is here sustained that an international arbitrator would need an even stronger 
case than a state judge in order to consider a third law’s overriding mandatory 
rules because he or she is tightly bound to the lex causae when the latter is 
chosen by the parties – which is frequently the case in international arbitration. 
This bindingness is owed to the principle of dominance of the parties’ will 
reigning in this type of legal procedure, which reinforces the idea of interna-
tional arbitrator as a forum tailor-made to the parties and ensuring legal cer-
tainty (it is known from the beginning what law will apply to the contract).   
2.1 Draft 
a If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is not substituted with the 
expression «rules of law» 
The following new (third) paragraph could be added to the current Art. 187 
PILA:  
«Instead of the law which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of another 
law, which rule wants to be applied mandatorily, may be considered when 
(according to a universal perception of law) legitimate and manifestly prepon-
derant interests of a party so require and the facts of the case have a close 
connection with this other law. Whether such a rule is to be considered is de-
cided having regard to its aim and the therefrom resulting consequences for 
an (according to a universal perception of law) appropriate decision. The di-
rect consequences of the consideration of such a rule are to be governed by 
–––––––––––––– 
474 GIRSBERGER/VOSER/COLACINO/DONCHI, 1375 (where «lois d’application immédiate» seems 
to refer to «overriding mandatory rules», i.e. to overriding mandatory rules in general, not, 
as here, only to overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori). 
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this other law and the indirect consequences – by the law designated by para-
graph 1.»475. 
b If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is substituted with the ex-
pression «rules of law» 
If «law» in Art. 187 (1) PILA is substituted with «rules of law», the new, third 
paragraph proposed here to be added to Art. 187 could be formulated:  
«Instead of the legal system which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of 
law of another legal system, which rule of law wants to be applied mandato-
rily, may be considered when (according to a universal perception of law) 
legitimate and manifestly preponderant interests of a party so require and the 
facts of the case have a close connection with this other legal system. Whether 
such a rule of law is to be considered is decided having regard to its aim and 
the therefrom resulting consequences for an (according to a universal percep-
tion of law) appropriate decision. The direct consequences of the considera-
tion of such a rule of law are to be governed by this other legal system and the 
indirect consequences – by the legal system designated by paragraph 1.»476. 
–––––––––––––– 
475 – in German maybe: «Anstelle des Rechts, das durch Absatz 1 bezeichnet wird, kann die 
Bestimmung eines andern Rechts, die zwingend angewandt sein will, berücksichtigt 
werden, wenn nach universeller Rechtsauffassung schützenswerte und offensichtlich 
überwiegende Interessen einer Partei es gebieten und der Sachverhalt mit jenem Recht 
einen engen Zusammenhang aufweist. Ob eine solche Bestimmung zu berücksichtigen ist, 
beurteilt sich nach ihrem Zweck und den daraus sich ergebenden Folgen für eine nach 
universeller Rechtsauffassung sachgerechte Entscheidung. Auf die unmittelbaren 
Rechtsfolgen der Berücksichtigung einer solchen Bestimmung ist dieses andere Recht und 
auf die mittelbaren Rechtsfolgen das durch Absatz 1 bezeichnete Recht anzuwenden.». 
476 – in German something like: «Anstelle des Rechtssystems, das durch Absatz 1 bezeichnet 
wird, kann die Rechtsnorm eines andern Rechtssystems, die zwingend angewandt sein will, 
berücksichtigt werden, wenn nach universeller Rechtsauffassung schützenswerte und 
offensichtlich überwiegende Interessen einer Partei es gebieten und der Sachverhalt mit 
jenem Rechtssystem einen engen Zusammenhang aufweist. Ob eine solche Rechtsnorm zu 
berücksichtigen ist, beurteilt sich nach ihrem Zweck und den daraus sich ergebenden 
Folgen für eine nach universeller Rechtsauffassung sachgerechte Entscheidung. Auf die 
unmittelbaren Rechtsfolgen der Berücksichtigung einer solchen Rechtsnorm ist dieses 
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2.2 Special connection 
The overriding mandatory rules of a third law can be given effect only through 
the special connection. Hence, here the latter is used.  
2.3 Overriding mandatory rules of the different types of third laws 
a Overriding mandatory rules legis fori   
Whether the overriding mandatory rules legis fori are at the same time over-
riding mandatory rules of the lex causae – because lex fori is also lex causae 
– is here not taken into account. Only the consequence of the origination of an 
overriding mandatory rule from the lex fori is examined (the significance of 
the belongingness of such a rule to the lex causae is analysed at another place 
– when dealing with overriding mandatory rules legis causae). 
aa. Lack of preferential treatment  
Overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori – here of Swiss law – cannot have 
the same role for international arbitration as for state courts; international ar-
bitration is not bound to protect the legal order of the seat as the latter are. 
When doing so, an international arbitrator would consider the overriding man-
datory rules of the lex fori not as a measure of protection of the latter but as 
part of his or her task to resolve the dispute – this task would simply include, 
amongst others, the finding of the relevant law477. For such an adjudicator, the 
overriding mandatory rules of his or her lex fori are as much overriding man-
datory as the overriding mandatory rules of any other law which is not lex 
causae, i.e. of any third law. He or she would treat a conflict between the over-
riding mandatory rules of the lex fori and the overriding mandatory rules of 
another law which is not the lex causae as if it were a conflict between the 
overriding mandatory rules of any two laws which are not the lex causae, i.e. 
–––––––––––––– 
andere Rechtssystem und auf die mittelbaren das durch Absatz 1 bezeichnete Rechtssystem 
anzuwenden.». 
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of any two third laws478. That is different than the situation in state court pro-
ceedings, where Art. 18 PILA would cause the overriding mandatory rules of 
the lex fori to override the overriding mandatory rules of another law which is 
not the lex causae, even to override the overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
causae. International arbitration simply lacks substantive law, conceptual and 
often factual nexus to the seat. The absence of a substantive law connection is 
visible, amongst others, from interpretation per argumentum a fortiori of Art. 
190 (2) (e) PILA. This article confers no special protection to the Swiss ordre 
public (it does not speak of «Swiss ordre public» as Art. 17 PILA but of «ordre 
public»). If even the Swiss ordre public does not enjoy special protection, the 
Swiss overriding mandatory rules must also not, since its ordre public is even 
more paramount to Switzerland than its overriding mandatory rules (an a for-
tiori argument). An international arbitration will be close to the law of the seat 
only with regard to procedural and conflict of laws issues479. As to the insuf-
ficient conceptual nexus of the international arbitration to the seat, the idea of 
international arbitration is to be a forum that is as distant as possible from state 
legal orders, including from the state legal order of the seat. Last but not least, 
often the case will not reveal even a factual relation to the seat, as the latter 
will have been appointed as such due to its neutrality. 
A position that international arbitration is distant from the lex fori is taken also 
in the literature. For instance, SCHNYDER, when discussing market regulatory 
law, underlines that the seat gives a procedural and conflict of laws frame to 
the arbitration, without bringing with itself necessity for the observance of the 
market regulatory law of the lex fori480. In order to apply in international arbi-
tration, the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori would have to prove 
separately, as the overriding mandatory rules of any other third law would 
have to, that they are overriding mandatory and connected to the case. KAR-
RER, similarly, points out that the Swiss ordre public rules (which he under-
stands as equal to overriding mandatory rules) could be applied or considered 
–––––––––––––– 
478 Also SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 321; 
KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 258. 
479 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 316. 
480 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 316, 317. 
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by a Swiss arbitrator not by virtue of them belonging to the lex fori arbitri, in 
particular not by virtue of Art. 18 PILA, but only through applying by analogy 
to international arbitration the rule that deals with overriding mandatory rules 
of a third law – Art. 19 PILA481. 
bb. Some consequences of the lack of preferential treatment 
The consequences of the lack of preferential treatment of overriding manda-
tory rules legis fori in international arbitration are the following.  
No control for compliance with lex fori 
For an international arbitrator, the overriding mandatory law of the forum will 
not constitute any barrier to the application or consideration of the overriding 
mandatory law of another state – such application or consideration will be pro-
ceeded to also where this overriding mandatory law of another state contra-
dicts with the overriding mandatory law of the forum. In comparison, a state 
court would have to prefer the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori482.   
No substitution with lex fori in case of contravention of the lex causae with 
ordre public  
Due to the lack of connection of the international arbitration to the substantive 
lex fori arbitri, one can agree with KARRER that in case of contradiction of the 
result following from the application of Art. 187 PILA with the negative ordre 
public, a Swiss international arbitral tribunal does not have to apply Swiss law 
(but the law with the closest connection to the case) as a substitution483. 
–––––––––––––– 
481 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 258. 
482 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 258, last sentence. See also CHRISTEN, 22. 
483 KARRER, BSK IPRG, Art. 187 N 229. However, KARRER’s position that this solution is 
contrary to that in cipher 214.52 of the dispatch on the PILA (in German: Botschaft IPRG) 
is here not agreed with. The latter dealt with the application of ordre public in state court 
proceedings, and not in arbitration. Neither were arbitration courts explicitly mentioned, 
and nor does the article discussed – Art. 16 at that time, nowadays Art. 17 PILA – on the 
reservation of Swiss ordre public apply directly in international arbitration. It can also be 




Chapter 23: New rules in Chapter 12 PILA 
 
239 
Not «lois d’application immédiate» 
That they do not prevail over the overriding mandatory rules of other laws, 
like the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori imperi do, means that the 
overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori arbitri cannot be called «lois d’ap-
plication immédiate», as the latter are. 
Not a separate category of overriding mandatory rules 
Since an international arbitrator will view them as equal to the overriding man-
datory rules of any other third law, and not, like a state judge, as an alternative 
(together with the overriding mandatory rules legis causae) of the overriding 
mandatory rules of such other third law, the overriding mandatory rules legis 
fori in international arbitration will make part of the overriding mandatory 
rules of a third law, and will not represent a separate category. That is why 
they are considered here under the heading «overriding mandatory rules of a 
third law», and not under a separate structural unit equally footed to «overrid-
ing mandatory rules of a third law» as in the literature on state courts. In fact, 
the practice and doctrine on international arbitration often confer special space 
to overriding mandatory rules legis fori, but that is in order to explain that they 
do not represent a separate category. 
If, for an international arbitrator, overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori 
arbitri are not a separate class, then only two categories remain to be relevant 
for him or her: overriding mandatory rules of the lex causae and overriding 
mandatory rules of a law other than the lex causae (overriding mandatory rules 
–––––––––––––– 
the parties (Art. 187 (1) PILA, first suggestion) or that which was objectively connected to 
(Art. 187 (1) PILA, second suggestion) or both. It can be supposed that he considers the lex 
causae which results from a choice of law because what he suggests for the case of contra-
diction between such lex causae and the negative ordre public is that the arbitrator applies 
the law most closely connected to the case, which, in fact, is the action envisaged by the 
second suggestion of Art. 187 (1) PILA, and the law that one proposes as a substitution 
must be different than the law that is to be substituted. If this is so, i.e. if KARRER really 
meant only the lex causae which has been chosen by the parties, the question remains as to 
which law should substitute the lex causae defined through the objective connection where 
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of a third law)484. At first sight, it seems inappropriate to call the overriding 
mandatory rules of a law that is not the lex causae «overriding mandatory rules 
of a third law»; there are two, not three, relevant categories, so in literal terms 
it would be a «second» law (hence «overriding mandatory rules of a second 
law»). However, in technical legal language, «third» can mean «another, dif-
ferent, any other» instead of «one that follows two others»485 486. 
b Overriding mandatory rules of the place of the contract’s perfor-
mance 
The fact that overriding mandatory rules make part of the law which is in force 
at the place of the contract’s performance can indirectly facilitate the effect 
within international arbitration of such overriding mandatory rules because it 
constitutes or at least brings about the connection required by the new rule for 
the giving of effect to such rules – namely the connection between these over-
riding mandatory rules and the case. However, the other criteria for the giving 
of the effect will need to be proven separately, including the criterion that the 
here mentioned (established) connection is close.    
In England, the overriding mandatory rules that belong to the law of the place 
of performance enjoy a special status – thanks to the Ralli rule, under which 
an infringement of the rules, except for revenue and fiscal rules, of such law 
lead to unenforceability of the contract.   
c Overriding mandatory rules of the law of the place of the arbitral 
award’s enforcement 
–––––––––––––– 
484 Also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94 (equally prompted by the loose, simpliciter proce-
dural, nexus of the international arbitration to the seat) see dualism in the perception of an 
international arbitrator – the latter had «only two possible sources of mandatory rules: the 
lex causae and third legal systems (which includes the lex fori)». 
485 For instance, when, within the context of property law, it is said that a «third party» may not 
prevent the owner from exercising certain rights with regard to the property, any other (than 
the owner) party, and not a party which is third next to the owner and some other party, is 
meant. 
486 Also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.94 use the word «third» when talking about two cate-
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The place of the arbitral award’s enforcement is a concept different than the 
place of the seat of the international arbitration. Enforcement can, but must 
not, be sought in the seat. In the seat the award is directly enforceable and the 
question of enforcement is hardly posed.  
Formally, an international arbitrator does not have to consider the overriding 
mandatory rules of the place of the award’s enforcement. Firstly, the legal ef-
fect of the award does not depend on its enforcement because the parties can 
implement it voluntarily. Second, the law of enforcement is not necessarily 
connected to the merits of the case, as when deciding in which country to en-
force the award, the (winning) party looks at where the losing party’s assets 
are located without searching for the country whose law relates the most to the 
case’s substance (anyway already ruled upon). Third, compliance with the 
overriding mandatory rules of the state in which enforcement is asked rarely 
constitutes a ground for refusal of enforcement – rather the ordre public does 
(Art. V (2) (b) New York Convention). Fourth, even if they want to consider 
the overriding mandatory rules of the place of enforcement, international arbi-
trators are often not able to do so, since at the time of adjudicating they do not 
know which those overriding mandatory rules are, as the place of enforcement 
is not yet known. In the world of today’s globalised business, especially finan-
cial business, the assets of debtors are frequently situated in various countries 
around the globe, and the creditors’ choices of state in which to enforce are 
not easily predictable. Even if an international arbitrator manages to read some 
intention in the creditor’s actions during the procedure, there is no guarantee 
that this intention will not change after the procedure finishes.  
d Overriding mandatory rules of the law of a party’s incorporation   
The belonging of overriding mandatory rules to the law under which a party 
to the dispute is organised cannot in itself ensure the consideration of those 
rules. Similarly to the belonging of overriding mandatory rules to the law of 
the place of the contract’s performance, it can only fulfil or contribute to the 
fulfilling of one of the several requirements for such consideration – namely 
the connection between the overriding mandatory rules and the case. In ICC 
Case No. 1512 (YCA, Vol. V, 1980, 170ff.), the arbitral panel refused to con-
sider a Pakistani law declaring payments to Indian parties illegal which was 
relied on by a Pakistani bank that had refused to pay under a guarantee it had 
532 
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issued to an Indian party under Indian law. Most probably the international 
arbitrators saw this law under which one of the parties was organised as an 
overriding mandatory law but also as a subjective political demonstration of 
hostility which they could not support – the law was enacted within a series of 
acts adopted by India and Pakistan after deterioration in their relations – i.e. in 
this case the quality of the overriding mandatory law (if one accepted that this 
law was overriding mandatory law) as a law of one of the parties was not 
enough to trigger its consideration.  
e Overriding mandatory rules of the law that would have been ap-
plicable if there was no choice of law             
Considering the overriding mandatory rules of the law that would have applied 
(had no choice of law been made) could be important for counteracting parties’ 
attempts to evade such rules. Such overriding mandatory rules would fulfil the 
criterion of being connected to the case because the conflict of laws rule that 
determines the law applicable in the absence of a choice law would not have 
determined the law to which they belong as applicable, if the latter was not 
related to the case. However, a question remains whether such a connection 
will be the closest connection. 
f Connected in other way 
The enumeration of types of third laws whose overriding mandatory rules may 
be considered is exemplaric. The overriding mandatory rules of laws con-
nected to the case in any other way can be considered too.  
g Conclusion 
For Swiss international arbitration courts, the exact origin of the third overrid-
ing mandatory rules is not decisive. It is relevant only insofar as it reveals a 
certain connection (of such rules) to the merits of the case, but it does not 
ensure the meeting of the rest of the criteria for consideration of such rules. So 
far, the situation for international arbitration courts is the same as that for state 
courts. The difference is that international arbitration courts do not, like state 
courts, confer special status to the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori 
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2.4 Art. 19 PILA as a prototype  
a Corresponding to Art. 19 PILA 
The language and content of Art. 19 PILA are followed (which is overtaken 
generally but not completely). The controversial requirement of the German 
and Italian translation that the interests touched upon be those «of a party» is 
preserved. Kept is also the act of consideration (as opposed to application). 
The presence of this lighter form of giving effect to the third law’s overriding 
mandatory rules is even more important for an international arbitrator than for 
a state judge because the international arbitrator can barely afford themselves 
to deviate from the lex causae. 
b Deviating from Art. 19 PILA  
aa. Structure 
The proposed rule differs from the rule in Art. 19 PILA in that it is structured 
in one paragraph, instead of two paragraphs. In this way, the rule is kept com-
pact and the treatment of overriding mandatory rules of a third law is more 
clearly separated from the treatment of other issues in Art. 187 PILA. 
bb. Overriding mandatory rules of a third law, not overriding manda-
tory rules of a third foreign law 
The term «foreign» from Art. 19 PILA’s title is not mentioned in order that 
the new rule covers not only the overriding mandatory rules of a foreign third 
law but the overriding mandatory rules of any third law, i.e. also the overriding 
mandatory rules of the domestic law which is the lex fori. The goal is to ensure 
that the latter are treated equally with the overriding mandatory rules of a for-
eign third law, as this is appropriate in an international arbitration procedure. 
cc. Universal instead of Swiss perception of law 
It seems unacceptable that in international arbitration the conditions for the 
consideration of a third law’s overriding mandatory rules – the legitimacy and 
manifest preponderance of a party’s interests in such consideration and the 
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the «Swiss perception of law» (Art. 19 PILA)487. International arbitration is 
too distant, in a substantive aspect, from the national legal order of the (here 
Swiss) seat488 to evaluate such substantive criteria through the perception of 
law of that legal order.   
The question is what the substitution for the Swiss perception of law in the 
new rule should be and should there be substitution at all. Natural substitutions 
seem to be the perceptions of law of the other involved laws apart from the 
Swiss lex fori – the third law the consideration of whose overriding mandatory 
rules is being contemplated and the lex causae. However, the perceptions of 
law of these laws are unfit. The third law is arguably biased: since (through 
the overriding mandatory rules whose consideration is being thought of) it pro-
tects them, it will always deem the concerned interests legitimate and mani-
festly preponderant and the decision appropriate. Having the governing law as 
a starting point is suboptimal because this law might see the interests as legit-
imate and manifestly preponderant and the decision as appropriate too rarely 
because the interests are protected by a law other than it – a third law. Besides, 
relying on the lex causae’s perception of law might too much resemble the 
material law approach which is, in fact, not undertaken here. The most suitable 
solution is to use some universal perception of law. The latter will correspond 
to the universal mindset of international arbitration. Such universal perception 
of law might sometimes be influenced by the perception of law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the international arbitrator was educated, since it is natural for 
them to look from the perspective of the law which they were trained in, but 
that will not be so detrimental – and anyway, this probability will have been, 
or at least will have had to have been, predicted by the parties (who nominated 
the international arbitrators). The last option would be to allow the interna-
tional arbitrator to choose completely on their own the premise from which to 
make the evaluation. That can be achieved through omitting to specify in the 
–––––––––––––– 
487 KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI, 7.98 and the authors referred to by them also consider that 
within application of Art. 19 PILA to international arbitration there should be adaptation of 
that article’s Swiss law perspective. 
488 The already-cited SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch 
Schiedsgerichte, 315, 316; MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 19 N 28; CHRISTEN, 20 
and the references in fn. 109 thereof. 
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new rule the perception of which law is to be used. However, that solution 
would most probably produce the same result as the solution of providing for 
a universal perception of law because after, for the reasons stated above, the 
international arbitrator does not find help in the lex causae or the third law, he 
or she would most likely turn to this universal perception of law. 
2.5 Rule on the law governing the consequences of considering over-
riding mandatory rules of a third law 
Unlike the determination of the law applicable to the consequences of the giv-
ing effect to the overriding mandatory rules legis causae, determination of the 
law applicable to the consequences of the giving effect to the overriding man-
datory rules of a third law is difficult since more than one law, in particular the 
third law and the lex causae, might show willingness to regulate – there is a 
conflict of laws. For instance, where an insurance contract is submitted to 
Swiss law and Spanish law’s requirements for the registration of the insurance 
company are considered in their capacity of a third overriding mandatory law, 
the question is raised whether Spanish law which envisages voidance of the 
contract or Swiss law which does not foresee such voidance (but only an ad-
ministrative sanction) should be applied to the consequences of such consid-
eration489. 
a Law governing the direct consequences  
There are the following positions which one may take in this respect.  
aa. No need of a rule because of adjudicator’s discretion within «consid-
eration» 
For some, the fact that Art. 19 PILA provides for the overriding mandatory 
rule to be «considered» means that the judge can decide what consequences to 
draw from such an overriding mandatory rule (e.g. partial nullity of the con-
tract, suspension of the performance, etc.), and such discretion includes the 
determination of law that governs them (one must have drawn them from some 
–––––––––––––– 
489 See SCHNYDER, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 279, fn. 24 giving an example with Art. 6 (1) of 
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law490). Indeed, the term «consideration» features a nuance of discretion. The 
providing in Art. 19 (2) PILA that the consequences of the consideration for 
the just resolution of the dispute be evaluated does not hinder such interpreta-
tion, since this evaluating implies that the consequences have already been 
identified (one cannot appreciate something one is not familiar with), which 
presupposes that the consequences have been extracted from some law, and 
this on its part means that such a law has already been determined (by the 
evaluator, i.e. adjudicator). If this logic is followed, the new rule would not 
need to determine expressly the law that governs the direct consequences of 
the consideration it prescribes.  
bb. Law to be defined by the international arbitrator 
One can also expressly delegate the determination of the law to govern the 
direct consequences of the consideration to the international arbitrator through 
embedding in the new rule a sentence such as «The arbitrator applies to the 
direct consequences of such consideration the law which they view as appro-
priate.». 
cc. Law of the overriding mandatory rules 
Being direct, the consequences in question are so closely connected to the con-
sidered overriding mandatory rule that not applying to them the law of the 
latter would be equal to leaving its consideration unfinished. Separating a rule 
from the direct consequences of its consideration by submitting those to a law 
different than the law to which it is submitted would be somehow unnatural. 
Other authors also make a similar point, admittedly with regard to the direct 
consequences of an overriding mandatory rule of the lex fori, but their reason-
ing can be relied on since it is also about closeness between the overriding 
mandatory rule and its direct consequences. MOSCHER (agreed with by 
VOSER) states that the overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori can be catered 
–––––––––––––– 
490 MÄCHLER-ERNE/WOLF-METTIER, Art. 19 N 32, 33. Also VOSER, Lois d’application immédi-
ate, 272, first paragraph underlines that the act of consideration referred to in Art. 19 PILA 
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for only when the lex fori’s «ideas about law» come to a breakthrough also in 
the legal effect of the overriding mandatory rules on the private law relation-
ship491. For VOSER, prohibitions with criminal sanctions show particularly 
clearly «the close connection between the overriding order and the legal con-
sequence» since it would be contrary to the unity of the legal order if the con-
tract’s conclusion or content is subjected to the Swiss lex fori’s public criminal 
law sanctions while its civil law consequences – to the lex causae492. Also, 
SCHNYDER believes that the direct consequences of the application of an over-
riding mandatory rule of the lex fori for the private law relation should be taken 
from that rule, in particular from its wording or through its interpretation493. 
Second, the lex causae might not at all regulate the consequences of the con-
sideration of the third law’s overriding mandatory rule. If, for example, it does 
not contain a rule dealing with a topic similar to that which the third overriding 
mandatory rule addresses, it might not need, and thus not contain, such regu-
lation. 
Last but not least, applying to the direct consequences of the consideration of 
an overriding mandatory rule a law different than the law having issued such 
an overriding mandatory rule might lead to contradictions, since the conse-
quences envisaged by this other law might be incompatible with the logic of 
the law author of the overriding mandatory rule. 
dd. Lex causae 
Lex causae is the law that reigns over the relationship between the parties, and 
that law is fit for regulating effects on this relationship, such as direct conse-
quences of the consideration of overriding mandatory rules. It is true that, due 
to being direct, these consequences are closely related to the overriding man-
datory rules and thus to the public law interest protected by these, but they will 
still occur within the private law relation between the parties.  
–––––––––––––– 
491 MORSCHER, 93, fn. 43 and VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 273 (own translation from 
German). 
492 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 273 (in fine), 274 (in initio). 
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Second, it might be more suitable for the nature of the consideration of the 
third overriding mandatory rules as an exception to the application of the lex 
causae if the lex causae governs the direct consequences of such considera-
tion. Exceptions are to be interpreted and applied restrictively – only within 
the necessary minimum – so that the giving of effect to the third law here 
should remain within what is necessary494, which is the considering of this 
third law’s overriding mandatory rules, but not also the following of this third 
law’s view on the consequences (be them the direct ones) of such considering.  
Third, the direct consequences foreseen by the third law might be irreconcila-
ble with the rules of the lex causae regarding other questions of the relation-
ship495. For instance, in criminal law, where the consequences are very strict, 
this might be very detrimental to the parties. 
ee. Conclusion 
There is no unambiguous answer to the question of which law should be ap-
plied to the direct consequences of the consideration of a third law’s overriding 
mandatory rule. Here the following reasoning is applied in order to make the 
(difficult) choice. Even if one can accept that the act of considering (instead 
of applying) the third law’s overriding mandatory rule entails empowerment 
of the adjudicator to define the law applicable to the consequences of such 
considering, this empowerment does not ensure the predictability that an ex-
plicit rule would ensure, which is why the latter is opted for here. Such a rule 
better confers competence to regulate to the law to which the overriding man-
datory rule (being considered) belongs, since the concerned consequences – 
direct consequences – are too closely connected to this rule for one to subject 
them to a law other than the law of the latter.     
b Law governing the indirect consequences 
aa. No need of a rule due to adjudicator’s discretion within «considera-
tion»  
–––––––––––––– 
494 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 273 with regard to overriding mandatory rules of the 
state forum. 
495 In this sense also VOSER, Lois d’application immediate, 273. 
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The theory discussed above (that the verb «to consider» delegates to the adju-
dicator the determination of the law governing the direct consequences of the 
consideration of a third law’s overriding mandatory rule) would be valid also 
for an adjudicator’s empowerment to determine the law applicable to the indi-
rect consequences of such consideration because the argumentation was de-
rived from the semantics of the verb «to consider», and not from the type of 
the concerned consequences. Hence, also here, the result of this logic is the 
lack of need of an explicit rule on the law to apply to the indirect consequences 
of the consideration of a third law’s overriding mandatory rule.  
bb. Law to be defined by the international arbitrator 
As in the case of direct consequences, there is the possibility to install a rule 
that entrusts the international arbitrator with deciding which law should be 
applied to the indirect consequences. An analogical (to that above) sentence 
could be drafted: «The arbitrator applies to the indirect consequences of such 
consideration the law which they view as appropriate.». 
cc. Law of the overriding mandatory rules 
Even though with less intensity (because the indirect consequences of the con-
sideration of an overriding mandatory rule are not as tightly connected to the 
latter as the direct consequences), the argument made above in respect of the 
direct consequences – that it is not good to split the consequences of a rule and 
such rule through submitting them to different laws – can be tried also here.  
Then, the law of an overriding mandatory rule is certain to envisage suitable 
consequences for the consideration of this rule because it contains the latter 
whilst the lex causae is not – this lex might not even treat the matter addressed 
by the third overriding mandatory rule at all.   
dd. Lex causae 
Applying the lex causae to the indirect consequences of the consideration of 
overriding mandatory rules of a third law would be most natural because these 
consequences are not closely connected to such rules so that their distancing 
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VOSER seems to deem the little closeness of indirect consequences to overrid-
ing mandatory rules as one of the heaviest arguments in favour of applicability 
of the lex causae to such consequences496.  
Then, since the indirect consequences concern the balance between the indi-
vidual interests of the parties to the contract and the main task of the lex causae 
is to ensure this balance, it would be legitimate to apply the latter to such con-
sequences497.  
Next, as it was for the direct consequences, the application of the lex causae 
to the indirect consequences of the consideration of overriding mandatory 
rules will conform with the exceptional nature of that consideration498. In fact, 
this argument has even greater strength in the case of indirect consequences – 
the latter are less connected to the third law’s overriding mandatory rule, so it 
is even more certain that applying this rule’s law to them would go beyond the 
narrow scope of exceptional giving of effect to a third law.       
Further, potential contradictions between the consequences that the third law 
attaches to its overriding mandatory rule and the lex causae’s solutions regard-
ing other matters of the relationship would be avoided.    
Last but not least, the consideration of overriding mandatory law has an effect 
which is less intense than the application of it, which implies less bindingness 
of the adjudicator to it, including to the indirect consequences it envisages.  
ee. Conclusion 
Though also here there is no indisputable winner, the conflict between the laws 
seeking to govern the indirect consequences of the consideration of a third 
law’s overriding mandatory rules is easier to resolve than the conflict between 
laws that want to regulate the direct consequences. As it was with the latter, it 
would not support legal certainty to leave the international arbitrator to decide. 
–––––––––––––– 
496 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 278. 
497 VOSER, Lois d’application immédiate, 278 (with regard to lois d’application immédiate in 
litigation). 
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On the other hand, since the indirect consequences of the consideration of a 
third overriding mandatory rule are not so closely related to that rule, the need 
to apply the law of the latter is not so great as for the principal regulatory 
competence of the lex causae to be deviated from and, besides, the latter deals 
with the balance between the parties’ individual interests, which is exactly 
what these indirect consequences concern. In other words, lex causae is here 
the «winner» of the competition. 
3. Rule on competition between overriding mandatory rules 
3.1 Draft 
a If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is not substituted with the 
expression «rules of law»  
The following rule dealing with the competition between the overriding man-
datory rules of different laws could be added as a new Art. 187 (4) PILA:  
«Where rules of different laws want to apply mandatorily, each of these rules 
is to be applied or considered with regard to those of the facts of the case 
which are situated within the territory of the law to which such a rule belongs. 
If such territorial limitation is not possible, the rule to be applied or consid-
ered is that which belongs to the law most closely connected to the facts of the 
case, whose aim is the worthiest of protection and whose application or con-
sideration would lead to (according to a universal perception of law) the most 
appropriate decision. If such a rule cannot be determined among all these 
rules, to the extent possible, all these rules are to be applied and/or consid-
ered. The third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the 
consideration of the rule of a law other than the law which is designated by 
paragraph 1.»499.  
–––––––––––––– 
499 – in German perhaps: «Wenn Bestimmungen verschiedener Rechte zwingend angewandt sein 
wollen, ist jede von ihnen auf diejenigen Tatbestände anzuwenden oder im Zusammenhang 
mit denjenigen Tatbeständen zu berücksichtigen, die im Hoheitsgebiet des Rechts, zu dem  
eine solche Bestimmung gehört, gelegen sind. Falls eine solche territoriale Beschränkung 
nicht möglich ist, ist diejenige Bestimmung anzuwenden oder zu berücksichtigen, die zu 
563 
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b If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is substituted with the ex-
pression «rules of law» 
In case the proposal for amending in Art. 187 PILA «law» to «rules of law» is 
adopted, the example of a new rule would read as follows: 
«Where rules of law of different legal systems want to apply mandatorily, each 
of these rules of law is to be applied or considered with regard to those of the 
facts of the case which are situated within the territory of the legal system to 
which such a rule of law belongs. If such territorial limitation is not possible, 
the rule of law to be applied or considered is that which belongs to the legal 
system most closely connected to the facts of the case, whose aim is the wor-
thiest of protection and whose application or consideration would lead to (ac-
cording to a universal perception of law) the most appropriate decision. If 
such a rule of law cannot be determined among all these rules of law, to the 
extent possible, all these rules of law are to be applied and/or considered. The 
third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the consideration 
of the rule of law of a legal system other than the legal system which is desig-
nated by paragraph 1.»500. 
–––––––––––––– 
dem Recht, das den engsten Zusammenhang mit dem Sachverhalt aufweist, gehört, deren 
Zweck am schützenswertesten ist und deren Anwendung oder Berücksichtigung die nach 
universeller Rechtsauffassung angemessenste Entscheidung zur Folge hat. Falls eine 
solche Bestimmung unter allen diesen Bestimmungen nicht ausfindig gemacht werden kann, 
sind, soweit möglich, alle diese Bestimmungen anzuwenden und/oder zu berücksichtigen. 
Der dritte Satz des Absatzes 3 ist auf die Folgen der Berücksichtigung der Bestimmung 
eines anderen als des durch Absatz 1 bezeichneten Rechts anzuwenden.». 
500 – in German something like: «Wenn Rechtsnormen verschiedener Rechtssysteme zwingend 
angewandt sein wollen, ist jede von ihnen auf diejenigen Tatbestände anzuwenden oder im 
Zusammenhang mit denjenigen Tatbeständen zu berücksichtigen, die im Hoheitsgebiet des 
Rechtssystems, zu dem eine solche Rechtsnorm gehört, gelegen sind. Falls eine solche 
territoriale Beschränkung nicht möglich ist, ist diejenige Rechtsnorm anzuwenden oder zu 
berücksichtigen, die zu dem Rechtssystem, das den engsten Zusammenhang mit dem 
Sachverhalt aufweist, gehört, deren Zweck am schützenswertesten ist und deren 
Anwendung oder Berücksichtigung die nach universeller Rechtsauffassung angemessenste 
Entscheidung zur Folge hat. Falls eine solche Rechtsnorm unter allen diesen Rechtsnormen 
nicht ausfindig gemacht werden kann, sind, soweit möglich, alle diese Rechtsnormen 
564 
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3.2 Preservation of «capabilities» and case-by-case evaluation 
The proposed rule is based on the idea that in a conflict with the overriding 
mandatory rule of another law, the respective overriding mandatory rule pre-
serves its «capabilities» (e.g. the overriding mandatory rule of a third law 
keeps on being capable of being considered even if it contradicts an overriding 
mandatory rule legis causae which is to be applied (not only considered)), and 
its effect is defined according to the concrete situation.  
3.3 The three solutions in the rule 
SCHNYDER’s rule of reason501 is taken as a model for the rule proposed here. 
The limitation of the legal effects of a competing overriding mandatory rule to 
the territory of the state which is its author, as proposed by SCHNYDER502, is a 
good solution503. It conforms with the international public law’s principle that 
the jurisdiction of each state is limited to the latter’s territory. However, it is 
here considered that it is in fact not a solution to a problem of competition (but 
to a problem of something else) because in that case no competition exists – 
the effect of each overriding mandatory rule remains within the respective ter-
ritory and the rules do not clash with each other. 
Another suggestion of SCHNYDER – to look for the overriding mandatory rule 
which is worthiest of protection where it is impossible to separate the effects 
of the overriding mandatory rules territorially – is also adopted here. The draft 
rule sets concrete criteria which in effect represent namely criteria for defining 
which overriding mandatory rule is worthiest of being protected. The criteria 
–––––––––––––– 
anzuwenden und/oder zu berücksichtigen. Der dritte Satz des Absatzes 3 ist auf die Folgen 
der Berücksichtigung der Rechtsnorm eines anderen als des durch Absatz 1 bezeichneten 
Rechtssystems anzuwenden.». 
501 See SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 322, 
323. 
502 SCHNYDER, Anwendung ausländischer Eingriffsnormen durch Schiedsgerichte, 322, 323. 
503 – employed e.g. in Morris Rothmans (WuW/E OLG 3051ff.) where the court applied the 
competition law of the forum only to the facts of the case which evolved in the forum’s 
territory (which allowed it to accommodate to a certain extent competing interests of a for-
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used are almost identical to the criteria used for the determination of whether 
an overriding mandatory rule of a third law deserves to be considered – only 
the legitimacy and manifest preponderance of a party’s interests which such 
an overriding mandatory rule seeks to protect is omitted, but this is because 
anyway all competing overriding mandatory rules would fulfil this criterion, 
hence, the latter would not help in defining which overriding mandatory rule 
is to be applied or considered. 
The last proposal of SCHNYDER – the cumulative connection – is also legiti-
mate. Yet (as SCHNYDER also seems to mean) it is appropriate as a last resort. 
First, in some situations this connection might be impossible, since the rules 
in question might contain contradictory orders (hence, the phrase «to the extent 
possible» in the rule’s draft here). Second, such a connection is quite burden-
some for the parties, for many rules would be considered504 – whilst it would 
sometimes result in the strictest rule imposing itself, as stated by SCHNYDER, 
that might not always be the case, and more (than one) rules might be applica-
ble at once. Hence, the cumulative connecting of all competing overriding 
mandatory rules is here proposed as a method to be employed solely if the two 
previous approaches are not fruitful. 
4. Summary            
4.1 Summary of the drafts 
a If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is not substituted with the 
expression «rules of law» 
aa. New rules  
The following new sentence in Art. 187 (1) PILA:  
–––––––––––––– 
504 Though, on the other hand, the probability of need to comply with the (overriding manda-
tory) rules of various jurisdictions is inherent in the conclusion of international transactions, 
especially international financial transactions, which such parties voluntarily step into. 
569 
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«The reference of this paragraph to a law encompasses all rules which, ac-
cording to that law, apply to the facts of the case, including rules of a public 
law character.». 
The following new Art. 187 (3) PILA:  
«Instead of the law which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of another 
law, which rule wants to be applied mandatorily, may be considered when 
(according to a universal perception of law) legitimate and manifestly prepon-
derant interests of a party so require and the facts of the case have a close 
connection with this other law. Whether such a rule is to be considered is de-
cided having regard to its aim and the therefrom resulting consequences for 
an (according to a universal perception of law) appropriate decision. The di-
rect consequences of the consideration of such a rule are to be governed by 
this other law and the indirect consequences – by the law designated by para-
graph 1.».  
The following new Art. 187 (4) PILA:  
«Where rules of different laws want to apply mandatorily, each of these rules 
is to be applied or considered with regard to those of the facts of the case 
which are situated within the territory of the law to which such a rule belongs. 
If such territorial limitation is not possible, the rule to be applied or consid-
ered is that which belongs to the law most closely connected to the facts of the 
case, whose aim is the worthiest of protection and whose application or con-
sideration would lead to (according to a universal perception of law) the most 
appropriate decision. If such a rule cannot be determined among all these 
rules, to the extent possible, all these rules are to be applied and/or consid-
ered. The third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the 
consideration of the rule of a law other than the law which is designated by 
paragraph 1.».  
bb. How the whole Art. 187 PILA would look 
(The text not formatted in italics is the current Art. 187 (1) PILA.) 
«(1) The arbitral tribunal decides the disputed matter according to the law cho-
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with which the disputed matter is most closely connected. The reference of this 
paragraph to a law encompasses all rules which, according to that law, apply 
to the facts of the case, including rules of a public law character. 
(2) The parties may authorise the arbitral tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono. 
(3) Instead of the law which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of another 
law, which rule wants to be applied mandatorily, may be considered when 
(according to a universal perception of law) legitimate and manifestly prepon-
derant interests of a party so require and the facts of the case have a close 
connection with this other law. Whether such a rule is to be considered is de-
cided having regard to its aim and the therefrom resulting consequences for 
an (according to a universal perception of law) appropriate decision. The di-
rect consequences of the consideration of such a rule are to be governed by 
this other law and the indirect consequences – by the law designated by para-
graph 1. 
(4) Where rules of different laws want to apply mandatorily, each of these rules 
is to be applied or considered with regard to those of the facts of the case 
which are situated within the territory of the law to which such a rule belongs. 
If such territorial limitation is not possible, the rule to be applied or consid-
ered is that which belongs to the law most closely connected to the facts of the 
case, whose aim is the worthiest of protection and whose application or con-
sideration would lead to (according to a universal perception of law) the most 
appropriate decision. If such a rule cannot be determined among all these 
rules, to the extent possible, all these rules are to be applied and/or consid-
ered. The third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the 
consideration of the rule of a law other than the law which is designated by 
paragraph 1.».  
b If in Art. 187 (1) PILA the word «law» is substituted with the ex-
pression «rules of law» 
aa. New rules 
The following new sentence in Art. 187 (1) PILA:  574 
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«The reference of this paragraph to rules of law encompasses all rules of law 
which belong to the respective legal system and which, according to the latter, 
apply to the facts of the case, including rules of law which have a public law 
character.».  
The following new Art. 187 (3) PILA:  
«Instead of the legal system which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of 
law of another legal system, which rule of law wants to be applied mandato-
rily, may be considered when (according to a universal perception of law) 
legitimate and manifestly preponderant interests of a party so require and the 
facts of the case have a close connection with this other legal system. Whether 
such a rule of law is to be considered is decided having regard to its aim and 
the therefrom resulting consequences for an (according to a universal percep-
tion of law) appropriate decision. The direct consequences of the considera-
tion of such a rule of law are to be governed by this other legal system and the 
indirect consequences – by the legal system designated by paragraph 1.».  
The following new Art. 187 (4) PILA:  
«Where rules of law of different legal systems want to apply mandatorily, each 
of these rules of law is to be applied or considered with regard to those of the 
facts of the case which are situated within the territory of the legal system to 
which such a rule of law belongs. If such territorial limitation is not possible, 
the rule of law to be applied or considered is that which belongs to the legal 
system most closely connected to the facts of the case, whose aim is the wor-
thiest of protection and whose application or consideration would lead to (ac-
cording to a universal perception of law) the most appropriate decision. If 
such a rule of law cannot be determined among all these rules of law, to the 
extent possible, all these rules of law are to be applied and/or considered. The 
third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the consideration 
of the rule of law of a legal system other than the legal system which is desig-
nated by paragraph 1.».  
bb. How the whole Art. 187 PILA would look  
(The first sentence is one which has already been proposed within the current 
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«(1) The arbitral tribunal decides the disputed matter according to the rules 
of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of a choice of law, according 
to the rules of law with which the disputed matter is most closely connected. 
The reference of this paragraph to rules of law encompasses all rules of law 
which belong to the respective legal system and which, according to the latter, 
apply to the facts of the case, including rules of law which have a public law 
character. 
(2) The parties may authorise the arbitral tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono. 
(3) Instead of the legal system which is designated by paragraph 1, the rule of 
law of another legal system, which rule of law wants to be applied mandato-
rily, may be considered when (according to a universal perception of law) 
legitimate and manifestly preponderant interests of a party so require and the 
facts of the case have a close connection with this other legal system. Whether 
such a rule of law is to be considered is decided having regard to its aim and 
the therefrom resulting consequences for an (according to a universal percep-
tion of law) appropriate decision. The direct consequences of the considera-
tion of such a rule of law are to be governed by this other legal system and the 
indirect consequences – by the legal system designated by paragraph 1. 
(4) Where rules of law of different legal systems want to apply mandatorily, 
each of these rules of law is to be applied or considered with regard to those 
of the facts of the case which are situated within the territory of the legal sys-
tem to which such a rule of law belongs. If such territorial limitation is not 
possible, the rule of law to be applied or considered is that which belongs to 
the legal system most closely connected to the facts of the case, whose aim is 
the worthiest of protection and whose application or consideration would lead 
to (according to a universal perception of law) the most appropriate decision. 
If such a rule of law cannot be determined among all these rules of law, to the 
extent possible, all these rules of law are to be applied and/or considered. The 
third sentence of paragraph 3 applies to the consequences of the consideration 
of the rule of law of a legal system other than the legal system which is desig-
nated by paragraph 1.». 
4.2 Summary of the applied connections 
578 
Chapter 23: New rules in Chapter 12 PILA 
 
259 
The examples of rules proposed here cumulate a uniform connection for over-
riding mandatory rules legis causae with a special connection for overriding 
mandatory rules of a third law and treat overriding mandatory rules of the lex 
fori as a type of overriding mandatory rules of a third law. 
 






   
Overriding mandatory rules are rules which, since they protect important pub-
lic interests, need to be given effect (applied or at least considered) in an in-
ternational private law case at any price, including where they do not make 
part of the lex causae.   
These rules can be approached through the material law method (giving effect 
to their content by applying a concept of the lex causae) or the conflict of laws 
method (giving effect to them because of following a conflict of laws rule 
which orders such effect). Here, the conflict of laws method is deemed as more 
correct and is employed.  
The conflict of laws rules of Chapter 12 PILA, which is devoted to interna-
tional arbitration, are silent on the effect of overriding mandatory rules. By 
contrast, Chapter 1 PILA contains several conflict of laws rules (Art. 13, 18 
and 19) which address the topic, but it is not known whether these apply to 
international arbitration, since it cannot be established whether PILA’s rules 
outside its Chapter 12, like them, do so. Hence, there is a gap in the law. 
This lack of express regulation is particularly cumbersome as overriding man-
datory rules represent a big challenge for international arbitration, which is 
because they do not reconcile with some of the conceptual features of the lat-
ter, mostly the dominance of the parties’ will. 
Though some willingness to give effect to overriding mandatory rules is no-
ticed, the current jurisprudence is rather inconsistent. Some international arbi-
trators apply or consider, some do not, and others avoid the topic by basing 
their award on some other concept.  
Analogia legis is a way to handle the problem – but only temporarily until a 
permanent solution is found. In particular, Art. 13 and 19 of PILA’s Chapter 
1 might be applied by analogy; Art. 18 PILA cannot, since in international 
arbitration, overriding mandatory rules of the seat’s law cannot be treated pref-
erentially because that procedure was meant to be distant from this law, espe-









Analogia iuris is difficult to carry out. Albeit it is often felt that an international 
arbitrator needs to apply or consider overriding mandatory rules, due to the 
involvement of many opposing principles, this is not so certain as for one to 
be able to extract a principle capable of being applied in a concrete case.    
The most appropriate solution is to adopt explicit conflict of laws rules in 
Chapter 12 PILA which deal with overriding mandatory rules. The new rules 
could construct a uniform connection for the overriding mandatory rules of the 
lex causae. For the overriding mandatory rules of a third law, they could fore-
see a special connection. The overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori they 
would have to treat as overriding mandatory rules of a third law, hence not 
preferentially, for international arbitration is independent of the seat’s substan-
tive law. Last but not least, with regard to the case of competition between 
overriding mandatory rules of different laws, they could order that: each of the 
concerned rules is applied or considered in relation to those of the facts which 
evolved within the territory in which the law of such a rule is in force; that 
where such fragmentation is impossible, the rule which mostly lives up to cer-
tain conditions (the conditions for consideration of a third law’s overriding 
mandatory rule) is applied or considered; and that where such a rule cannot be 
nominated, as far as possible, all rules are applied and/or considered. When 
drafting the new rules, those of the conflict of laws rules of Chapter 1 PILA 
which deal with the same type of overriding mandatory rules (which would be 
Art. 13 and 19 PILA) could be overtaken and, where necessary, adapted to the 
specificities of international arbitration, thus ensuring at the same time coher-
ence with the rest of PILA and regard to the needs of international arbitration. 
In any case, more important than their content is that the rules are adopted in 
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